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ABSTRACT

AUTHORITY IN POLITICS:
AN INVESTIGATION OF THEIR PLACE
IN RATIONALIST AND INTERPRETIVE THEORY
February

1,

1983

Michael T. Gibbons, B.A., University of Massachusetts
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Professor William E. Connolly

The dissertation is an examination of the relationship amongst

theories of authority, theories of rationality, and theories of

language in rationalist and interpretive theory.

Peter Winch and

Hans-Georg Gadamer are taken as representative of interpretive theory;

Martin Hollis and Jurgen Habermas are taken as representative of
rationalist theory.

The thesis argued is that neither the

interpretive nor rationalist theorists examined satisfactorily address
the problem of political authority

.

Winch and Gadamer make the

mistake of interpreting all forms of authority as instances of
epistemic authority.

Hence, both overestimate the consistency of

the
authority with freedom of choice and action and underestimate

authority.
coercive potential of the exercise of some forms of

Of the

to recognize the
rationalist theorists examined, Martin Hollis fails

roles and personal
extent to which rational evaluation of social

overestimates the
identity is language dependent and Habermas
pragmatics would provide
independence that his theory of universal

rational discourse.

dimension to
All four thinkers have an apolitical
VI

their interpretation of social life.
A theory of democratic authority can,

however, be developed from a

notion of the common good and an expressivist theory of language.
Moreover, the latter also provides the basis for strong evaluation,
hence providing the common ground for both

a

strong form of human

agency which the rationalists seek and legitimate political authority
which interpretive theorists defend.
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CHAPTER

I

THE BOUNDS OF AUTHORITY:
LANGUAGE, PERSONAL IDENTITY AND REASON

Philosophy, Sociology and Understanding

At the beginning of The Idea of a Social Science Peter Winch

claims there are some fundamental misunderstandings amongst social
scientists about the nature of their own enterprise.

These misunder-

standings flow from misconceptions about both the nature of philosophy
and the nature of social science.

Briefly put, the view of social

science and philosophy that Winch wishes to attack, and which he attributes to both early and contemporary empiricists, claims that knowledge

of reality can only be gained through experimental methods and observation.

Proponents of this view hold that philosophy has only

a

limited

role in the investigation of reality, i.e. the clarification of
particular conceptual confusions.

Language is one of the tools used

and scientiby scientists but it is often defective, imprecise, vague

fically unreliable.

It is the role of the so-called underlaborers,

science, to
i.e. philosophers, to clean up this particular tool of
so that the true
eliminate the defects of ambiguity, imprecision, etc.

with their work.
masters of knowledge, i.e. scientists, can proceed

amongst knowledge,
Winch rejects this account of the relationship

language and philosophy.

Philosophy, he argues, has a much broader

underlaborer view.
role than what is prescribed by the
of reality.
of philosophy to elucidate the very concept
1

It is the role

This is not

2

to deny the importance of science in investigating
particular

phenomena.

But this is quite different from determining what
is to

count as part of reality itself.

the bounds of philosophy:

This latter question falls within

"...the philosopher is concerned with the

nature of reality as such and in general

For it is not an

empirical question at all but a conceptual one.

It has to do with the

force of the concept of reality.

This discussion of the concept of reality involves questions about
its nature, how reality is intelligible, and what possible contact the

human mind could have with reality.

Because, Winch argues, there is

no clear separation between the world and our language, the answer to

such questions necessarily involves an investigation of the very

nature of language, a task that goes considerably beyond the solution

of isolated conceptual problems.

The world is available to us only

through our language and the concepts we use.

"The concepts we have

settle for us the form of the experience we have of the world....
world

is_

for us what is presented through those concepts.

The

That is not

to say that our concepts do not change; but when they do that means
that our concept of the world has changed too."
If the philosphers'

2

concern is an investigation of the concept of

reality as such, and if part of that problem involves a discussion of

how reality could be intelligible, then it follows for Winch that
epistemology occupies a central role within philosophy.

Philosophy is

concerned not only with language and the concept of reality but it is
also concerned with contributing to "our understanding of what is

involved in the concept of intelligibility, so that we may better

3

understand what it means to call reality intelligible."^
Winch's views on epistemology also have a bearing on
the study of
social life.

Human behavior is, for Winch, a reflection of man's

understanding of reality and the world around him.

"A man's social

relations with his fellows are permeated with his ideas about
reality.

Indeed,

'permeated' is hardly a strong enough word; social

relations are expressions of ideas about reality."^

philosophy merges with the study of social life.

it is here that

For to demonstrate

how an understanding of reality is possible one must necessarily "show

the central role which the concept of understanding plays in the
activities which are characteristic of human societies,

"in this way

the discussion of what an understanding of reality consists in merges
into the discussion of the difference the possession of such an

understanding may be expected to have make to the life of

a man;

and

this again involves a consideration of the general nature of a human

society, an analysis, that is, of the concept of a human society."^

This latter question, the nature of human society, is itself a

philosophical question that has been usurped by empirical sociology,

claims Winch.

Rules and Meaningful Behavior

As we mentioned Winch argues that there is an extremely close

relationship between language and social reality.

For Winch our

language, concepts and ideas in part constitute our social life.

This

in itself would be sufficient to make language a focus of the study of

human action.

But Winch takes his argument one
step further.

The

relationship that language has to non-linguistic
activities magnifies
the importance of language for the
study of social life,

"it is

because the use of language is so intimately,
so inseparably, bound up
with the other non-linguistic activities
which men perform that it is

possible to speak of their non-linguistic behavior
also as expressing

discursive ideas.

Given this intimacy between language and social

action, the investigator of social life must be
concerned with forms

of activity that have meaning or symbolic content,
Weber,

"we are concerned with human

'behavior'

or,

borrowing from

if and in so far as the

agent or agents associate a subjective sense with it.""^

The social

scientist then is concerned with that behavior which has meaning for
the participants, i.e. that which is rule governed.

very strongly:

"i have

Winch puts it

claimed that the analysis of meaningful

behavior must allot a central role to the notion of a rule; that all

behavior which is meaningful (therefore all specifically human
Q

behavior) is ip^o facto rule governed."
This concept of rule-governed behavior does not include only that

behavior in which rules are clearly formulated and consciously

applied.

Such a notion is too narrow from winch's point of view.

There must, of course, be standards by which one can determine whether

or not action is in accordance with a particular rule but "the test of

whether a man's actions are the application of

a rule is not

whether

he can formulate it but whether or not it makes sense to distinguish
between a right and wrong way of doing things in connection with what

he does."

9

The idea of there being a right and wrong way of going

about things means that the concept
of rule-governed behavior is
bound

to the notion of a mistake,

in other words there must be
some

standard by which to evaluate what one
is doing.
a

The establishing of

standard involves developing external checks
on one's behavior; it

necessarily in requires

a

social context.

This brings us to two

central features of Winch's concept of
rule-governed behavior.

First,

all rules are social rules in the sense that
they could not be

developed outside the context of human society.

Second, they must, in

principle, be discoverable by others.

This view of meaningful behavior as rule-governed and the

relationship between ideas about reality and social relationships
lead
Winch to conclude that one cannot explain

a way of life or set of

activities within a way of life without reference to the concepts,
ideas and intentions which help to constitute that way of life.
example that Winch uses is that of voting.

of ways.

Pulling a lever, making an

'X'

One

One may vote in a variety

on a ballot, raising one's

hand, writing a name down on a piece of paper are all examples of ways

that one might vote.

But none of these constitutes voting per se;

I

may perform each of these activities and may intend and accomplish

something other than voting, either because

I

intend something else by

them or because the context within which they are performed will lead

others to understand them differently.
a lever,

making an

'X',

The point here is that pulling

etc., do not constitute voting unless

I

first

have the concept of voting available to me and, second, that the
voting is understood by others to be part of a process of rendering

collective decisions.

6

Winch claims that this view of human behavior
makes the

application of scientific methods to social action
illegitimate.

This

is not to say that there are no regularities within
social life.

It

does mean that knowledge of such regularities depends on
knowledge of
the intentions of the actor, the concepts available
to him, and the

way of life within which his actions are implicated.

This is

substantially different from the knowledge of regularities in the

physical world.

"Understanding" in the study of social action "is

grasping the point or meaning of what is being done or said.

This is

a notion far removed from the world of statistics and causal laws:

it

is closer to the realm of discourse and to the internal relation that

link the parts of a realm of discourse.

"''"^

The rejection of a causal analysis of individual social behavior
does not in itself eliminate the possibility of a scientific approach

to social life.

It can still be argued that the study of social

action involves the discovery of general regularities, an empirical

task that makes the study of social life the logical equivalent to the
study of natural phenomena.

To this Winch replies:

A regularity or uniformity is the constant recurrence of
the same kind of event on the same kind of occasion; hence,
statements of uniformity pre-suppose judgements of identity.
But .
criteria of identity are necessarily relati e to some
rule; with the corollary that two events which count as
qualitatively similar from the point of view of one rule
would count as different from the point of view of another.
So to investigate the type of regularity studied of the rule
according to which judgement of identity are made in that
enquiry
. .

In case of social science,

the rules that govern criteria of identity

are those employed by the object of the sociologists' study and they

are not a set of criteria developed by the
sociologist himself.

This

does not mean that the social scientist is prevented
from using
concepts to describe social action which are not used
by the

participants themselves.

What it does mean is that these concepts

must "imply a previous understanding of those other concepts
which

belong to the activities under investigation"

."'^

understand the intersubjective rules that govern

We must be able to
a way of life or a

society and this takes us beyond the so-called purely 'objective'

understanding of science.

Forms of Life and Rationality

If social life can only be explained in terms of the ideas,

beliefs and concepts that help constitute it, and if these in turn can

only be understood from within the practices that they grow

in,

it

follows for Winch that the practices of one culture or form of life

cannot be judged logical or illogical, rational or irrational from the
point of view of another. Logic is neither the particular property nor

something independent of specific forms of life:

"criteria of logic

are not a direct gift from God, but arise out of, and are only

intelligible in the context of, ways of living or modes of social
life.

It follows that one cannot apply criteria of logic to modes of

life as such.

For instance science is one such mode and religion is

another; and each has criteria of intelligibility peculiar to

itself ."'^

It is unintelligible to say that "either the practice of

science itself or that of religion is either illogical or logical;

both are non-logical."
It

further follows that if the criteria of logic
and rationality

arise out of modes of life and can be understood
only in the context

of the appropriate mode of life, no single form of
life can claim
monopoly on standards of rationality or criteria of logic.

a

Concepts,

beliefs and practices can only be judged or evaluated in terms
of the
context from which they derive their meaning.

"Something can appear

rational to someone only in terms of his understanding of what is and
is not rational.

If our concept of rationality is a different one

from his, then it makes no sense to say that anything either does or
does not appear rational to him in our sense. ""'"^

We cannot

criticize the concepts, beliefs or practices of another culture in
terms of our own because those concepts, etc. get their sense from the

use that they have in their respective cultures or forms of life.

For

example, when we are examining the Azande belief in witchcraft or

their apparent use of ad hoc generalizations to explain why certain
predictions of oracles do not come to pass, it is a mistake for us to
label these things illogical or irrational.

To do so is to use our

concept of what is rational to judge another belief and this is an
error:

"ideas cannot be torn out of their context in that way - the

relation between idea and context is an internal one.
its sense from the role it plays in the system.

Winch takes his argument one step further.

The idea gets

""^^

It is not just the

case that a concept or belief gets its meaning from the form of life

within which it is found and therefore can be judged rational only in
relation to the context of that form of life.

Judgements about

.

reality are dependent upon context, i.e.
language, as well:
is not what gives language sense.

"Reality

What is real and what is unreal

shows itself in the sense that language
has....

Further both the

distinctions between the real and the unreal and the
concept of
""^'^
agreement with reality themselves belong to our
language.

Science then cannot judge the reality of God and religion
cannot judge
the reality of Galilean astronomy, and neither
science nor religion

can judge the reality of Azande magic.

And just as one cannot

establish the superiority of any particular concept or standard of
reality, neither can one establish a concept of reality that is

independent of language

Winch does not mean that we need to see things exactly the same
way that the participants of a culture or form of life do.

The aim is

not to chuck our own concepts in favor of those that we are studying,
but rather to relate alien concepts, etc. to our own:

"We must

somehow bring S's conception of intelligibility into (intelligible!)
relation with our own conception of intelligibility.

That is, we have

to create a new unity for the concepts of intelligibility, having a
certain relation to our old one and perhaps requiring a considerable

realignment of our categories.

We are not seeking a state in which

things will appear to us just as they do to members of
such a state is unattainable anyway.

S,

and perhaps

But we are seeking a way of

looking at things which goes beyond our previous way in that it has in

some way taken account of and incorporated the other way that members
of S have of looking at things."

18

In

other words, we have to

extend our categories, concepts, meanings and conception of

10

rationality and intelligibility to include those
categories, etc. of

the culture or form of life that we are studying.

A Rationalist Critique (Of Sorts )

Mollis'

critique of Winch is tempered by a sympathy for what Winch

is trying to achieve, namely to show that human action requires
a

different structure of explanation and different criteria of identity

than do the phenomena of the natural world.

Mollis even admits that

rules play a role in shaping social behavior and that explanation in

terms of rules is at first glance convincing:
is intoxicating.

context.

"The concept of a rule

It gives us a neat and workable notion of social

It lets us express systematically those images which are so

appealing - that the world is

a stage,

that roles form a stock, that

interaction is a game, that reality is negotiated, that norms create a
constraining order.

Only because there are rules does the actor have

the moves to make, cards to play, tokens to exchange."

19

Nonetheless Mollis argues that any explanation in terms of rules, and
Winch's account in particular, fails in its attempt to provide a

coherent alternative to naturalistic-causal models of explanation.
Generally speaking. Mollis' criticisms fall into three closely related

categories:
(1)

Explanation in terms of rule-governed behavior is not a

sufficiently strong form of explanation.

In

particular Winch's

criteria of verifiability are incoherent and his account of
rule-governed behavior is absurd.

Winch's position regarding rationality and
reality is mistaken

(2)

and would make the study of social life impossible.

Explanation in terms of rules relies on a metaphysic of
human

(3)

nature that Mollis labels Platic Man and as such leaves
no room for
autonomous human action.

Human nature and social theory

,

in his book Models of Man Martin

Hollis argues that all social theories can be grouped into one of
two

categories distinguished by their metaphysical assumptions about human
nature.

These assumptions about human nature carry implications for

the mode of explanation, the view of rationality, the type of
self-identity, and the possibilities for political practice that a

thinker can entertain.

"Every social theory needs a metaphysic,

I

shall contend, in which a model of man and a method of science

complement each other.

There is no shirking questions of quasi fact,

of normative analysis and of praxis."

The two competing metaphysics of human nature see man as either

passive or active.

Passive conceptions of human nature are most often

found in those social theories which model themselves after the

natural sciences in trying to explain social life in terms of causal
laws.

Such theories are not limited to one discipline in the human

sciences.

Explanations in terms of sociobiology, socialization

processes, or stimulus-response are examples of theories that assume a

passive conception of man according to Hollis.
Such theories rob man of his autonomy.

His choice of action is

not his own but is determined for him by biological factors,

12

socialization techniques and social
structure, or the manipulation of
external environment. His choices

as to who he is and what he will
do

are not his own.

"His identity is thrust upon him
by contact with a

central value system, induction into
socio-economic relationships, his
drives and disposition, the mechanics
of his unconscious or ge etic

progrmming."21

^

each case his self and social identity,
his

beliefs and action are not the result of
his own autonomous, rational

choices but are determined for him either
naturally (sociobiology) or
through an external social world (e.g.
behaviorism),

men are only 'spuriously individuals'.

in such

theories

Lacking a strong notion of

self-identity, men are constituted by either their
natural drives or

the external factors of the social world or some
combination of the
two.

Such a view of human nature tends toward

political practice.

a

manipulative form of

For such a view sees human beings as "essentially

programmed creatures and their output is a function of their input,
with or without intervention of whatever is between, itself presumably
in any case the product of earlier inputs and its own feedback.

Programmed creatures can be manipulated by selecting the input or

adjusting the programmed - hence talk of social engineering." 22

And

again in discussing Plastic Man elsewhere Hollis says, "Apart from any
random factors, the creature portrayed behaves predictably in given

conditions and can be manipulated by engineering the apt
conditions."
)llis
Ho:

23

clearly objects to this manipulative approach to political

practice and use of social theory.

He maintains that even though few

13

societies offer the opportunity to exercise as much autonomy as he

would like to see, the task of social theory

is,

nevertheless, to

inform political practice in such a way that the opportunities to

exercise autonomy are increased.
The alternative to those forms of social theory whose explanatory
value rests upon a metaphysics of human passivity is a form of social
theory that assumes an active role for human beings.

this active view of human nature Autonomous Man.

Mollis calls

Autonomous Man is

the author of his own beliefs, ideas, actions and identity; he is the

product of neither laws nor of social environment.

His actions are

always rational in that the reasons he gives for his actions are the
best possible reasons that one could have for acting in a particular
In short. Mollis is arguing for the assumption of an

situation.

autonomous subject as the basis for social explanation.

"There must

be a self whose activity is sufficient explanation of some social
In calling him Autonomous Man, we are demanding a subject,

behavior.
self, the

I_

of 'The

I

and the Me'

than G.H. Mead intended."

,

perhaps given more independence

Autonomous Man is a subject who is in

control of his life, whose reasons for acting are his own,

reflectively arrived at, yet objectively rational.

Challenges to

those social theories that rest upon a passive conception of man must

provide not only a coherent form of explanation but

a role

for the

active self as well.

Rule governed behavior and explanation

.

According to Mollis there are

in
several reasons why rule-governed behavior, and Winch's version

14

particular, fails to provide a complete, coherent
alternative form of

explanation to those social theories that assume
man.

a

passive view of

First, though rules may help us to identify certain
actions or

behavior they do not tell us why that particular rule and not
some
other is being followed.

"There is an initial gap between saying that'

the rule constitutes the action and that adding that it explains
the
action.

To close the gap we must at least accept sets of rules, under

some such title as 'culture,'
the data of last resort.

'value systems,' or 'forms of life;'

as

Actors can still change a rule or decide to

break one, but only if the changing or breaking of one rule is
explained as the following of another.
to be the final category lapses. "^^

Otherwise the claim of rules

Mollis then argues that the

question that still remains is why does the actor choose to follow
this form of life (say become a monk) rather than another (become a

libertine) or choose to adopt one value system rather than another.

Winch's brand of rule-governed behavior is particularly guilty of
failing to address this last question from Mollis' point of view.
Winch, as Mollis reads him, sees rules as public.

This eliminates the

possibility of a man following a private rule; one cannot follow a
rule unless one already has external standards that enable him to

identify when a rule is broken.

If the social scientist wishes to

study social behavior he should begin with the institutions that

embody the rules.

In

summarizing Winch he says:

"all rules whatever

are to be explained by reference to social institutions.

reality nor individual behavior is
institutions

a given:

Neither

both depend upon

Actions are to be explained by reference to the

15

motives or purposes for which they are done and
motives or purposes,
in turn, by reference to the institutions that
make them

intelligible.

Thus a man's purposes do not determine this way of
life

but, rather, his way of life determines his purposes.

For a way or

form of life gives him a pattern of reasons for action
as well as a

conception of reality."

°

Mollis realizes that Winch believes

actors do have some choice.
rather than another, or,
than another.

A man may choose to follow one rule

for example, make one move in chess rather

However, the array of alternatives is determined by the

institutions of a society and the rules embodied in them.

In the end,

explanation rests with an account of these institutions and not with
individuals.

Hollis claims that if his reading of Winch is correct, Winch's

prescriptions for social science threaten social explanation with
infinite regress.
than another,

For if we ask why an actor follows nne rule rather

the explanation must be in terms of another rule, and

the explanation of that in terms of yet another, and so on.
In

Mollis' words,

"the individual can only experience external

standards of correctness if he already has rules for interpreting what
is said to him....

If these rules

for interpreting what is said also

require external criteria, then the individual will need further rules
for interpreting these external criteria and so ad infinitum."

Winch's response, that explanations must end somewhere,

is
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purely

arbitrary, claims Mollis, and evades precisely the guestions that

Winch is claiming to address.

Mence Winch has failed "to dismiss the

view that 'institutions' are composed of individuals following rules

,

on which they

appeal."
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(individuals) are in principle the final
court of

m

failing to do so Winch has also failed
to provide us

with a compelling alternative to explanation
in terms of individuals.

Not only is the notion of rule governed
behavior an insufficient
or incomplete form of explanation, but any
explanatory value that it

can have is obtained only at the cost of including
precisely what
Winch wishes to reject, i.e. a notion of causality.

To say that one

engages in this or that behavior because of this or that
particular
rule or way of life does not exclude the possibility of one
arguing

that the connection between the way of life and the rule in question
is causal.

In fact it is possible to argue that the way of life is in

fact a necessary condition for behavior to be identified as the type
that it is.

In short,

rules "do not exclude causal connections and do

not amount to an explanation without them."^^

Mollis' third objection to Winch's prescriptions for explanation
in the social sciences are that Winch makes the importance of

quantitative techniques dependent upon the explanation in terms of
rules.

The findings of econometrics, demographics, antnropometry

etc. are significant only if they are explainable in terms of, or

coincide with, a rule followed by the participants.

This is too

restrictive a concept of social significance for Mollis.

There are

many correlations and regularities that are significant but are not

reducible to or explainable in terms of

a

form of life.

Rates of

unemployment, inflation, demographic changes, correlations between

personal habits (say smoking) and health (e.g., lung cancer) are
significant findings regardless as to what the institutions and rules
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of society say.

As Alasdaire Maclntyre has put it,

the social

scientist is interested not just in what people
do but in what happens
to them as well.

And what happens to them is not always explainable

in terms of their own concepts and beliefs.

Related to this point is Mollis' final objections to Winch's

account of rules as explanation,

winch,

says Mollis, will grant that

an explanation of a type of behavior is valid only if it
is recognized

as so by the participants of that way of life.

Explanations of

behavior which are at odds with the explanation given by the

participants must be rejected.

The participants are the last court of

appeal when it comes to the validation of an interpretation and

explanation of their behavior.
position, argues Mollis.

This puts Winch in a peculiar

If the participants agree that an

explanation of their behavior offered by an observer is correct only
after a long process of argumentation and persuasion, is it not the

case that the explanation was significant or correct even before it
was admitted to be by the participants.

If it is,

continues Mollis,

then there must exist some criteria of truth or validations that are
independent of the consent of the participants.

"The growth of

knowledge and progress of enquiry requires that what the scientist
knows in the end was true all along.

He must be entitled to

presuppose some criteria of truth and to impute social significance,
even though his subjects are unaware of what he claims to

discover. "^'^

The social scientist must be able to assume an

epistemologically privileged position.

Without that privileged

position Mollis fears social science will be stymied in its
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accumulation of knowledge.

Rationality and reality.

Hollis also takes issue with winch's

prescriptions for evaluating the rationality of
beliefs, actions and
social practices.
is no single,

The reader will recall that Winch claims
that there

objective standard of rationality that the
investigator

can use to judge social practices in different
cultures or forms of
life.

Standards of rationality grow out of forms of life
and

therefore depend upon social practices.

Hollis takes this to mean

that Winch is claiming that the very rules of logic
are themselves

malleable and that different social relations could very well
promote
or engender different standards or rules of logic.

Hollis will have none of this epistemological and ontological
relativism.

To hold such a position would make social science

impossible.

In

order to understand another culture or way of life we

must establish a bridgehead into that language, i.e. discover some

utterances in the alien culture the meaning of which we can identify
with utterances or proposition in our culture.

Minimally this means

that they and we must share the same reality, i.e. our propositions
must be about the same things in the world.

In

addition we must share

the same standards of truth and falsity, for we must know what
propositions about the shared reality they will consider correct and
which propostions they will condsider false.

Finally, they must obey

the fundamental rules of logic, i.e. the rules of identity,

contradiction and inference.

These rules of logic enable us to

determine the coherence and consistency of statements.

This is what

constitutes the minir^al rationality
that all cultures must ascribe
to.
It is not even a question of
trying to discover whether or not
we

have the same standard of rationality
and the same reality as other

cultures or ways of life.

Standards of rationality and reality
are

not things that can be tested for.

We have to assume the same

standard of rationality and the same reality
in order to even
translate a proposition from their language
to ours.

rationality and reality are in fact

a

Standards of

priori assumptions that the

social scientist is obligated to hold if he
is to begin studying

another culture at all.
In sum, without similar standards of rationality
and reality we

would be faced with a vicious circle.

In order to

understand the

language of another form of life we must know their standards
of
rationality and reality.

But since those standards of rationality and

reality are language bound, according to Winch, we cannot know
these
standards until we know their language.

The only way into the vicious

circle is to assume that we share the same rationality and reality.
Without that assumption the study of other forms of life cannot even
begin.

The Rationalist Alternative:

Ideal Explanation

Mollis claims that there are three dimensions to the structure of

explanation which the social theorist must provide.

explanation must have

a

Every form of

social context or stage, a theory of human

nature (an actor), and an explanatory link that connects the actor to
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the stage.

arbitrarily.

These elements of explanation
cannot be joined

Some views of human nature
would be incompatible with

some types of social context as
well as some types of explanation.

change one of the elements in

a

To

previously consistent and fully

developed explanatory model requires
that one change each of the other

elements as well, or otherwise risk
leaving inconsistencies and gaps
within the model.

Thus, a theory of explanation that
claimed to

support an active conception of the man,
but the social context (or

explanatory link) of which required passive
actors would, in all
likelihood, supply us with, at best, inconsistent
and incomplete, or
at worst contradictory, explanations of
social action.

Social rul es and normative explanation

.

As an ideal form of

explanation Mollis proposes a form of role theory that
he calls

normative explanation.

Normative explanation accounts for human

behavior by exlaining it in terms of duties, obligations
or

requirements that are attached to the particular set of roles
available to the individual whose behavior is to be explained.

These

roles provide the social identity of individuals and are the source of
reasons for action.

Schematically, normative explanation looks

something like the following:

(1)

(2)
(3)

The agent occupied a position with roles Ri-.. Rj
requiring action A;
The agent knew that Ri... Rj required A;
Conditions (1) and (2) were the agent's reasons for
doing A.^^

This is what Mollis takes to be the elementary form of

explanation.

But explanation in terms of roles is only a beginning

.
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and does not yet supply us
with an alternative to those
forms of

explanation whose philosophical
anthropology is
of man.

a

passive conception

if we let the concept of a role
function as an explanaudum

then what we end up with is a passive
conception of man and we fail to
answer the question of why the agent
chose that particular role to
follow and not some other.

m

addition we need to account for the

existence of the roles themselves.

To leave explanation at the level

of roles is to treat roles as pre-given
characters of a play.

We need

to ask questions of who authors the
play and is responsible for the

existence of those roles/characters.

That is, the roles themselves

are to be accounted for, are part of the
explanans.

in other words,

to explain the action of an individual in terms
of the reasons

legitimized by the norms of the role occupied does not
answer the

questions of whether those reasons are the real reasons that
moved the
individual,

"in terms of the actor and character, then, we still deny

that the actor's motives are the character's reasons since the

character has reasons supplied by the play without reference to

matters off stage.

Nor do we accept that the character's reasons are

the actor's motives since this, although holding for a passive homo

sociologicus, leaves no room for autonomy

Normative explanation,

instead of being a full first step in a two step explanation, is half
an answer to the only question.

In strong actionist eyes the actors

are as responsible for the context as they are for deciding what to do
in it."^^

What must be supplied now is an actor who can

autonomously create and choose amongst the social roles in

a

society
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Autonomy and personal identity

.

Mollis argues that this latter

dimension to social explanation
requires

a

strong notion of personal

identity, i.e. an individual whose
ideas, beliefs, motives or reasons
for acting are his own and not
those that he is supplied by virture of
the social position he occupies.

The social theorist who offers an

explanation in terms of reasons must make
the case that the reasons
given are actually those of the actor and
not those that we assume go

along with the positions occupied.

This means that the autonomous

individual must be separable from the character he
plays on the social
stage.
However, two related though slightly different dilemma's
face the

social theorist trying to reach the terrain beyond
that supplied by
roles.

When we say that the autonomous individual must have an

identity beyond that identity supplied by roles we must be wary
of
falling into the trap of positing the existence of pre-social,

atomistic individuals who constitute society through some version of
the social contract.

Additionally, by arguing that we must insure

that the reasons we offer in the explanation of an action are actually

the actor's reasons we are positing the existence of an individual

outside of the characters he plays or social roles he occupies.

There

is then an individual who exists outside of the social context by

which we know him.

But in separating the character from the actor in

this manner we raise the questions of how we can in fact know what

motives and reasons the individual entertains.

Mollis wishes to avoid both of these pitfalls since he believes
that the self is a social self.

But he also wishes to avoid
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identifying the individual with his social positions and roles, for
this results, he feels, in a weak form of actionism, i.e. a plastic
view of man, and no room for individual autonomy.

The route by which

he tries to solve this dilemma is the following:

"Taking the hint

from political theory, we can propose an ambitious thesis about

autonomy.

An autonomous man acts freely by definition.

He acts

freely, only if he has good reasons for what he does (and no better

reasons for doing something else)
acts in his ultimate interests.

what he essentially is.

.

He has good reasons only if he

His ultimate interests derive from

What he essentially is depends partly on what

is essential to his being any person and partly on what is essential

to his being that particular person.

The thesis will be defended in

latter chapters but its ambitions are vain unless the concept of 'what

he essentially

is'

is,

so to speak,

load bearing.

I

shall try to show

next that the load requires strict criteria of identity for persons,

criteria which let the self stand outside the construction.""^*^
To walk the line between an oversocialized view of human nature

that would leave no room for an autonomous subject, and the notion of
an autonomous albeit pre-social atomistic individual, Hollis believes

there is only one possible move to make,

Tliere

must be times when the

actor acting as a character on the social stage is in fact acting in
his ultimate or real interests.

In other words there must be a time

when the real interests of the actor and his responsibilities, duties,
actions or interests of his social position(s) coincide.

"It must

sometimes be true that what the character has good reasons to do, the
actor eo ipso also has good reasons to do.

Necessarily the autonomous
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actor must be himself in some of
his characters.

This in itself does not completely
solve the problem according to
Mollis. For now we must ask how
we know what the real interests
of
the actor are. The dilemma
Mollis thinks we face is something
like
the following.
Either they are interests that he has
outside of

society as would a Robinson Crusoe
that so many theorists are fond of,
or his real interests come part
and parcel with his social positions.

Mollis responds by arguing that even
though the interests of the actor
are acquired in his relations with
others, the actor can reflect upon

the social positions that he assumes and
determine which of those

positions are expressions of his essential self
and hence consonant
with his ultimate interests.

"My own view is that,..., real interests

are acquired within a social contract.

The initial choice of

positions, non-rational in prospect, can be rational
in retrospect or
if irrational in retrospect can be rationally
corrected.

A man can,

I

think, have good reasons to be glad today that he got married

yesterday without thereby having to have had good reason yesterday
to

be glad at his impending change of state... at any rate, we can at
least secure strict identity by making autonomous men define

themselves as characters

when the individuating actions are

essentially those of a character the agent has rationally become, we
get strict identity of persons."

Mollis admits that an individual

could never reflectively evaluate all of the social roles that he

occupies at once.

To do so would require the possibility of the

individual placing himself outside of society altogether and this

Mollis denies is possible.

It

is possible, however,

for an individual

"
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to critically evaluate his different
roles/positions separately and to

decide after the fact that the duties,
obligations, responsibilities,
etc. that constitute or are attached
to that position are expressive

of the individual's real interests.

Objective rationality.

Mollis now has a stage

(a

set of roles that

CO -titute a social context) and an actor (an
individual who
reflectively evaluates the social positions that he
occupies),

what

is still required is an explanatory schema that
connects the actor to
the stage.

action.

The schema that Hollis offers is a theory of rational

Such a schema is the most complete form of explanation for,

as Hollis claims in several places,

explanation.

"Rational action is its own
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Given Mollis' other two elements in his theory of explanation, not
just any theory of rationality will do.

Forms of subjective

rationality where individuals act consiste tly with what they believe
to be the case, whether those beliefs are true or false, are too weak

from Mollis' perspective.

Such a standard of rationality fails to ask

whether the beliefs on which the individual acts are themselves well

founded or rationally held.

Hence, there is the danger that virtually

all action would be judged rational and the concept of rationality

robbed of its explanatory value.

"The result is again to make all

action rational and so to rob us of any hope that a man's real reasons
will, under certain conditions, yield the explanation of his actions.
By saturating the description, we empty the explanation, in readiness

for a causal account of wants and beliefs.

Subjective rationality is
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not strong enough to sustain a
notion of autonomy

Neither is the notion of Zweckrationalitat
rationality.

a

sufficient account

Zweckrationalitat, though not wholly silent
about means

and ends, is in some respects too narrow.

Because of its bias towards

instrumental action it judges certain acts as
non-rational (e.g.
ritual) while at other times failing to judge
the ultimate goals

towards which action is directed.

From Mollis' point of view a

complete account of rationality must be able to judge
the rationality
of ends as well as means to those ends,

irrational or non-rational then,

"if the ultimate ends are

...the means cease to be rational.

This is not to deny that utilitarian and instrumental
accounts of

rational action can be used in causal explanation, without assigning
rational goals.

But autonomous man is relying on the slogan that

rational action is its own explanation and he must be found ultimately
rational goals."^'''
What is needed, according to Mollis, is a theory of rationality by
which we can determine whether or not the actions of an agent are

expressive of his real interests, objectively determined.

The key to

the argument is that rationality is not just a measure of

consistency.

"Rational action can follow on false belief or misplaced

desire but only when the belief is rationally held or the desire

rationally supported.

Objective standards are being invoked, even

though we have to be what they are.

of real interests.

So there is no escaping a notion

Autonomous men are moved not by mere desire but by

desire for what is truly, self-expressive.

The twin effect is to

dethrone instrumental and promote expressive rationality."
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An
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individual's action is to be judged rational if
it is an expression of
some set of real interests that are consistent
with the actor's social
identity, the latter of which the actor reflectively
determines is

consonant with his personal identity.

Summary

.

In short the account goes like this.

A person reflectively

decides that certain characters or social roles are expressive
of what
he essentially is.

These roles have real interests that can be used

to judge the rationality of the goals that the individual chooses
as
well as the means to these goals.

The choice of real interests will

be determined, in part, by the ability of the individual to understand
his situation accurately and thereby decide what action is rational.
In a sense rational action is a skill.

Having adopted a particular

social identity as expressive of my personal identity, the ends that

choose or action that

I

I

engage in can be evaluated as either

supportive or non-supportive, expressive or non-expressive of that

social identity.
As we mentioned befo

,

Hollis claims this standard of rationality

must minimally consist of (1) the law of identity,

(2)

non-contradiction, and (3) a minimal law of inference.

the law of

Without these

minimal rules we could never judge the consistency of statements.

In

addition, we must assume that those whose behavior we are evaluating

share much of the same world that we do.

If they perceive everything

differently than we do we would have no basis for interpreting what is
being said at any given time.
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The Interpretive Rejoinder

in response to Mollis'

points.

First,

I

critique of Winch

i

will focus on four main

shall try to aigue that Mollis'
arguments for a

private rule and language are unconvincing
and that his own account of

personal identity and rationality belie this
account of the
possibility of such a rule.

Second,

I

think Mollis' reading and

criticism of Winch's arguments concerning rationality
and reality
ignore important parts of Winch's argument.

Third,

I

shall try to

demonstrate that Mollis' own theory of explanation
is not as strong an
alternative to causal explanation as he believes.

Finally,

I

will

argue that his theory of explanation and social theory
pose their own
threat to individual autonomy.

Private language and social beinqs

.

In discussing the possibility or

impossibility of a private language it is perhaps helpful to begin by

eliminating what is not at issue.

Quite obviously no one has ever

proposed that an individual or group of individuals could not develop

some secret language or code that could be used to communicate
meanings between individuals and that would, in practice, be available
to a limited number of individuals.

A whole range of human activity,

from children's games to military intelligence work, involves such

private languages and rules.

Similarly, no one is arguing that a

normally socialized individual in temporary isolaton (e.g. the privacy

of one's study) or not so temporary isolation

(a

person lost at sea or

marooned on an island) would be unable to develop rules to follow or
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Change his language to incorporate new
experiences, etc.
issue is whether or not:

a)

What is at

one would have to have been brought
up in

a social setting in order to be
able to act in a manner that we would

describe as rule following, i.e. whether it
makes sense "to suppose
anyone capable of establishing a purely
personal standard of behavior

if he had never had any exprerience of human
society with its socially

established rules.

and

b)

these private rules or language are in

principal learnable by others who could then judge
whether or not the

rule is being correctly followed.
I

will not pretend to offer

a

definitive solution to the questions

of the possibility of private rules.

What

I

will try to do is a) show

that Mollis' account of the possibility of private rules is

unconvincing,

b)

show that things he says elsewhere regarding personal

identity and rationality belie his position regarding the possibility
of private rules, and c) demonstrate that even if we grant the

possibility of such rules they would be of no use in explaining human
action.

Language, rules and Robinson Crusoe

.

As a grounding for his

criticism of Winch that purely private rules are not only possible by
necessary for explaining human behavior Mollis, like others, uses the
example of an isolated Robinson Crusoe.

There are, however, several

oddities about Mollis' argument that are indicative of the difficulty
of making a convincing argument using the Robinson Crusoe example.

The first point to make is that, as will be remembered from the

original story, DeFoe's Crusoe was an Englishman who was shipwrecked.
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Far from being an individual

-outside- of society, he brought all
the

trappings of English culture with him (e.g.

a

strong concept of

private property, an imperialistic attitude
toward the single native

who befriended him, etc.).
a language,

a

Obviously this individual, who already had

culture, a way of life, in short, who knows
what it

means to make a mistake and to follow social
rules, cannot be the same
Crusoe that Mollis speaks of.

DeFoe's Crusoe, having been raised in

English society, knows what it means to have socially
established
criteria of correctness even if he temporarily has no
one present to

check what he says or does at any particular moment.

We must assume

then that the Crusoe of whom Mollis speaks is Mollis' own
invention;

he was never taught
of others.

a

language for he was never raised in the presence

(The question of how he got where he is and exactly how he

was raised must for the time being remain a mystery.)
Mollis claims this mysterious figure would be able to establish

and follow private rules that would constitute a private language in
spite of his never having had any prolonged human contact.

Abandoned

at the pre-linquistic stage of infancy, this individual has

nonetheless grown up to entertain several ideas that go into the

concept of rule following.

Minimally, he must have concepts of and

standards for identity and differentation.

He must have an idea of a

correct or incorrect way of going about things, i.e. he knows what it
means to make a mistake and to correct it.

name things but he develops a language
than just a vocabulary.

For example,

.

Finally, he doesn't just

By a language we mean more

Crusoe's language would have to

distinguish sensations from feelings and, in general, distinguish
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descriptions of inner feelings from
external objects.
There are, however, several
characteristics of our language which

cannot be used to describe Mollis'

(Crusoe's) private language.

First, Crusoe cannot be said to be
self-conscious of his language in

the same sense that we are self-conscious
of ours.

Our notion and

practice of self-consciousness is framed with
reference to other
individuals.

When we become self-conscious or reflective
about our

language, it is often with
be understood by others.

a

mind to how our language will affect or

Mollis'

private rules/language cannot be

subject to the same reflection that our language is,
since there are
no

'others'

for Crusoe to be conscious of.

Second, the idea of a dialogue that informs our use of language

must be absent from Crusoe's private language.

Crusoe's private

language is not the development of shared meanings intended to
communicate; it can at best only be a private record of Crusoe's

reaction to this or that.

Crusoe's language is totally at his

disposal in a way that ours is not at oui disposal.

Both are

conventional, but Crusoe can make this 'mean' anything he wants while
we cannot, and this effects his ability to check his present use of a

particular concept to see if it squares with his earlier use.
Crusoe's language is more like the language of our dream world than

the language of our everyday life.

Related to this is the absence of a distinction between intended
meaning and received meaning.

By definition Crusoe's language cannot

be misunderstood in the sense that ours might be, not just because he
is isolated but because his language is not the developmental process
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or product of a group or way of
life.

Third, Crusoe's language contains
no peformative utterances that

assume the existence of another.

directed at an other, are not

Commands and questions, both

a part of

Crusoe's language.

In

addition, Crusoe's language cannot be used
to manipulate, intimidate,

persuade, propagandize or discuss.
Now what must strike one as peculiar at this
point is Mollis'

choice of terms to describe his Crusoe's actions.

He

(Mollis)

does

not find it odd to use our notions of language
and vocabulary to

describe ausoe's.

But in light of the extremely different nature of

Crusoe's 'language' it cannot be taken for granted that Mollis
can

describe this language with the same vocabulary that is used to
describe ours.

Mollis simply assumes that whatever it is that Crusoe

is doing is indeed a language.

But from Winch's point of view this is

precisely what is in question.

In effect Mollis fails to address

whether or not a language can be construed simply as a sign system
used to designate or identify phenomena in the external world, or

whether a language actually involves more than this, e.g. expressing
intentions, feelings, and sensations.

The former is a fairly simple

system of corresponding signs and phenomena; the latter involves a
vocabulary and a grammar,

language to develop within

depth if you will that requires the

a
a

community of language users.

The sign

system of a single user could not, for instance, make the distinctions

between intended meaning and construed meaning.

Because others do not

exist for whom the intended meaning could be misconstrued, the

distinction would never come up and would make no sense to the
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Defoeian language user.

Moreover, one of the questions that arises
in

the distinction between intended meaning
is the questions of the

sincerity of the speaker.

But sincerity is an intention that

presupposes the existence of others; it is an example
of how some of
the most basic elements of language are
intersubjectively founded.
In light of the array of activities that
our language can perform

that Crusoe's does not, it cannot be taken for
granted, as Mollis
does, that one can use the terms language, meaning, etc.
to describe

the activity that Crusoe performs.

To make his case Mollis would have

to show that the activities that our language makes possible,
the

relations and concepts that shape the very nature of language that we

use intersubjectively, are not central features of language.
Intention, sincerity, ambiguity, irony, pity, deception, persuasion,

manipulation, dialogue, conversation, question, response, are just
some of the concepts and activities that are absent from Crusoe's

language and without which we would be unable to employ our
language .^^

Personal identity & social identity

.

Mollis' own arguments

concerning social and personal identity seem to undermine his

arguments concerning the possibility of private rules and language.
If I am said to be following a personal standard of conduct,

i.e. a

rule, one of the things that is implied by such a claim is that

I

am

potentially self-conscious about having my actions be consistent with
some ^et of ideas or beliefs that
action.

This means that

I

I

believe to be important guides for

must be able to determine when my actions

are and are not consistent with
those ideas and beliefs.

short, be capable of critical
self-examination.

I

I

must, in

must be able to

reflect upon my actions and adjust my
behavior according to the rule

claim to be following.

Additionally,

I

must be able to examine the

I

usefulness, propriety or appropriateness of
any particular rule if the

occasion warrants it.

This means that

I

must be aware of the context

of my rule following and be able to
discern new circumstances or

evidence that might possibly have

a

bearing on my continuation of a

particular rule, or on the revision of the rule to fit
new

circumstances unanticipated in its initial formulation.

Such a

picture portrays a being who has not merely learned a
trick, or an

individual not merely conscious of his activity, but rather

a

being

who is, potentially at least, self-conscious, who has the
potential
for self-reflection.

This is a brief sketch of the strong notion of

personal identity that Hollis claims underlies his social theory and

defense of autonomy.

Hollis also argues, however, that an individual conscious of his
activity in the manner just described cannot develop outside of

relations with other human beings.

The self who would possibly

exercise these critical abilities is a social creature:
"Consciousness does not, even could not, operate in

a

vaccuum and

bodies are just bodies unless relations among them are endowed with

shared meaning. "'^^

If this consciousness is socially developed then

without some relations with others we obviously have no consciousness
and thus no self-consciousness.

Hollis takes this to mean that we

could also have no autonomous subjects, for the possibility of the
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latter rests on a strong notion of
the self that goes with

self-consciousness.

But if this is the case then the
status of

Mollis- claims concerning the
possibility of a private rule and

language comes in to question.

More than that, the implication seems

to be that whatever else Crusoe is
he is not an autonomous subject,

for autonomy is characteristic of only
those with strong notions of

personal identity and pe sonal identity cannot,
argues Mollis, be

developed outside of relations with others.

Intentions, rules and explanation

.

Mollis' argument in favor of

private rules faces one additional problem.

individual is following

a

To claim that an

rule is to make a claim not just about the

behavior of the individual but of his intentions and beliefs as
well.
It is to say that he could potentially recognize
contraventions of

that rule as well as circumstances in which the following of that rule

might not be appropriate.

To say that an individual is following a

private rule is to say that he is following some rule guided by
beliefs, intentions, etc. that are in principle unavailable to us.

would not know what the nature of the private rule was.

We

Indeed, we

would probably not know that he was following any rule at all.

For to

be able to say that someone is following a rule, even an unspecified

one, is not only to be able to pick out some regularities in his

behavior but to be able to specify the point behind such

a rule;

i.e.

it means we must be able to say something of the inte tions guiding
the rule.

In order to

recognize the action as rule following we would

have to be able to give examples of contraventions of the rule or

specify instances in which the
following of the rule would be

inappropriate.

Otherwise we would be unable to
distinguish the

so-called rule following from mere
regularity.
Thus, although we can say that
one can imagine (in a very loose

sense, e.g. in the way that we
can all imagine a unicorn) an

individual following a private rule, we
could never say that this or
that particular individual was following
a private rule.

To do so

would be to claim that we could recognize
some behavior as not random
or mere regularity but as the

actor's standpoint.

'same'

as some other behavior from the

But to do this would go quite a ways towards

specifying, at least generally, what the rule
in question is.

In

short, to be able to claim that an individual
is following a rule,

private or otherwise, is to be able to specify
enough of that rule to

refute the claim that it is a purely private rule.

In other words,

however possible it is to 'imagine' someone following a
private rule,
we would never be able to point to particular examples
without ex-post
facto explanations from the actor in question.

To be able to describe

an activity as rule governed is to claim that it is activity governed
by a rule that is in principle discoverable by us and thus a
social

rule.

Thus, even if private rules can be said to exist in some still

mysterious sense, they are virtually useless in explaining social
action.

Yet Mollis at times wants to locate final explanation with

such private rules'.

Rationality and social action

.

Many commentators on Winch have argued

that Winch's proscriptions for social science constitute an extreme
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fortr,

of relativism,

in all fairness it must be
pointed out that Winch

is in part responsible for what
the point he is trying to make.

I

will aigue is a misunderstanding of
At times he does make statements
that

lead the reader to believe that he thinks
standards of rationality are

incomensurable:

"Something can appear rational to someone only
in

terms of his understanding of what is and is
not reational.

If our

concept of rationality is a different one from
his then it makes no

sense to say that anything either does or does not
appear rational to

him

m

our sense."

Such statements can lead the reader to infer

that Winch thinks that standards of rationality in
different societies
are totally incomparable.

Similar statements concerning reality have led some commentators
to claim that Winch also believes that reality itself is
different for

different cultures or ways of life:
language sense.

"Reality is not what gives

What is real and what is unreal shows itself in the

sense that language has."^^

It isn't just that there is a single

reality differently perceived.

The implication seems to be that there

is no single external reality that can be used as a check on a set of

beliefs or way of life.

Reality and rationality are relative then.

No single form of either can be used to judge another for there is

virtually nothing that they can be said to share.
Such readings of Winch are not uncommon.

ignore important parts of Winch's argument.

Yet

I

believe that they

These are not just

qualifications to the above claims but points that lead one to see
Winch's argument in a substantially different light.

I

would also

argue that these ignored dimensions render Winch's argument more
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plausible than that of many of his
critics, specifically more

plausible than Mollis'.
The reading given above juxtaposes
its own view of rationality vis
a

vis Winch in the following way.

Winch believes, it is said, that

there are no standards of rationality
and reality that are common to
all ways of life.

Anything, then, can be interpreted as
rational,

if

anything can be interpreted as rational
then the concept is
impoverished; it no longer can play the
critical role for which it was

originally intended.

"The result is again to make all action
rational

and so to rob us of any hope that a man's
real reasons will, under

certain conditions, yield the explanation of his
actions."^®

To say

then that this or that action is rational is to
say nothing about it
on this account.

Competing theories of rationality, on the other hand, because
they
require that actions, beliefs, etc. conform to the minimal rules of
logic, promise to offer more fully developed concept of rationality

according to their proponents.

To say that a belief or an action is

rational or irrational in this sense is to convey
information about the action or belief,

a

certain amount of

(e.g. that it does not

contradict other beliefs, etc.).
This interpretation of the debate between winch and rationalists
is not quite accurate, however,

winch does not deny that there are

certain minimal criteria of rationality.

Indeed, the concept of

rationality is, for Winch, central to language per se:

"Rationality

is not just a concept in a language like any other; it is this too,
for,

like any other concept it must be circumscribed by established

use:

a use that is

established in language.

But

I

think it is net a

concept «hich a language may,
as a matter of fact, have
and equally
not have, as is, for instance,
the concept of politeness.
It is a

concept necessary to the existence
of any language:

to say that of a

society that it has a language
is also to say that it has a
concept of
rationality."^^

Although the concept of rationality
must be "circumscribed by

established use" this does not mean
that concepts of rationality in

different languages or ways of life can
be totally different,

in fact

Winch insists that their use of language
must have some features that

are similar to what we would call rational,
i.e. to our concept of
rationality.

"There need not perhaps be any word functioning
in its

language as 'rational' does in ours but at
least there must be
features of its members' use of language
analagous to those features

of our use of language which are connected with
our use of the word
•rational'.

Where there is a language it must make a difference
what

is said and this is only possible where the saying
of one thing rules
out, on pain of failure to communicate, the saying
of something

else."^°

We could not say that this or that culture has a language

unless there were features of the language that resemble what
we would

call rational.

But that is not because there is a concept of

rationality that we entertain that is superior to others,

it is not a

case of it being our concept of rationality so much as it is
question of the requirements that any language must meet.

a

The

mistake, from Winch's standpoint, is for us to assume that we have

monopoly or some special access to this notion of rationality.

a

This in itself would seem
to indicate that Winch
has been

misinterpreted by many on the
problem of rationality.

But Winch

actually takes his argument
concerning rationality one step
further.
TO say that to have a language
is to have a concept of
rationality,
and then also to say that
there must be similar uses if a
language
between different languages that
constitute a concept of rationality,
is to say not only must some
uses of language be the same but
that

different cultures must think about
their language in similar, though
not identical, ways.

Many of Winch's opponents argue
that this

consists of the minimal rules of logic
that Mollis outlines.

As we

have pointed out Winch is not denying
that there must be common

features to languages of different cultures.

What he is saying is

that the criteria of logic are by
themselves insufficient for making

judgements of rationality:

"the forms in which rationality expresses

itself in the culture of a human society cannot
be elucidated simply
in terms of the logical coherence of the
rules according to which

activities are carried out in that society.

For,

as we have seen,

there comes a point when we are not even in a position
to determine
what is and what is not coherent in such a context of
rules, without

raising questions about the point which following those rules
has in
society.

And again later when discussing judgements of

rationality, "First, as

I

have indicated, these possibilities are

limited by certain formal requirements centering around the demand for
consistency.

But these formal requirements tell us nothing about what

in particular is to count as consistency, just as the rules of

prepositional calculus limit, but do not themselves determine what are

to be proper values of P,

Q,

etc.

We can only determine
this by

investigating the wider context
of life in which the activities
are
carried on."^^
^^^^^
addition to the formal rules of
consistency, know what counts
as a particular instance
of something.
Before I can say that in an alien
culture, persons x, Y and z are
believed to be witches,

I

must know what it means for
someone to be a

witch, what the point behind
witchcraft is, and what the rules of

evidence are regarding that way of
life.
If the argument to this point
has been correct, then far from

offering an impoverished account of
rationality Winch's concept is in
fact more fully developed and richer
than those who would be content

with merely the requirements of formal
logic.

The latter fail to take

into account the fact that the formal
rules of logic tell us nothing
about the meaning of particular beliefs
or statements.

This problem is particularly troublesome
for Mollis.

His attempt

to establish an objective standard of
rationality in terms of some set

of real interests would,

I

think, undermine his attempt to take into

account the importance of any social context.

It will be

remembered

that Mollis tries to establish a way of judging the
rationality of
goals as well as the rationality of means.

shown to be expressive of what

I

If certain goals can be

take to be my self-identity, then it

is rational for me to adopt and pursue them,

in addition we can,

in

principle, establish the one best way to achieve these goals, he
claims.

But what is not clear still is what he means precisely by an

objective standard of rationality, i.e. how we would determine that
some goals or forms of expression are objectively rational or how such
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goals cculd be truly expressive
of something that a person
essentially
IS.

For example, it may be the case
that in the nineteenth century
as
a member of the working
class it would have been rational
for me to

pursue a way of life in hopes of
building, both personally for my own
family and collectively with others
for our progeny, a better life for
them.

The evidence available at the time
would have been convincing

enough to indicate that my sacrifice
could result in a better life for
them.

As

I

work to make the economic pie bigger,
so to speak,

am

i

working for the well-being of my offspring
and their children.

I

can

sacrifice now, and rationally so, so that my
children will not have to.
Such a vision, though once rational, appears
somewhat less

rational today,

in a

society in which such sacrifices are sometimes

scorned by those in whose name they are made, or if
not scorned, in a

society in which it appears that such a sacrifice
is unlikely to
secure for my offspring a life free from the pressures
and condition

that

I

presently face, to commit oneself to such a culture of

sacrifice seems self-defeating.

In other words,

goals, beliefs or

ideas that appear rational in one time and place may appear irrational
at a different time because of the social developments of that

society.

Certain types of self-identity will appear rational in one

social setting because, among other things, they are sustainable and
the expectations (i.e., roles, duties, obligations, responsibilities,
etc.) that go along with them are in my power to meet.

However a

different social position or historical situation may make the
adoption of those same types of self-identity impossible to sustain or

make it impossible for .e
to .eet those expectations
that are tied to
it.
in the first instance
my adoption of that
sustainable, attainable

self-identity appears (at least
at first glance) rational;
in the
second instance my adoption of
a self-identity that is
unsustainable
or unattainable appears less
rational.

The import of this point is

that self-identity is more
context or socially dependent than
Mollis
seems willing to admit.
Thus it is not clear how Hollisobjective
standard of rationality would account
for the changing conditions of
an individual in the situation
described above.

It seems that he

cannot simply say that the goals that
are rational in one society or
time in history are irrational in
another. That implies relative
standards of rationality which he adamantly
denies are acceptable.
This dilemma is forced on Mollis
because his method for securing what

he believes is a strong rational
actor eliminates any historical

dimension from that actor's real interests.

I

think this is the price

he pays for a notion of -real interests'
with the type of distance he
is pursuing.

On the other hand, someone adopting Winch's
structures regarding

rationality could more easily (though not necessarily
without
difficulty) explain and account for the fact that what
appeared
rational in one contest appears irrational in another.

Winch, aware

of the connection between rationality and the possibilities
presented
in a way of life,

could account for the changes that might take place

between historical periods and thereby explain why

a

personal identity

and personal way of life that seemed so attractive at one point in

time might seem unsustainable, self-defeating, or irrational at

another point in time.

But it is unclear what
alternative forms of

explanation and evaluation are
available to Winch in the event
the
actions of participants fail
to live up to their own
standards of
rationality. Nor is Winch totally
convincing except to sympathetic
readers that his account of
rationality is not in the end of

form of

relativism,

winch does say that the phenomena
of birth, sex and death

provide the threads around which we
can weave comparisons of
standards
of rationality, but he provides
no hint as to what this might
look
like.

The range of beliefs about birth,
sex and death found in

different cultures seems to repose the
problem of what can be
considered rational or what it would mean
to say the beliefs of a

certain culture about birth, sex and
death were rationally held.

Rational explanation and cau<^?^1ity.

Throughout his writings Mollis

emphasizes that one of his goals is to provide
an alternative of sorts
to causal explanation.

Explanation in causal terms, though it has its

strengths, namely its single mode of explanation
according to Mollis,
lacks a self to appy the explanation to.

tendencies, causal explanation denies

a

Because of its deterministic
place to human autonomy.

However, there remain a variety of ambiguities in both
Mollis'

intentions as to what he is proving and his account of his
alternative.
First, it is not quire clear what Mollis means when he says
he is

offering an alternative to causal explanation.

At times one gets the

impressions that causal explanation is to be replaced altogether.

must accept either Mollis' theory of explanation with its active
conception of man or side with the determinists and their plastic

One

conception of

rnan.

^ere

is no ground in the
middle,

no compromise
between the two modes of man and
hence no compromise between
the two
types of explanation. He says,
.'in the broadest terms,
passive and
active conceptions vie with one
another, each requiring a different
model of explanation and each
model of explanation presupposing
a

(different) view of human nature. "^^

addressing the same issue:

"i

And elsewhere, while

undertake to show that there can be
no

compromise and to propose a notion of
the autonomous self together
with its missing mode of explanation."^^
At other times one gets the impression
that Hollis sees the two

types of explanation as complimentary.

One should try to explain as

much as possible using the model of rational
action.
one can turn then to causal explanation,

m

When this fails

this latter case the only

problem with social science is that it has allowed
the net of causal
explanation to be cast a bit too far.

It isn't that causal

explanation is an illegitimate form of explanation for
social action.
It's just that it has been used to describe action that
could more

accurately be described by other means.

As long as social theorists

recognize the limits of it and the place of rational explanation,
no

harm has been done.
I

will consider both of these possibilities together.

I

shall try

to show that in both cases Hollis fails to meet his own requirements

for limiting the scope of causal explanation and its plastic model of

man and that according to his own arguments his form of rational

ex:planation would have very little purchase in explaining social life.
It is part of Hollis'

argument that in order for his form of

rational explanation to
succeed as an alternative
to forms of
explanation that assume a
plastic view of man, he must
offer a strong
notion Of personal identity.
As we have earlier
outlined, by a strong
notion of personal identity
he means one in which the
identity of
actors can not be said to be
determined by the social or
natural
environment.

Mollis tries to supply

a

strong notion of personal identity,

without falling into pre-social
atomism, by arguing that individuals
can retrospectively evaluate
their positions and roles in
society and
thereby determine which are expressive
of themselves.

Having done

this, we can say that an actor
has autonomously chosen his own

identity, and we can then evaluate
to what extent his actions are

rational in terms of his choice of personal
identity.
be determined objectively,

The latter can

for social theorists will be able
to

determine, according to Mollis, the single
best course of action for
the individual in question.

However, there are several objections

that Hollis must meet before such an account
of social explanation can
be convincing.

First, it is unclear just how a theory of human
nature will

influence the choice of personal and social identity.

At times Hollis

states that human nature must be ahistorical, to say
that it changes
with cultures is to fall into a form of relativism
that Hollis finds

unacceptable,

if human nature is a constant the question that
arises

is what is it that individuals reflectively and
autonomously choose

amongst.

It would seem that a good deal,

personal identity is already determined.

if not all, of their
If human nature is as

constant as Mollis seems to believe,
then only those things that are
consonant with that nature can be
expressive of my nature and hence
much of my own personal identity.
Such a view is far from the

autonomous individual that Mollis seeks
to defend from naturalism.
The second point that Mollis must
consider when making an argument

for a stront notion of personal identity
is that individuals placed in

different social contexts in which the range
of possible

self-interpretations are not identical may make
different choices
regarding their roles and choice of social
action,

if range and

actual choice of self-interpretation varies
with different

contemporary social contexts, then it seems that any
notion of

self-identity is going to be more socially dependent than
Mollis
admits.

For example, it is conceivable that an individual placed in
a
society in which personal worth, recognition, security for one's
family, and the availability of life chances were dependent upon

individual achievement and personal wealth would rationally adopt

a

personal identity consonant with that environment, particularly if
alternatives were seen as foolishly self-sacrificing, a sign of
weakness, or a sign of inability.

On the other hand, in a society in

which unbridled personal ambition and individualism are seen as

evidence of evil, a distorted personality, or

a

disruption of one's

relationship with family and friends, a significantly different

personal ide'^tity would likely to be rationally adopted by the same
individual.

Mollis has no way of explaining this variability of

different identities.

Mis notion of objective real interests seems to
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leave little room for
maneuver between significantly
different
cultures or historical
periods.
in other words,

reflective evaluation of
the alternatives

available to one will not
then necessarily yield

a single rational
Rational individuals could
disagree, or a single rational
individual could, after different
experiences, chose differently,
each case the choice would
be influenced, though
not necessarily
determined, by the evidence and
range of alternatives avilable.
Mollis seems to recognize
this at times,
several places he
Claims that the self, because
it is a social self, is the
result of
self definition within a range
of shared meanings.
But this means, at
the very least, that
self-inteipretations not available within,
or
excluded from any particular web
of meanings, are either
unavailable
to an actor or irrational if
adopted,
if this is true then my

Choice.

m

m

self-identity is at least in part
constrained by the meaning available
to me in my language. One does
not have to agree that language
is a

prison-house to recognize that it exerts
a limiting effect.

But to

recognize this inhibiting influence is
to abandon the claim for the
strong notion of personal identity such
as Mollis wants as well as to

abandon the strong claim that human
nature is a historical constant.
Since Mollis' theory of objective
rationality is intimately bound to

this type of strong notion of personal
identity, the possibility of
achieving the goal of his form of rational explanation
is subsequently
imperiled.
I

think that the crux of Mollis' problem is that in
order to

connect the strong notion of personal identity to the
social roles and
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context that .a.e that
identity a social identity,
he needs what has
been described as an
expressivist view of language.
This

interpretation of language sees
language not just as a tool
or sign
syste. for designating and
identifying the external
world.
Language
does perform this function.
But .ore importantly the
expressivist
view of language sees language
as the medium through
which we become
aware of our ideas, feelings
and sensations; it is
the phenomena that
makes reflection on those ideas,
feelings and sensations
possible.
But this view of language
insists that language is also
a the property
of a community and not the tool
or instrument of a private
individual
as Mollis believes it can be
and needs to be. As we shall
see in the
last chapter, it is the expressivist
view of language that provides
the type of strong evaluation
that would be the hub of Mollis'
strong

notion of personal identity; but at
the same time it precludes the
private rules and type of distance from
language and ways of life that
Mollis insists are the foundation of
Autonomous Man.^^
The final objection to Mollis- theory
of explanation concerns the

accuracy of Mollis' model of rational
explanation as an actual

description and explanation of what actually
occurs.

At one point he

admits that his choice of Autonomous Man as the
metaphysical basis for

rational explanation is not grounded on
the case.

Me says,

"...

I

a

claim of what is actually

propose to take Autonomous Man as not a

description but, so to speak, a prescription,

in as

much as all

social theories presuppose a view of human nature, an
active

conception holds that men are potentially autonomous.

Yet not

everyone succeeds in acting autonomously all the time - not all
social
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action can be explained
negatively.

And elsewhere he
states:

"I want tc suggest finally
and fleetingly that
the free social
individual is the .an who
creates his own social
identity by acting

rationally within a consistent
role-set of his own choosing
and
becomes what he has chosen
by accepting his 'duties'
as his duties
Few .en take this course
and few societies offer
it."" The import
cf such remarks is that
Hollis' ideal of rational
or normative
explanation seems to have little
in common with how men
usually act in
social life. If this is the
case, if rational explanation
is what
Mollis would like tc see
rather than what actually
occurs, and if
"Whatever is beyond the scope
of the ideal is fair game for
a causal
58
account.",
then it seems that much of
what occurs in social life
must be explained precisely
by that model of explanation
that Hollis
seeks to reject, i.e. causal
explanation,
if
fact few societies
offer the alternative of acting
autonomously (and therefore

m

rationally, according to Hollis),
and if few men take that alternative
when it is offered it seems to
follow from the way Hollis has set
up

the choice of alternatives that his
form of rational explanation has
failed to supplant causal variants
relying on plastic conceptions of
man.

in some respects Hollis has made
a better case for his opponents

than he has for himself.

For he has said in so many words that
one

must choose between the two types of
explanation, and yet his, he
admits, describes (at best) only occasional
instances of social life.
It

would seem to follow from this that one would
be better off using

causal model of explanation exclusively (if in
fact there can be no

compromise between the two forms of explanation) or
at least using

a
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causal explanation as the
primary form of explanation.
These Shortcomings of
Hollis' account of rational
action and
explanation can he traced, in
part, to the nature of
choice that
Hollis seems to believe is
available to actors. There
seems to be a
tension in Hollis between
his recognizing the
necessity of at least
some limits to choice and
the desire to be able
to break those
limits,
in the end Hollis opts
for the latter.
Hence, Hollis. theory
Of Autonomous Man is the
actor who not only chooses
between

alternatives but who determines
the alternatives as well;
it is a
theory of radical choice.
But surely any order implies
some limits,
allowing some possibilities and
not others,

without such limits it'is

difficult to imagine how Hollis'
rational actor's choice can be
anything other than the exercise
of pure will.
The fact that in the
end this view of man in unsustainable,
coupled with the way Hollis
sets up the alternatives between
rational explanation and causal

explanation, almost guarantee that causal
explanation will appear as
the more convincing alternative.

Real interests and autonomy.

As a model of explanation Hollis posts

an actor who has a set of rationally
arrived at goals.

What makes

these goals rational is that they correspond
or are consistent with

a

set of real interests that are attached to
th actors social roles, the

latter of which is are expressive of the actor's self,

in Hollis'

words, a person "has good reasons only if he acts in
his ultimate

interests.
is.

His ultimate interests derive from what he essentially

What he essentially is depends partly on what is essential
to

.
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being any person and
partly pn what is
essential to his being
that
particular person...^O The
latter, presumably,
are In part the real
interests that are attached
tc .y rcle which I
have reflectively
determined tp be expressive
pf myself. Thus, pnce
I reflectively
decide that being an
academician is expressive of
my self, it can be
determined what my real
interests are regardless
of what I may think
them to be. Similarly,
to say that I have
certain ultimate interests
by the very nature of my
being a person, and then
to add that this
nature is ahistprical, is
to say that It is
unaffected by what
my beliefs about myself
are.

^sn

Mollis admits that the question
of real or ultimate interests
Shades into the area of ethics
and the Good Society.

But he

repeatedly hesitates to enter
into a discussion of what that
Good
Society looks like, admitting
that such a discussion is
nonetheless
necessary for a complete social
theory
in sum,

Autonomous Man is the individual who
acts rationally,

a

person acts rationally by acting in
their real or ultimate interests
determined by the roles that are
expressive of one's self and an
unspecified, ahistorical human nature.

autonomy and real interests:

There is a link between

acting autonomously is dependent upon

(consists of) acting to fulfill my
real interests.
There are two related objections
to this account of real interests

and autonomy.

The first is that the nature of this
reflective process

that would enable one to rationally
determine what is self-defining or

expressive is still very unclear.

This is exemplified by the fact

that although he chides winch for making
man always subject to public
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rules and supposedly
leaving no roo. for
distance fro. rules, and
therefore no roo. for
personal autonomy, he
hi.self states that -i
confess to believing that
there can be no self
where all rules are
Played with distance.... In
this sense .an is a
social ani.al. But,
given existing social forms
to play without distance
is to be
passive. The free .an therefore
distances himself from the
outward
aspects of his roles, while
choosing and commiting himself
to real
roles whose duties are among
his motives...^^
Presumably these
•real'

roles are not social roles,
otherwise the distance they
are
supposed to provide would disappear.
But this still leaves unanswered
a myriad of questions about
such real roles,

without further

elaboration it is not clear how
Hollis' autonomous individual
has any
more distance than Winch's
rule-governed
agents.

At times Hollis-

version of Autonomous Man looks
alarmingly like

Englightenment versions of the human
subject and freedom,

immune to

religious and cosmologically imposed
identity, the subject of the

Enlightenment is self-defining and
self-causing.

He looks to neither

religious dogma nor to established
tradition to find meaning and

purpose for this life; he provides it
himself.

In its most extreme

version, the Enlightenment subject makes
the existence of God

epistemologically dependent upon himself.

However, as Charles Taylor

has pointed out, "The self-defining
subject of modern epistemology is

thus naturally the atomic subjectivity of the
psychology and politics

which grew out of the same movement. "^^

This atomistic view of

psychology and politics with its implicit mechanistic
and technocratic
approach to social life is precisely what Hollis seeks to
avoid.

For
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the latter is as much
a threat to
Autonomous Man as the

oversocialization that Hollis
feels
leeis result-,
results f.om
from explaining human
.

Classical Enlightenment trap,
Enlightenment

it see.s he wants the

•

•

autoncy that the
'

.s

episte.ologlcal subject has
without the atc.istic
mechanistic approach to
psychology and politics that
accompanied it.
TO salvage the strong
version of autonomy without
having to
transport the baggage of
atomism into his social
theory Mollis
introduces what he takes to be
a strong version of
personal identity,
albeit one that is in the end
the identity of a social
self, yet this
version of personal identity
that he settles for rests
upon an
approach to language that is more
closely allied with the winchian
position than the view of autonomy
that Hcllis seems intent on

defending.
As we pointed out earlier,
Hollis thinks that his version of

Autonomous Man is imperiled unless
rock bottom explanation rests
with
some version of private rules
that allow the subject to be

self-causing and self-defining.

But to avoid the atomism that
plagues

some political theories (e.g., the
old Enlightenment position) he
imports a theory of personal identity
that assumes a social context,

shared meanings, and which is arrived
at through reflective evaluation
that can only be partial at any given
time.

Thus,

I

can only evaluate

my personal identity in terms of the
array of roles and meanings
available to me within a given social context.

Even then

i

can only

evaluate some of my roles or part of my identity
in terms of other
roles and meanings at a given time.

To be able to evaluate all the
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roles and meanings available
to me at once would require
that I be
able to place myself completely
outside of my social context and

language, and not even Mollis
believes this to be oossible.

But this version of personal
identity undermines his claim that
explanation must, in the end, rest

with some version of private rules

and is amazingly similar to the
Winchian claim that all specifically
human behavior is governed by
rules that can only be developed in

contact with social life,

in fact this view of personal
identity

seems to rest upon an expressivist
approach to language that

characterizes the Winchian (and similar)
positions.

But if Mollis is

going to accept the expressivist
approach to language and pin his

hopes for

a

notion of personal identity on it, he will
have to revise

his view of the relationship of Autonomous
Man to social rules and

language.

But perhaps more disturbing than this incoherent
view of autonomy
and personal identity is the threat to freedom
that Mollis' account of

real interests poses.

When one ties a notion of real or ultimate

interests, which have implications for some broader notion of
the Good

Society, with an epistemologically privileged position of the
social
theorist, new tendencies emerge that represent a new threat to freedom

and autonomy.

Its most extreme version is described by Hegel in the

dialectic of Absolute Freedom and Absolute Terror.

There Hegel argues

that the Terror of the French Revolution is the necessary outcome of
the Enlightenment and its view of itself.

The Enlightenment sees

itself as a universal rational consciousness that can determine what
is universally just.

This is not arrived at by an aggregation of
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particular or individual views
or interests.

It is arrived at by pure

insight on the part of the
universal knowing subject.

The universal
knowing subject tries to transform
the world according to Its
universal reason. This Hegel calls
Absolute Freedom:
rational

subjectivity unencumbered by reality
outside of itself.

It

refuses to

recognize the legitimacy of any
dissenting view or the truth of any
independent reality.
Practically speaking, this means that
all individuals must will
the same thing.

The universal rational subject
cannot tolerate

different realities of interpretations of
reality or independent
structures outside of this universal will.

universality is threatened.

Otherwise the claim to

That which is at odds with, or those who

disagree with the universal will, are
portrayed as representing

particular wills, i.e. they are self-interested,
opposed to the
universal or general interest.
But such universality is, according to Hegel,
impossible.

The

universal, rational will, in order to become actual,
must find

embodiment in a single individual or group.

But no single individual

or group could ever have the total knowledge that is
claimed the

universal will has.

Triose

who represent themselves as the universal

knowing subject are merely a particular group or faction which usurps
the position of u'^iversal consciousness that excludes others.
Hegel's words:

Just as the individual self-consciousness does not find
itself in this universal work of absolute freedom qua
existent substance, so little does it find itself in the
deeds proper and individual actions of the will of this
freedom. Before the universal can perform a deed it must

In
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individuality and put at
'^^^ universal
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The result is that this
false universal consciousness
uses its claim

to universal reason as a
justification for concerning others
who it
sees as self-interested, i.e.
opposed to the interest of all.
Historically, Hegel thinks the
teign of Terror was the embodiment
of
this. Absolute Terror is the
expected (necessary for Hegel)
outcome
of Absolute Freedom, i.e. the
claim to universal (including
moral or
ethical) knowledge.
It is important to reiterate
the nature of this claim to universal

knowledge in order to understand
the connection to Absolute Terror.
The claim is that the universal
interest is objectively rational and
therefore achieved by pure insight,

in this

sense it is accessible to

all who are not captured by the dogma
of religious or politically

motivated claims.

Those who take issue with this universal
interest

are seen as either dupes captured by the
dogma of irrationality (e.g.
church or monarchy) or the knowing
perpetrators of that dogma, i.e.
the clergy, aristocracy or other alleged
self-interested individuals.
Once the truth is revealed by the universal
knowing subject and the

mask of dogma removed and its claims disproved,
opponents and critics
of the universal will must appear complicitous in
the efforts of those

motivated by particular interests, and therefore morally
bankrupt.
Individuals opposed to the universal will can no longer claim lack
of
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-o«le.ge

as tHe reason
.0. their allege.

for ignorance has
disappeared.

wUh

selMnterests; t.e space

They ™.st either
support and eo^pl,

the universal will
or ad.it their
ccpiicit, in the ohstruction
Of the universal wiii
and .ace the political
terror that results fro.
the drive to absolute
freedom.

NOW

a. not claiming that
Hegel's account of the
dialectic of
Absolute Freedom and Terror
fits Mollis, view of
explanation,
I

rationality and autonomy
perfectly.

But several of the
elements that

are necessary ingredients
or conditions for what
Hegel calls Absolute
Terror are to be found in
Hollis. social theory.
Specifically, he
welds an epistemologically
privileged position for the
theorist to a

theory of objective rationality
and ultimate interests.

This

combination threatens to bring
substantial moral pressure,
if not
outright coercion, upon
individuals who act irrationally
from the
point of view of Hollis' real
interests to act autonomously
as
determined by Mollis. At the
very least it is incumbent
upon Hollis
to demonstrate how his
account of real interests avoids
the tragedy

that Hegel claims the Enlightenment
fell into.
TTiis

is not to identify Hollis
with the extremes of the French

Revolution.
thought.

It is perhaps more a question
of a tension in Mollis'

He seems to want a God's eye
view of the world and

alternatives for action that would
allow for comprehensive criticism
of the rationality of social
actors.

At the same time he seems to

recognize that we must start with
social roles that are embedded in
a
web of relationships and from this
attempt to achieve greater, more

complete forms of reflection.

But when push comes to shove, he
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sacrifices the latter for the
former.

Hence,

i

think he leaves

himself open to the criticism
that he falls into the
trap Hegel
claimed plagued the Enlightenment.

A theory of authority
extrapolated .

Of authority.

autonomous man.

Hollis nowhere outlines

a

theory

But we can extrapolate from
his view of rationality
and

Of the several thinkers we
will examine, Hollis comes

closest to the pure Enlightenment
view of the relationship
between
autonomy and tradition. Although
the social roles available to
actors
are the raw material of
reflection, Hollis believes that
actors can
rationally determine their real
interests if provided sufficient

distance from those roles.

Given this view of the relationship

between autonomy, reason and social
roles, Hollis would be led to deny
any claim that authority and a
way of life on the one hand and

autonomy and rationality on the other
are identical, complementary, or
consistent with each other.

Authority, either that of a way of life

and tradition or that of an individual
or office, sets limits on the
range of reflection and alternatives
for action available to agents.
It is the imposition of an external
will,

policy or constraint that is

not necessarily consistent with my real
interests.

Hence, authority

in any form would be antithetical to the very
notion of Autonomous Man.

The necess ity of authority

.

An alternative account of authority and

its relationship to autonomy is available from Winch's
account of

rule-governed behavior,

winch claims that what distinguished human

society from other types of life is that the former is based on
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communication,

can only give

speech and mutual understanding.
a

Because of this one

complete account of human
social life by considering

the way in which concepts,
ideas and beliefs enter into
social
relations.
The pivotal role that
concepts play in constituting
social
action means that it is a
rule governed activity.
To engage in a rule

governed activity one must be
able (at least tacitly) to
distinguish
between a right and wrong way of
doing things. This right and
wrong
way of doing things is never
simply determined subjectively.

I

can

not capriciously use concepts
nor capriciously determine the
meanings

of my actions.

Rather,

the possible meanings that a word
or action

can have are partly determined
by the intersubjective rules that

govern that particular mode of speech
or type of activity.

To insure

that one's actions conform to these
intersubjective rules necessitates

an appeal to authority according
to Winch.

"All characteristically

human activities involve a reference to
an established way of doing
things.

The idea of such an established way of
doing things in its

turn presupposes that the practices and
pronouncements of a certain

group shall be authoritative in connection with
the activity in

question."
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For example, one who wishes to learn chess will
appeal

to the authoritative pronouncements of a chess
master regarding the

rules governing not only the mechanics of the game but also
how to
conduct the best opening, middle and closing parts of the
game.
This account of the relationship of authority to human action
leads Winch to conclude that authority does not stand in an external
(i.e. causal) relation to human action.
to human action is an internal one.

The relationship of authority

One cannot engage in
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rule-governed (and hence
specifically hu.an) activity
without at the
same ti.e accepting the
exercise of see authority.
.-The acceptance
Of authority is not
just something which, as a
matter of fact, you

cannot get along without if
ycu want to participate in
rule-governed
activities; rather to participate
in rule-governed
activities is in a
certain way, to accept
authority ."^^ The relationship
between human
action and authority is not
contingent; without authority
there could
be no meaningful human action
for Winch.
Winch's second, and perhaps
even more controversial,
conclusion
flows directly from his argument
concerning the relationship and
necessity of authority to social
life,
in order to be able make an

autonomous, rational choice one must
be able to consider reasons
for
and against the actions, belief
or idea under consideration.
To know
what constitutes a good reason for
doing something presupposes a

knowledge of the rules that guide that
activity and the point behind
that form of life:

"reasons are intelligible only in the
context of

the rules governing the kind of activity
in which one is

participating."^^

And as was pointed out earlier Winch argues
that

the notion of a rule presupposes the
existence and necessity of

authority.

It

follows that if it is only in the context of
rule

governed activity that it makes sense to evaluate,
accept and reject
reasons; and if this deliberation concerning reasons
is itself and

intrinsic part of exercising autonomy or freedom of choice,
it follows
then that "it is only in the context of rule governed
activities that
it makes sense to speak of freedom of choice,

to eschew all rules -

supposing for a moment that we understood what that meant

-

would not
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be to gain perfect

freed™, but to create

a situation in

„Mch

the

notion Of freedo. could no
longer find foothold....
the acceptance of
authority is conceptually
inseperable fro. participation
in
rule-governed activities.
It follows that this
acceptance is a
precondition of the possibility
of freado. of choice.
Somebody who
said that he was going to
renounce all authority in
order to insure
that he had perfect freedom
of choice would thus be
contradicting
."^^
himself
It is critical that we
understand precisely the point
that winch

is making here.

He is not making the more
common argument that

authority is legitimate because
it is something we voluntarily
agree
to subject ourselves to and
that it is this voluntary aspect
of

authority that distinguishes it
from power, coercion, etc.

winch is

making the more radical claim
that because human action is

characterized by its rule governedness,
it is necessarily subject to
authority and it is only in this
context of this authority that one
can exercise freedom of choice at
all.

in

fact,

from winch's

perspective, without authority there can
be human action at all,

free

or otherwise.

From this account of human action and
authority in general winch
derives the following conclusions concerning
political authority.

rule governed activity exists in

a

social vacuum.

No

There will always

be other groups and the actions of each
social group has potential

effects on some or all of the other groups.

One can go so far as to

say that since the ideas, concepts and beliefs and
rules that help

make up

a

way of life or social group are expressions of
ideas about
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realuy (including or
particularly social reality,
that

the existence

Of any one group
presupposes the existence of
particular other groups
cr other groups in
general,

since conflict .ay arise
between or

amongst various social
groups, there .ust be
these conflicts.

a

.eans of resolving

It follows that even
though one does not .ake
a

deliberate choice to accept
existing political authority
in the way
that one chooses to accept
the authority of a chess
.aster, the very
nature of hu.an, i.e.
rule-governed activity, requires
or presupposes
some political authority:
"the fact that one is a human
social being,
engaged in rule-governed
activities and on that account
able to
deliberate and to choose, is in
itself sufficient to co^it one
to the
acceptance of legitimate political
authority.
jt is political
authority that interprets the rules
for adjudicating between
conflicting groups; political
authority determines the right and
wrong
way of resolving conflict.
Winch recognizes that it is in
politics that there is often

disagreement over the right and wrong
way of proceeding or of
resolving conflict.

But it is because of this that
political

authority is bound by the expectation
that it can justify its actions
as the right thing to do.

In other words political authority,

challenged, must appeal to some normative
standard.

when

Once those in

political authority cease to justify their
actions as being in
conformity with some set of norms that are (at
least tacitly)

collectively held, it ceases to function as authority
and degenerates
into power or coercion, according to Winch.

Winch, however,

eventually repudiates this account of political
authority, while at
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the same time maintaining
that any account of
poiiticai authority must
nonetheless incorporate his
more general account
of authority.

Critique of the Winchlan Arcn„
nt of Authority

in spite of the
untenability of Hollis
alternative, winch's

account of authority and
freedom of choice «ill not,
as it stands
provide an acceptable alternative,
^ere are several problems with
Winch's argument that can
be traced to the fact
that he focuses on
eEistemic authority in his argument
and in the examples he
gives.
This leads him to assume
that the triadic relationship
found in

epistemic authority amongst the
concepts and

ideas that help

constitute a way of life, those who
are said to be in authority,
and
those over whom authority is
exercised holds for all instances
of
authority, m effect, winch
violates his own Wittgenstienian
strictures in his analysis of
authority.

Instead of examining the

different uses of authority in
different language games (e.g. chess,
education, politics, etc.), he offers
a single version of authority
(i.e. epistemic authority) as
paradigmatic,

authority can be analyzed in these terms.

-mus, all instances of

But just as we cannot take

any single use of the concept game
as the paradigm for all games, upon
which all other uses of the term game
are parasitic, neither can we

expect that epistemic authority can be
paradigmatic for all forms of
life in which the concept and exercise of
authority is found.
This focus is the reason why winch makes the
unqualified claim
that one who is placed in a position of authority,
be it political.
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administrative, judicial, or
otherwise, is necessarily -an
authority,'
i.e. has a certain recognized
expertise concerning the area
over which
he is placed in authority.
This leads one to infer that
there could
never, in winch's eyes, be an
illegitimate exercise of authority,
indeed, it is difficult to see
exactly how the question of
legitimacy

would even come up.

This focus also leads winch
to overstate the role

of criticism in the actual
exercise of non-epistemic forms of

authority.

Although

I

believe that Winch's argument corrects
a previously

mistaken emphasis, his account of
authority rests upon several

unexamined assumptions which, when scrutinized,
render his account of
authority unacceptable in its pure form.

Specifically,

I

would argue

that in order for the pure form of
epistemic authority to exist six

assumptions or pre-requisites must be met:

(1)

The point behind the activity or way of life
must not
Itself be in question or challenged. For example,
chess
novices do not contest the point behind chess.

(2)

At least some of the primary or formal rules (e.g.
the
rules governing the mechanics of chess or basketball)
must themselves be available to all or agreed upon by
all, although the less formal rules concerning a better
or best way to proceed might not.

(3)

The 'formal test' or procedure for establishing one as
'an authority' must be relatively clear in that it is
generally known what the test consists of and the
criteria for establishing that authority are not
themselves contested severely.

(4)

The criteria by which 'an authority' is determined are
themselves internally related to the activity in
question.

(5)

Because epistemic authority is bound up with systems of
ideas, and because systems of ideas must be subject to
discussion and criticism,

it follows that there must
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When each of the above
prerequisites is met we can be
said to have
a pure case of epistemic
authority, in other words,
the

pronouncements of those in authority
are taken as authoritative
because it is presumed that those
in authority do in fact have
greater
knowledge about the right and wrong
way of going about things and
because the shared background to
the enterprise gives others the

opportunity to subject those claims
to some degree of critical
scrutiny (an authority is recognized
)

.

in such a case it can be said

that one who is -in authority is
also -an authority and that the

exercise of such authority is consistent
with the exercise of freedom

of choice.

The stronger claim can also be
supported, i.e. that this

sort of authority is a prerequisite
for freedom of choice since it

provides the background conditions against
which choices are formed.
But his set of idealized conditions does
not always pertain,

when

one or more of the conditions is not met,
the claim to superior

insight or knowledge, though it may still be
present, recedes and

other criteria become more prominent.

For example, during the early

stages of the Viet Nam War, those in political authority
in the United

States justified U.S. policy in Southeast Asia as being
in the
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national security of the
U.S., national security
which those is
political authority knew best
how to determine and
protect. As this
Claim became the object of
criticism, the Justification
for the war
eventually shifted to the
President's authority to
commit troops to
combat situations because
of the powers vested in
the President as
Commander-in ^ief of the anned
forces by the Constitution,
the
first instance the
Justification based on the claim
to know what was
in the national interest
was most prominent. But when
this

m

Justification failed to convince an
ever growing segment of the
population and the Congress as well,
the more legalistic (though
Constitutionally questionable)
Justification was offered.
In addition,

the role of criticism and the
relationship between

authority and freedom of choice may
change.

Ttiis

is not to say that

the epistemic dimension of authority
ever disappears altogether.

My

argument is the more limited claim
that other bases for authority

become more prominent under these
conditions.

To support this claim

I

would like to focus on several examples
of social life in which

someone is said to be -in authority and use
these to demonstrate the
defects of Winch's argument.
The myopic approach to authority that Winch
takes leads him to

make the claim that anyone who is 'in authority'
is 'an authority'.

This can mean two things.

Winch can be arguing that one who assumes

or is placed in a position of authority somehow
becomes

'an authority'

on something, presumably the mode of activity or way of
life that they
are said to be

'an authority'

on.

Or Winch can mean that a person is

only 'in authority' when he is acting as 'an authority.'

Those who
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are placed in positions of
authority but are not in fact
'an
authority, do not really exercise
authority but exercise power,

coercion or influence.

(The distinction between
authority on the one

hand, and power, etc. on the
other is important for winch.

The former

is internally related to
human action, the latter stands
in external

i.e. causal, relation to it.)

The first claim is empirically
false.

It is not the case that all
who assume positions of authority

necessarily become authorities on that
particular way of life or
activity.

The second claim attempts to
account for authority by

definitional fiat.

It is a moment of

Winchian enterprise as a whole.

nominalism that strains against

For it is one of Winch's claims that

to understand a concept we must understand
how it is used within

particular form of life.

An examination of several examples of

relationships in which authority is said to be
exercised will indicate
that Winch's claim concerning the epistemic
basis of all authority

needs to be modified.

The workpl ace and authority

.

Within the workplace certain actions and

statements of owners and managers are taken by their employees as

authoritative.

Decisions concerning what will be produced and what

techniques will be used in the manufacture of those products are

generally recognized by employees to be the domain of managers.

At

the same time workers often dispute the wisdom or knowledge of

management concerning how the product might best be produced or
improved upon,

in effect,

workers often deny that management has any

monopoly on the right way of producing the good.

This denial on the
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part Of workers has several
dimensions to it.

First, management and

workers perceive the activity
of work differently,

while there may he

some overlap concerning
the point of their
enterprise, both parties
alsc^in part, perceive the
workplace as having different
instrumental
uses.
Hence, there is less than
total agreement between
workers
and managers on the point
or purpose behind the
workplace. Secondly,
all the criteria for determining
who will and will not be
placed in a
position of authority are not
internally related to the activity
in
question. Managers are often
hired less for their knowledge
of the
right and wrong way of producing
this or that good than for
their
ability to control wage demands,
increase profits, etc. Finally,
many
social theorists would argue that
the structure of modern capitalist

economy is such that the threat of
unemployment and the lack of

alternatives concerning the organization
of production makes the

participation on the part of workers in
the economy less than
voluntary.

The choices available to them are
severely restricted.

They do not voluntarily participate in
the production process in the
way that one voluntarily takes up chess.
In spite of the fact that conditions
(1),

(A)

and (6) that we

established for epistemic authority are not met,
it would be

inaccurate to describe the relationship between managers
and workers
as one of merely power or coercion.

Workers do recognize the

authority of managers in the workplace but not because
of any
epitemological privilege that managers are thought to have
but rather
because managers are in the position of ownership or represent
those
who are.

Hence, although managers may not be recognized as

'an
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authority, by workers they
are nonetheless
recognized as being
authority' by them.

family life and authority

.

The second example is
taken from the

family,

undoubtedly most people
entertain ideas about the right
and
wrong way to raise children.
Yet in modern American
society it cannot
be said that there is a
single set of identifiable
rules that each
parent must conform to similar
to what we might find in
a less
complex, more ritualized culture.

Not just the techniques, but
the

goals of child rearing are
themselves not widely agreed upon.
Nonetheless, except in the most
extreme cii.:umstances (e.g.,
actual
threats to the child's welfare that
can be classified as violations
of
more general crimes), even when
we deny the appropriateness of
the

techniques, knowledge or even motives
of a particular parent

concerning childrearing, that parent's
authority to -bring his/her

children up as he/she sees fit- is still
accepted and recognized.
This recognition of authority certainly
does not rest on a recognition

of their knowledge of the right way to bring
up children,

in fact

their authority may be defended by some who
nonetheless view the

parents in question as poor parents.
In such a situation the legitimacy
of the parents authority in

rearing their own children is based on their position
as natural
parents.

This is not to say that we deny altogether that
they might

have some correct knowledge about how to rear their
children; but to
the extent that we claim this privileged position for
them we do so

not so much because of some formal test but because of the
fact that

71

thay occupy a certain
(biological) position with
respect to their
particular children.

Legal authority
system,

.

The final example is
taken fro. the American
legal

in most instances in
the United States judges
are appointed

by elected officials.

Though no formal criteria
exist concerning the

expertise or knowledge of the
law, it is generally
expected that
nominees to such positions will
have foi^al training in law
and will
have been engaged in some
occupation with the law or
government
indicating a greater knowledge of
law than the average layman
might
have. However, in a number of
areas in the United States judges
are
not appointed and subject to the
above expectations, but are elected
themselves by popular vote,

in many of these elections
the

requirements or expectations concerning
formal legal training of the
candidates are nill.

At best only a very limited case
could be made

that the voters require any expertise
concerning the law.
Nonetheless, the pronouncements of elected
judges are taken to be as

authoritative as those of judges who have somehow
demonstrated their
legal expertise.

In such cases the mere occupation of
the position is

taken as sufficient warrant to recognize the
judge as in authority

regarding the law.

This is not to say that knowledge of the law
as a

determinant of authority disappears altogether.
expected to act in accordance with the law.

Such judges are still

But it is to say that the

requirement of superior knowledge as the legitimation of one's
legal
authority has slipped into the background and the occupation, via
election, of formal position is thrown into relief.
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It would see. then that
Winch's account of authority
is unable to

account for how the concept
of authority is actually
used in various

form

of life.

For some social theorists
this would pose only a

minimal problem. But because
Winch believes that in order
to
understand a particular concept
or idea one ,„ust examine
the place
that it has in a particular
culture or way of life, this
represents a
serious problem for him.
An additional problem with
Winch's focus on epistemic
authority,

the legitimacy of which is
dependent on its being potentially
subject
to critical scrutiny, is that
it overestimates the facility
with which
criticism may emerge. First, the
focus on pure forms of epistemic

authority tends to ignore the exclusive
nature of some tyes of
authority,

in the case of pure empistemic
authority, all who can

demonstrate knowledge of a particuar activity
are said to be an
authority on that subject matter or activity.

Hence, in chess there

is no theoretical limit to the number of
persons who might be said to
be authorities on chess.

The existence of the one authority on
chess

(or the English language, philosophy,
American politics, etc.) does

not exclude the possible existence of other
authorities.

It

may even

be the case that those who are recognized as
authorities differ in
their pronouncements on a particular subject.

For example, there may

be different interpretations of the strength of the
Presidency in

American politics, each requiring that the other interpretation(s)
be
at least partly wrong.

We might still recognize each inhterpretaton

as a reasonable, defensible interpretation of the Presidency in
spite

of their disagreement, and not repudiate the one as an authority
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because of our acoeptance
of another's
interpretation.
However, there are .any
oases where the exercise
of authority is
exclusive, and the acceptance
or recognition of one
authority
precludes the recognition of
others,
importance of this point is
that in those areas of
life that include multiple
authorities (e.g.
Chess, academic life, etc).)
the potential for criticise
is great.
Winch takes this possibility
for criticise and
subsequent

Justification to be an important
part of authority.

It is crucial in

establishing its compatibility
with freedom of choice as
well as the
basis for distinguishing it
from power, coercion or
manipulation.
This is not to say that
those who occupy exclusive
positions of

authority do not need to Justify
their actions.

it does mean is

that Where exclusive forms of
authority exist, i.e. where the

knowledge required for the right
to declare what is the right way
of
going about something is available
to only one or a limited number of
people, the possibilities for those
over whom authority is exercised
to critically evaluate whether
or not a particular action is
correct,

Just, appropriate, etc., are likely to be
more (even extremely)

limited than in those areas where there
are a multiplicity of

authorities, while the importance of critically
evaluating that

exclusive authoriti^

possibly greater

.

In such cases we tend to recognize
the pronouncements of those who are

epistemologically privileged as authoritative because they
are the
pronouncements of the epistemologically privileged, rather
than
because they measure up to some standard of criticism that
we have

concerning a way of life.

Because the possibilities of criticism in
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such circumstances are
U.ited, the possibilities
of those In
authority trading on their
authoritative positions to
disguise «hat
are actually exercises
of power or manipulation
are greater.
I do not
think that .inch would
disagree with this last
point. But his account
Of authority tends to
undeiplay it.

Winch's account also tends
to obfuscate the meaning
of concepts
that are derivitives from
the term authority, i.e.
authoritarian and
authoritative, for which criticism
plays a less important role,
when
we speak of someone's
attitude as authoritarian we
mean that the
individual is prone to place the
actions and pronouncements of
those
in authority above critical
examination and discussion.
The

authoritarian individual defers
to those who are 'in authority'
simply
because they are 'in authority'.
Similarly, when we take someone's
statements to be authoritative we
often mean that we accept those
statements as accurate, true, lawful,
etc., without critically

examining their accuracy, truth or
legality.

The use of both terms

implies the suspension of judgement;
a failure, refusal or inability
to engage in a critical examination
of authority and a willingness
to

accept that authority as legitimate
without immediate justification.

While it is true that when we take

a

statement, action or decision as

authoritative there is often an assumption that
the authority in

question is legitimate and could be justified,
the use of the term
implies that critical examination has not taken
place and is thought
to be unnecessary, even if only temporarily.

And to describe

someone's attitude as authoritarian is to imply that
one has accepted
the exercise of authority in areas of life where
such acceptance is
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illegitimate or when critical
examination of particular
actions or
statements should have emerged
but did not.

This emphasis on the
possibility of critical examination
and

subsequent justification threatens
to collapse the concept of
authority with that of persuasion,
it is true that those in
authority
are sometimes put on the
defensive and are pressed to justify
their
decisions, statements or actions.
And I would agree with winch
that
the possibility of such criticism
and justification is one of the
things that distinguishes authority
from naked power.

Nonetheless, if

those in authority are continually
pressed to offer justification for
their authoritative decisions, etc.,
it becomes unclear how their

position is any different from those not
holding positions of
authority who seek another's compliance with
their decisions, etc.

'

Indeed, if an authority were always pressed
for justification, we

would be tempted to say that that individual
or institution had lost

his/her/its authority.

Authority and Freedom of Choice

The focus on epistemic forms of authority and the subsequent

overestimation of the possibility of critical examination lead Winch
to overstate the compatibility of authority with freedom of choice.
To say that the exercise of freedom of choice is compatible with, and

even depends upon, the exercise of some authority is quite different
from saying that the exercise of any authority is always compatible
with, or never a restraint on, any freedom of choice.

I

take Winch to
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be saying the former.

But at times his language,
as well as his

discussion Of political authority,
can lead the reader to
infer the
more extreme claim that
every exercise of authority
is always
compatible with freedom of
choice. This latter claim,
quite
Obviously, cannot be sustained.

I

might recognize the actions
of

a

particular individual or institution
as authoritative and legitimate
even when those actions are a
restriction on my freedom, i might,

for

example, recognize the authority
of the Federal Reserve Board
to set
interests rates even if it means
that, in a particular instance,
such
action makes it impossible for me
to buy my own home.
Indeed, it
seems to be a crucial aspect of
political authority, at least, that

I

recognize the legitimacy of its
restrictions on my freedom at
approprite times.
Winch tacitly recognizes the difficulty
his discussion of

authority has accounting for restrictions
on freedom of choice in his

account of political authority and his
subsequent rejection of that
account.

His repudiation of his own account of
political authority is

itself ambivilent.

He agrees with Hume, at one point, that
the

authority of the state stands in an external (and
therefore causal?)

relation to other social institutions.

This leaves one to wonder

whether he would revise this earlier claim that authority
stands in an
internal relation with social action and freedom of choice.

On the

other hand, he claims that any account of political authority
must
take account of what he says regarding authority in general.

He also

implies that there is something of an internal relation amongst the
state, political authority and the citizen of a political community
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When he says that the
state's "force and...
authority are what they

the society within which
they ae exercised - a
concept that enters
into what subjects will
and will not submit to
from the state; it

manifests itself in the
spontaneous life of the society,
even though
its existence makes possible
the impositon of certain
things in a way
that would not otherwise
be possible. "^^
think that Winch's view of
the relationship amongst the
state,
citizens and political authority
is, in part, correct, but
it lacks'a
more developed concept of the
common good to make it more
convincing.
I think, nonetheless,
that he underestimates the
coercive potential of
political authority. This is not
to say that he is completely
wrong
I

regarding the relationship between
political authority and freedom,
that the former is at times consistent
with the latter.

But his

identification of political authority with
freedom of choice must be
revised.

I

would go further and aigue that what
winch says about

political authority being tied to a notion
of the state, and what

people will accept fom the state, reinforces
his claim that authority
has something of an epistemic basis, but
that the epistemic

legitimation of authority is only a partial basis
of political
authority.

If winch were to recognize that at times there
is a

non-epistemic dimension to authority he would be able
to give an
account of political authority that was both consistent
with his

notion of authority in general and recognized the coercive
potential
of political authority.
I

think winch is right when he claims that the notion of the state
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enters into «hat citizens
will and will not sub.it
to fro. the state
in this sense political
authority does stand in an
internal relation
to political action.
But this clai. by itself
is insufficient to
support a fully developed
concept of political authority.
Nonetheless
it is the embryo of a more
fully developed account of
political
authority and its relation to
the common good. As a
preview of a
position I will try to defend
later, I think that Winch's
account of
the general concept of
authority sheds light on political
authority if
one looks at political authority
as a triadic relationship amongst

political authority, citizens

artf

what can be called the common
good.

CHAPTER
,

The

II

AUTHORITY, AND PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS

Practical Tnte nt nf
Ftiilosophical HPr^.n.......

It is only recently
that the work of Hans-Georg
Gadamer has begun
to reach a substantial
audience in the Anglo-Z^erican

world,

unfortunately, in spite of the
increased familiarity with
Gada.er,
most of the commentators on
his work have come primarily
from the
field of literary criticism.^

No political theorist has
engaged in

a

comprehensive analysis of his work,
and only a few have even briefly
addressed his major arguments.^
There is something paradoxical
about this for even though his
magnum opus does not appear to be an

explicitly political text on first
glance, Gadamer has voiced
political aspirations for philosophical
heimeneutics, the term he uses
to describe his enterprise:
I think, then, that the
chief task of philosophy is
to defend practical and political
reason against the

*"

domination of technology based on science.
That is the point
It corrects the peculiar
falsehood of modern consciousness:
the idolatry of
scientific method and of the anonymous authority
of the
sciences and it vindicates again the
noblest task of the
citizen - decision making according to one's
own
responsibility - instead of conceding the task
to the
expert,
in this respect, hermeneutic philosophy
is the heir
of the older tradition of practical philosophy
.3
of philosophical hermeneutic.

The explicitly political role that
Gadamer claims for

philosophical hermeneutics might come as
with Gadamer

-s

work,

a

surprise to many familiar

for he does not at first glance appear to address
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explicitly pciiticai issues.

Nonetheless, Ue does see a
renewal of a
version of Aristotlean
praotioal philosophy as one
of the primary
goals of Philosophical
hemeneutics, and it is against
this goal that
I shall measure his
effort.

The Problem of Philosophy
and Every day

'

^^<='

Perhaps the best way to begin
describing Gadamer's work is to
say
that it is directed at what he
believes is the most important
question
confronting the modern world, one
that is the result of the
emergence
of modern science and technology.
"It is the question of how our
natural view of the world - the
experience of the world as we simply
live out our lives - is related
to the unassailable and anonymous

authority that confronts us in the
pronouncenents of science.

Since

the seventeenth century the real
task of philosophy has been to

mediate this new development of man's
cognitive capacities with the
totality of our experience of life."^

Gadamer detects what he believes is a
problem in this relationship
between science and everyday life.

Science, he argues, has claimed an

epistemological scope and status that exceecfe what
is appropriate or
legitimate.

Briefly put, the claim on the part of science to
an

objective form of knowledge that alone can render
unassailable truth
is,

from Gadamer 's standpoint, a one-sided view of the
nature of

truth; science claims a monopoly on truth and knowledge
that cannot be

legitimated.

Gadamer is careful to distinguish his interpretation of the
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proble. Of the relationship
between science and other
for.s of hu.an
life and understanding fro.
what he considers to
be an anti-scientific
attitude. He insists that his
argument does not atte.pt
to dictate to
the sciences, natural or
otherwise, what type of
research they should
engage in. Neither does he
think that his argument
has any import for
the methodological disputes
within the human sciences.
At one point
he says of his arguments
in Truth and Method:
"This does not prevent
the methods of modern natural
science from having application
to the
social world. Possibly the
growing rationalization of society
and the
scientific techniques of its
administration are more characteristic
of
our age than the vast progress
of modern science.
The methodological

spirit of science permeates
everywhere.

And again later, "...it

is not my intention to make
prescriptions for the sciences or the

conduct of life, but to try to correct
false thinking of what they
are."

Such statements resemble Winch's
denials of anti-scientism:

"But it should not be assumed.

.

.that what

I

have to say must be ranked

with those reactionary anti-scientific
movements, aiming to put the

clock back, which have appeared and flourished
in certain quarters
since science began.

My only aim is to make sure that the
clock is

telling the right time, whatever it may prove
to be."^

Both Gadamer

and Winch, it seems, want to be careful not
to assume the role of

intellectual luddite.
Nevertheless, Gadamer does believe that the methodological

self-consciousness of the sciences has overestimated the monopoly that
science has on truth and knowledge, and thereby misunderstood
the
nature of its own task and its relations to other forms of
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experience.

At the very least
this has resulteo in
the subversion of
other for.s of experience
and understanding,
"
argues Gada.er:
the
successes df modern sciences
rests on the fact that
other

possibilities for questioning
are concealed by abstraction...^
This
Cdnceal.ent that has taken
place with the unconcealment
of science is
critical according to Gadamer,
for science can never
provide us «ith
the knowledge that we need
to answer the most
important questions.
"For as triumphant as the
march of modern science has
been, and as

obvious as it is to everyone
today that their awareness
of existence
is permeated by the scientific
presuppositions of our culture, human
thought is nonetheless continually
dominated by questions for which
science promises no answers."^
On the practical side the effects
of this misperception of the

relationship of science to other forms
of life, though less explicit,
are somewhat more ominous:

"...over against the whole of our

civilization that is founded on modern
science, we must ask repeatedly
if something has not been omitted.

If the presuppositions of these

possibilities for knowing and making remain
half in the dark, cannot
the result be that the hand applying this
knowledge will be

destructive?"^°

Gadamer is not quite clear what form this

destruction will take.

At times it appears that he believes it leads

to the impoverishment or a superficiality of
human relationships.

He

says, "Unavoidably the mechanical industrial world
is expanding within

the life of the individual as a part of the sphere of
technical

perfection.

When we hear modern lovers talking to each other, we

often wonder if they are communicating with words or with advertising
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labels and technical ter.s
fro. the sign language
of the .odern
industrial world. It is
inevitable that ^e levelled
life for.s of
the industrial age also
affect language, and in
fact the
impoverishment of the vocabulary
is .aking enormous
progress/'^^
other places he intimates
that this growth of science
could involve
new relationships of power
and subordination:
"Each science, as a
science, has the field of
its knowledge set out in
advance, and to
have knowledge of this field
is to have power over it."^^

m

earlier he says, "But the knowledge
of all the natural sciences
is
knowledge for domination."!^ it
follows that if the methods
employed by the natural sciences
inherently involve relationships of
power and domination over the
object of knowledge, then the
deployment
of such methods in the social
sciences or in the social world could
result in new systems of power and
subordination there as well.
The crux of the problem, from
Gadamer's point of view, lies in the
fact that science does not exhaust
the range of genuine experience and

knowledge of the world.

Science itself is but one particular way of

approaching the world and obtaining knowledge
of it.

There are other

possible approaches to comprehending the world,
e.g. artistic,
historical and even our everyday attitude
toward the world.

Though

science may ignore these other forms of experience,
knowledge, and
truth,

it can never replace them.

Speaking of our everyday experience

of the world, Gadamer says, "but we cannot seek
to remove or refute

natural appearances by the 'eyes' of scientific understanding.

This

is pointless not only because what we see with our
eyes has genuine

reality for us, but also because the

trulti

that science states is
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Itself relative to a
particular attitude to the
world and cannot clai.
to be the Whole.
But it is language which
really opens up the whole
of our attitude to the
world, and in this whole
of language
appearances find their legitimacy
just as much as science.-^^
And
again later he states that
"The .objective situationthat science
knows, and from which it
derives its own objectivity,
is one of the
relativities embraced by language's
relation to the world."^^ An
exhaustive account of the notions
of truth, knowledge and
experience
must go beyond the self-understanding
science.
It must adjust its
lenses so as to bring into
focus the universal, linguistic

constitution of the world.

The Linguistic C onstitution of
the World

The short-sidedness of the
scientific attitude toward the world
and its self-understanding lies in
the fact that science overlooks two

constitutive characteristics of the world
and our experience of it:
its historicality and its linguisticality

.

The first Gadamer

describes in what he calls the principle of
effective-history.
latter in the linguistic constitution of
the world.

The

Though we shall

deal with these two characteristics of
the world separately, they do
not represent separable aspects of experience
for Gadamer.

The world,

and our experience of it, is linguistic
because it is historical and
it is historical because it is linguistic.

It is important to realize that the shortcomings that
Gadamer sees
in the scientific attitude are not its failure to live up to its own

Ideal Of knowledge, but
rather inherent in the
nature of its procedure
and its identification
of objective knowledge
with knowledge
se
unfortunately for science, the
world does not have the
objective
status that science claims,
i.e., objective knowledge
ooes not exist
independent of us. The world,
claims Gadamer, exists for
us as human
beings only in and through
language. We have no access
to the world
that is not mediated by
language.

^

It is this linguistic
experience of

world that is absolute,

not the methodologically
controlled, objective experience
of science
or any other particular
attitude toward the world. Echoing
the

sentiments of Peter Winch, Gadamer
says, "...in language the world
itself presents itself. The
experience of the world in language
is
•absolute'.

It transcends all the relativities
of the positing of

being, because it embraces all
being- in-itself in whatever reltionship

(relativities) it appears.

The linguistic quality of our
experience

of the world is prior, as
contrasted with everything that is

recognized and addressed as being.

The fundamental relation of

language and world does not, then, mean
that the world becomes the
object of language.

Rather, the object of knowledge and of
statements

is already enclosed within the world
horizon of language.

The

linguistic nature of the human experience of the
world does not
include making the world into an object. ""^^

And again later, "For

man's relation to the world is fundamentally
linguistic in nature, and

hence intelligible."^^

The world, as we experience it as human

beings, is available to us only through language.
The linguistic experience of the world is not meant
to imply that

language is a barrier to
be overcome.

Cadaver's point is that it
is

language that constitutes,
mediates and hence ailows
accessibility t
the world.
"Language is not Just one
of .an's possessions in
the
world, but on it depends
the fact that .an has
a world at all.
For
.an the world exists as
a world in a way that
no other being in the
world experiences it. But
this world is linguistic
in nature.-^^
It is important to emphasize
the nature of Gadamer's
claim.
Though
his claims resemble those
of Winch, his fundamental
arguments cut
somewhat deeper, positing an
ontological status for language:
"Language is the fundamental mode
of operation of our being
in the

world and the all embracing form
of the constitution of the
world.

There is nothing beyond language
that is more fundamental

to human experience or existence
in the worla.

The fundamental, ontological
status that Gadamer claims for

language should not be construed as
meaning that language is itself

independent of or separable from the
world.

interdependence between the two than that:

There is more

"...language has no

independent life apart from the world that
comes to language within
it.

Not only is the world 'world- only
in so far as it comes into

language, but language, too, has its
real being only in the fact that
the world is re-presented within it.

Thus the original humanity of

language means at the same time the fundamental
linguistic quality of
man's being-in-the-world."^°
An example might be helpful here.

As human beings we have need

for flat surfaces that enable us to eat, write, read and
do a variety

of other things comfortably.

Hence, we have slowly and tediously
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developed that piece of
furniture known as a
tabie.

Though the notion
or the concept of a
table is an open one.
not Just anything .ii:
count
as a table.
The concept of a table
is 'closed, enough to
allow us to

distinguish tables fro. other
types of furniture, including
those that
^ay also have flat surfaces
(e.g., dressers, etc.).
Moreover, the
concept Of a table, properly
understood, allows us to
distinguish good
from bad, better from worse
tables.
This differentiation of
various types of furniture
is possible
only because of the concepts
that we have to describe the
oifferent
objects. But beings with a
different set of needs would not

necessarily develop the same type
of furniture nor the same
vocabulary
to re-present that furniture
in exactly the same way we
do.

In

effect, that part of our world
that deals with furniture is
available
to us only through the concepts
that we have of tables, chairs,

dressers, etc.

But these concepts could not have
developed in a

vacuum; in part we have the concepts
we have because of the various

types of furniture that fit our needs.

In other words the language of

furniture developed in response to the
needs that we have as the

creatures we are and those objects of
furniture are available to us
(i.e., describable, useful, makeable,
distinguishable, repairable,

variable, etc.) because of the concepts that
we

have.-^"^

Like Winch, Gadamer denies that this linguistic
constitution of
the world implies what has become known as the
prison-house of

language.

The linguistic constitution of the world does not
mean that

we are trapped within the language that we grow up in.

On the

contrary, though we can never totally step out of our
language, nor
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Change our language in
the sa.e .anner that
we ohange our clothes,
we
can nevertheless extend
our language to include
other attituoes and
Views of the world.
Our language is always
translatable into other

linguistic nature of the
world that constitutes our
freedom.

°ther living
crVaturef
creatures, man's
L'n.frelationship to the world
characterized by freedom from
habitat
This freedom
includes the linguistic
constitution of the wo^ld
Both
belong together. To rise
above the oressure nf wh.f
comes to meet us from the
world means to ha e lanQuane

^'^^^^^^^ constitutron' Of'
tne world 7s
the
is 'f^r'f''
far from meaning that man's
relationshio to
the world is imprisoned within
a linguisticallv
•

•

contrary'^wJerlia^ language
an men exist, there is not
and
only a freedom from the
''^^
?he habitat
iralsoMd'n'
^^^ation to the names that we give
things?. ^1^22
Finally, the language that we
inherit, the language that

constitutes our relationship to the
world, is historically
determined.

We can never escape the fact that
our language has

developed in certain ways, that the
concepts in it have come to have
the meaning that they have, and that
certain ideas pervade that

language.

This historicality of our language
Gadamer calls the

principle of effective-history.

The Principle of Effective History

One of the errors of scientism, and one that
accompanies its

mistaken faith in objective knowledge is that it believes
that the
historical circumstances that we find ourselves in are barriers
to.
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lead to Misunderstandings
of, the objects of
our knowledge.
This
prejudice against our own
history is typifia, by
what Gada^er caiis
hrstoricai objectivism, which
attempts to shake off the
influence of
history Which it sees leading
to distortions and
misunderstandings of
historical Objects of knowledge.
To really understand a
text, the
objectivist Claims, we must
forget our own values, beliefs,
etc. that
have been handed down to
us by tradition and
influence our
understanding of the past or of
a text.
We must adopt the ideas and
language of the historical period
we are studying, the intentions
of
the author, or the world
view of the particular era.
The latter can
only be achieved by a sort of
historical and social amnesia. A
second
version, one heard less frequently
today, asks us to neutralize the
influence of history by stepping
outside of history altogether in

order to objectively understand the
text, historical actions, or

historical era we are studying.
Both prescriptions, claims Gadamer,
are ill-advised.

In the first

place there is no neutral point outside
of history from which we can
observe that which we wish to investigate.

He says, "There is no such

thing, in fact, as a point outside
history from which the identity of
a

problem can be conceived within the vicissitudes
of the various

attempts to solve it.

It is true that all understanding of the
texts

of philosophy requires the recognition of the
knowledge that they

contain,

without this we would understand nothing at all.

But this

does not mean that we in any way step outside the
historical

conditions in which we find ourselves and in which we understand."^''
If the attempt at an ahistorical neutrality is
doomed to failure.
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the suggestion that we
shed dur dwn histdrical
circumstances for those
Of the text under
consideratidn is epualiy
misleading.
This approach
still assumes that we can
treat the text or
text-analogue (i.e.,

historical action, historical
era, etc.) as an object
that we cln
approach without the influence
of our own traoition or
prejudices.

In

that respect it attempts
to sidestep the question
of the historicity
of understanding,
it assumes that a state
of historical amnesia is
possible. In contrast Gadamer
argues that "True historical
thinking
must take accdunt df its dwn
histdricity. Only then will it
ndt chase
the phantdm df an histdrical
dbject which is the dbject df
prdgressive
research, but learn td see in the
dbject the counterpart df itself
and
hence understand bdth.
The true histdrical dbject is
net an dbject at
all, but the unity df the dne
and the dther, a relatidnship in
which

exist bdth the reality df histdry
and the reality df histdrical

understanding.

A prcper hermeneutics wduld
have td demdnstrate the

effectivity df histdry within understanding
itself,
this as effective-histdry.

I

shall refer td

Understanding is, essentially, an

effective-histdrical relatidn."^^
The first characteristic df effective-histdry
is its

ineliminability.

Our histdry always determines what the tdpic
and

path df research will be, what questicns we
ask, and what will cdunt
as a satisfactdry answer.

"If we are trying td understand a

histdrical phencmendn frdm the historical distance that
is

characteristic of our own hermeneutic situaticn, we are always
subject
td the effects df effective-histdry."^^

We may reflect upcn dur

histdrical situaticn, but we cannct escape it.
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The problem of the
objeotivist approach is that
it ignores

this effectiveness of history
or believes it can be
neutralized
through the proper methodological
procedures. But in pretending
its immunity to the effectiveness
of history it does not
transcend
effective-history but only conceals
its own involvement in it.
"But
looking at the whole situation
we can see that the power of
effective
history does not depend on its
being recognized. This, precisely,
is the power of history over
finite human consciousness, namely
that
it prevails even where faith
in method leads one to deny
one's own

historicality."25

^o set of methodological procedures
can over-

come the effect of effective-history.

Moreover, belief that

methodological procedures can overcome or
make one immune to the
demands of effective-histoiy does not
simply result in

self-misunderstanding, it results in error as well:

"...we should

learn to understand ourselves better and
recognize in all

understanding, whether we are expressly aware of
it or not, the
power of effective-history is at work,

when a naive faith in

scientific method ignores its existence, there can
be an actual
deformation of knowledge ."^^
However, the recognitio- of the presence and influence
of

effective history is itself no guarantee that the latter will
be

neutralized.

Though consciousness of the effects of effective history

can help prevent us from committing the errors of those who deny
it or

believe they have overcome it through methodological sophistication,
this recognition does not remove us from its influence.

reasons fo

There are two

First, "We are always within the situation, and to
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throw light on It is a
tas. that Is never
entirely completed. This
Is
true also of the hermeneutic
situation. I.e., the
situation in which
we find ourselves with
regard to the tradition
that we are trying to
understand. The illumination
of this
situation-effective-historical
reflection, can never be
completely achieved, but this
is not due to a
lack in the reflection,
but lies in the essence of
the historical
being which is ours. To
exist historically means that
knowledge of
oneself is never complete.
All self-knowledge means
that knowledge of
oneself is never complete. All
self-knowledge proceeds from what
is
historically given, what we call
with Hegel, 'substance', because
it
is the basis of all subjective
meaning and attitude and hence
both

prescribes and limits every possibility
of understanding any tradition
whatsoever in terms of its unique
historical quality.
^^^^
we have inherited historically
that is the basis for understanding.

Our historical throwness allows
certain possibilities and Imposes

certain limits.

The result is that there is no
standpoint, no high

ground from which to view the entire
tradition.
Second, since each new attempt at the
understanding of that

tradition is an appropriation and re-making
of it, each new attempt at

understanding part of that tradition results in

a new

understanding,

one different, sometimes subtly different,
from the last understanding
of that same tradition.

Gadamer would, of course, deny that the principle of
effective
history is reason for despair at the possibility of genuine
knowledge.

Only those who still accept the scientific ideal of

objective knowledge as an absolute or as the highest form of knowledge
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will see reason for
despondency.

But the principle of
effective

history does demand an
awareness of what is involved
in the
understanding of a historical
object, i.e., what actually
occurs in
genuine hermeneutic experience.
Gadamer describes this genuine
hermeneutic experience as the
fusion of horizons.

Immersed (submerged?) in
history as we are, we always
find
ourselves within particular
historical situation. Central
to the idea
of a situation is the notion
of a horizon.
A situation, according
to
Gadamer, both presents us with
possibilities and limits our field of
vision.

"Hence an essential part of the
concept of situation is the

concept of -horizon'.

The horizon is the range of
vision that

includes everything that can be seen
from
standpoint. "28
of our horizon.

a

particular

g^, historical situation determines the
topography
In addition to presenting,

framing, connecting and

throwing certain problems into relief, it
also deflects, refracts,
veils and hides other questions.

Our historical situation determines

what questions we can genuinely ask,
which will seem naive,

unproblematic, irrelevant, or obvious, and which
questions we cannot

even yet formulate.
The problem of understanding, then is to
extend our horizon to

include that horizon of the text or historical era that
we are trying
to understand.

Gadamer describes this as the fusion of horizons.

But

this phrase does not accurately capture the full meaning
of what

occurs in the phenomena of understanding.

For this formulation

implies the separation of different horizons, historically remote
ana

isolated from each other.

But this is not exactly the case.

As one

9A

-ght anticipate

frc. Gaoa^er's discussion
of tradition, there
are no
irruptions, cracks, fissures,
breaches, breaks or fractures
between
the horizon of the present
and those of the past.
Rather the horizon
of the present is
connected to the horizon of
the past,
within the
horizon of the present there
are localities, perhaps
on its frontiers,
that are the central
viewpoints of the horizon of the
past and will
be the central viewpoints of
the horizon of the future.
There are, in
other words, no historically
isolated horizons, rather each
of the
separate horizons constitutes the
single tradition that we are
all a
part of.
Thus, to understand something
does not involve transferring

oneself out of one's own historical
situation into that of another.
"When historical consciousness places
itself within historical
horizons, this does not entail
passing into alien worlds, unconnected
in any way with our own, but
together they constitute the one great

horizon that moves from within and
beyond the frontiers of the
present, embraces everything contained
in historical consciousness.
Our own past, and that other past towards
which our historical

consciousness is directed, help to shape this
moving horizon out of
which human life always lives, and which
determines it as
tradition.

"^^

Thus, to place ourselves in the horizon of the
past does not

involve the historical amnesia that the historicist
insists upon in
his quest for objective knowledge.

attain

a

It means extending our horizon to

broader vision of both ourselves and that which we are trying

to understand, be it a text, historical act, or
historical era.

"This
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Placing of ourselves is not
the empathy of one
individual for another
nor rs it the applioation
to another person of
our own oriteria,
but

it always involves the
attainment of a higher
universality that

overcomes, not only our own
particularity, but also that
of
another.... To acquire a
horizon means that one learns
to look beyond
what is close at hand - not
in order to look away
from it, but to see
it better within a larger
whole and a truer proportion."^0
And
again later: "In fact the
horizon of the present is being
continually
formed, in that we have
continually to test all our
prejudices. An
important part of this testing
is the encounter with the
past and the
understanding of the tradition from
which we come. Hence the horizon
of the present cannot be formed
without the past. There is no more
an
isolated horizon of the present than
there are historical horizons.

Understanding, rather, is always the
fusion of horizons which we

imagine to exist by themselves."'!

The fusion of horizons produces

a new standpoint involving the
bringing together of two different

points of view.
What Gadamer says about the fusion of
horizons and the attainment
of a higher universality, a new standpoint
from which to view the

past, the present, and the future,

resembles Winch's prescriptions for

those who would study alien cultures.

Winch argues that before we can

understand and evaluate the intelligibility of the
practices, beliefs
or ideas of another culture we must extend our concepts,
particularly
our concept of rationality, to include those of the
culture or way of
life we are studying.

"That is, we have to create a new unity for the

concept of intelligibility, having a certain relation to our old one
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and perhaps requiring a
considerable realignment
of our categories
we are not seeding a
state in which things
will appear to us
Just as
they do to .embers of S,
and perhaps such a state
is unattainable
anyway.
But we are seeking a way
of looking at things
which goes
beyond our previous way in
that it has in some way
taken account of
and incorporated the other
way that members of S have
of looking at
things.
Seriously to study another
way of life is necessarily
to seek
to extend our own - not
simply to bring the other
way within the
already existing boundaries of
our own, because the point
about the
latter in their present form
is that they ex hypothesi
exclude that
other. "^2 under3t3n^i^g ^^^^^^^
^.^^
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^

requires a growth and expansion
in the ideas and concepts
that are
available to us from our own way of
life.

Three similarities emerge between
winch and Gadamer at this
point.

First, both place a burden on the
investigator to extend his

concepts or horizon in his efforts to
understand a different way of
life or historical era.

He cannot simply take his own concepts,
way

of life or horizon for granted.

A re-examination of what is most

familiar is one of the conditions for
genuine understanding.
Second, Winch and Gadamer agree that
understanding is not an act
of empathy.

We cannot simply place ourselves in another
historical

era or culture.

Such psychologistic suggestions fail to appreciate

the linguisticality of understanding.

Finally, because understanding requires that we enlarge
our ideas,

broaden our concepts, and extend our horizons, and because
the world
is available to us only through the language,

it follows that every
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act Of understanding
is potentially
productive of changes in our
way
Of l.fe, how we perceive
the world, and our
relationships to others
TO be sure these changes
are rarely, if ever,
revolutionary; they are

-ost often subtle and
usually unnoticed.

Nonetheless, any act of

genuine understanding does
result in changes in our
way of life or
tradition.

The Rehabilitat.1nn nf
PrPjudice. Tr.dit.'nn and Auth ority

Even though the ontological
priority of language does not
lock us
in a windowless, linguistic
prison, it does nonetheless
raise anew the
question of the role that prejudice,
tradition and authority play in
understanding. The Enlightenment,
and the scientific attituoe that
it
spawned, saw prejudice, particularly
that originating in faith in

authority and tradition, as a source
of error.

Indeed, prejudice

resulting from faith in authority was
considered by the Enlightenment
to be the antithesis of reason,
the failure or refusal to use one's

own reason at all.

For the Enlightenment, reason,
unencumbered by the

accidents of history or the dogma of
authority (be it religious or
political), was to replace the prejudices
of authority and tradition
as the ultimate court of appeal concerning
claims to knowledge and the

ordering of human affairs.

Only be freeing the human mind from the

authority, tradition and the prejudices that they
perpetuated could

dependable, i.e., objective knowledge, be had.

This prejudice against

prejudices can still be found in mocern historicism, rationalism
ana
scientism, claims Gadamer.
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But if the rejection
of prejudices
supported by the authority
of
tradition was necessary
for the iiheration
and development of
.odern
science, the rejection
of ali tradition,
authority and prejudice
«as a
radrcal. unwarranted
excess claims Gadamer.
There are three reasons
for this.

The most fundamental
flaw in the Enlightenment's
denigration of
prejudice, particularly that
resulting from authority, and
the
consequent pursuit of human
reason free of prejudice,
is the
impossibility of achieving that
ideal.
The linguisticality and

historicality of our experience
of the world and our
existence
guarantee that we will never, can
never, escape the influence
of

prejudices completely.

As Gadamer points out:

"...'prejudice' means
judgement that is given before
all the elements that determine
a
situation have been finally examined. "^^
Since, as Gadamer points
out in his account of the
linguisticality and historicality of our
a

experience, we can never have access
to all the elements that

determine

situation because we are never totally
outside of any

a

situation; because we can never step
outside of our language and

history and treat our situation as an
object, it follows that we can
never be free of the prejudices and
prejudgements that make up our
situation.

Gadamer defines the issue this way:

"Does the fact that

one is set within various traditions mean
really and primarily that
one is subject to prejudices and limited in
one's freedom?

Is not,

rather, all human existence, even the freest, limited
ana qualified in

various ways?

If this is true,

then the idea of an absolute reason is

impossible for historical humanity.

Reason exists for us only in
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concrete, Historical
ter.s, i.e..

u

is not its o«n
.aster,

but

regains constantly
dependent upon circumstances
in which it
operates...
And the circumstances
in which it operates
are
determined, in part
nart at least,
ipocf
k
^.u
by the prejudices
we inherit from our
historical-linguistic situation.
The Enlightenment -s
error went beyond merely
mistaking the
dlsposibility Of prejudices.
Prejudices are not merely
barriers to
truth, blinders on our
view of the world, or
distortions of
knowledge:
...prejudice, certainly does
not mean a false judgement,
but it is part of the
idea it can have a positive
and a negative
value."^5
,133^^^^^^ ^^^^ emphatically,
..prejudices are not
necessarily unjustified and
erroneous, so that they inevitably
distort
the truth.
In fact, the historicity
of our existence entails
that
prejudices, in the literal sense
of the word, constitute the
initial
directedness of our whole ability
to experience.
Prejudices are
Simply conditions whereby we
experience something - whereby what
we
encounter says something to us.'.^*
short, there are legitimate

m

prejudices as well as illegitimate
ones, prejudices that are
productive of knowledge that enable
us to have access to the world.
Indeed, it is only because of these
prejudices that we can have

knowledge of the world.

They are the fundamental conditions
of our

knowledge of the world.

Gadamer puts is quite strongly:

..Jhls

recognition that all understanding inevitably
involves some prejudice
gives the hermeneutic problem its real thrust.'.^''

Moreover, it is

only the recognition of the essentiality
of prejudice that guarantees
the accuracy of understanding of our own
historicity.

.'The

overcoming
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Of

an

prejudice, this gio5al
demand of the Enlightenment,
will p.ove
to be itself a prejudice,
the removal of which
opens the .ay tc an
appropriate understanding
of our finitude,
which dominates not only
our humanity, but also
our historical
consciousness.-^^

The fact that there
are both positive and
negative prejudices,
prejudices that are productive
of knowledge as well
as prejudices that
constrain our experience,
determines the nature of
the problem of
knowledge:

formulate the central question
of a truly historica/°
epistemologically its fundamental
question
namp?.'''V'''
namely where is the ground of
the legitimacy of preluSices-^
What distinguishes legitimate
prejudices from all the
countless ones which it is the
undeniable [ask of the
critical reason to overcome. "39

Unfortunately, we cannot determine
ahead of time which prejudices
are legitimate, i.e.,
productive or contain truth.

"The prejudices

and foremeanings in the mind of
the interpreter are not at his
free
disposal. He is not able to separate
in advance the productive

prejudices that make understanding
possible, from the prejudices that
hinder understanding and lead to
misunderstanding. "^° The

legitimacy or productivity of prejudices
can only be determined
retrospectively.

It is only through the working out of
the

forestructure of prejudice through the process
of understanding and

experience that we can determine which of our
prejudices are
illegitimate, wrong, constraining, and misleading,
and which of our
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prejudices are accurate,
legiu.ate, correct,
iiiu.inating, or
encouraged openness to
experience.
The working out of
our prejudices to
determine their legitimacy
is
achieved through the
hermeneutic circle.
Prejudices provioe us with
what Gadamer calls,
following Heidegger, the
forestructure of
understanding, i.e., a set
of meanings that in
part determine the
possible meanings that any
text or social action
(sometimes referred
to as the text-analogue)
can have for us. The
forestructure of
understanding both enables
and ccnstrains our
understanding. Out of
this forestructure of
understanding we project a
meaning or set of
possible meanings when we
attempt to understand a text
or social
action.
"A person who is
trying to understand a text
is always
performing an act of projecting.
He projects before himself
a meaning
for the text as a whole
as soon as some initial meaning
emerges in the
text.
Again, the latter emerges only
because he is reading the text
«lth particular expectations
in regard to a certain meaning.
The

working out of this foreproject,
which is constantly revised in
terras
of what emerges as he penetrates
into meaning, is understanding
what
IS there."
We project some meaning that
will be born out, others
that will prove fruitless, ana
still additional meanings may emerge
in
the course of our understanding a
text.

"The process that Heidegger

describes is that every revision of the
fore-project is capable of

projecting before itself a new project of
meaning, that rival projects
can emerge side by side until it
becomes clearer what the unity of

meaning is, that interpretation begins with
fore-conceptions that are
replaced by more suitable ones.

This constant process of new

projection is t.e .ove.ent
of understanoing
and interpretation
This forestructuxe
of understanaing
and the process of
understanding that takes
place do
not n,ean that we
ciing
dog.aticaiiy to preconceptions
or that we su™.arii,
reject o.r
previous understanding
(assuming either of
these courses of action
are
actually open to us).
The new meanings
that emerge and and
the
revision of our previous
understanding are in .any
respects not at our
disposal to ignore or
confirm:

"""^ ^^^^
L'a:!ngrc^Lt'ttd"r^?o"od-i^'°"^^;:;
we cannot continually
^ust as
.LunSe.stand" ff,^^^"^^*^^°^ ^ «°rd without
it affecting the meanlnn of tJf h
^^^^
blindly to our own
?SJe-™eanina
understand the meaning
oranothe?
Of TnlllVL''

Tit

'°

"^-^ - -

fo?get'an''S^?
A 1° Sat° s"!ste3'!s'?hat""'"5
n^eaning of amtheJ pe son
o?

T^"

*

e'^usf

id°ea\'

T

°-

hrtexr^eS'^n'"

''^""s"^^

---g^^

wltTth^^'hT
with^the
Whole of our own meanings
or ourselves ?n refaUon
In a sense the new
understanding that leads to a
re-evaluation and
revision of the forestructure
of understanding is not at
our disposal,
it forces itself on us,
implies Gada^er:
"If a person is trying to

understand something, he will not
be able to rely from the start
on
his own chance previous ideas,
missing as logically and stubbornly
as

possible the actual meaning of the
text until the latter becomes
so
persistently audible that it breaks
through the imagined understanding
of it.

Rather, a person trying to understand
a text is prepared for

it to tell him something."*"

Again, this does not mean that we
can

abandon our prejedices that constitute
our forestructure of
understanding; but neither an we cling to them
dogmatically if we are

co..itted to genuine
understanding.

The dialogue with
the partner or

confrontation of the text
will lead to

a

revision of our forestructure
Of understanding, and
out of that new projected
meanings will e.erge

Thrs constant projection
and revision of meaning,
this her.eneutic
Circle, .eans that the
understanding we achieve at any
given .o.ent
will always be provisional,
subject to further revision.
Hence,
notions of objective truth,
far from being superior
claims to truth,
are the interruption of
this hermeneutic movement;
they attempt to
freeze what is always
subject to movement and are
therefore an
abstraction from truth.

The Ubiquity of Au thority and Tr^ditinn

Gadamer insists that the problem
of prejudices reawakens the
problem of authority as well. The
Enlightenment critique of prejudice
was initially tied to its rejection
of authority, the latter being
the
source of prejudice and hence,

human error.

from the Enlightenment's standpoint,

But if there can be legitimate
prejudices, prejudices

that are the source not of error but
of genuine knowledge, then the

Enlightenment rejection of all authority
is problematic and the
question of legitimate authority re-merges:

That the prejudices that determine what
I think are due to my
own narrowness of vision is a judgement
that is made from the
standpoint of their dissolution and illumination
and holds
only of unjustified prejudices,
if, contrariwise, there are
justified prejudices productive of knowledge, then we
are
back with the problem of authority. Hence, the radical
consequences of the enlightenment, which are still contained
in Schleiermacher's faith in method, are not
tenable .45

IDA

The Enughtenmenfs
r.U.r. to appropriately
address the question
Of authority is not
limited to its
misunderstanding of the
relationship amongst
authority-prejudice-knowledge.
It extends to a
"Misunderstanding of the
relationship between
authority and tradition
°n the one hand, and
freedo. and reason on
the other.
According to
the Enlightenment
the acceptance of
authority and tradition
is
diametrically opposed to the
exercise of one's reason
and freedom.
Accordingly, the totally
rational, autonomous
subject is one who
rejects all authority and
tradition and the prejudices
they foster
He allows neither the
authority of individuals
nor that of tradition
to intrude on the
deliberations of reason and
exercise of free
Choice. He is. in Martin
Hollis' terms, the autonomous
man one who is
completely self-determined.
Or as Herbert Marcuse
unqualifiedly puts
it:
"The recognition of authority
as a basic force of social
praxis
attacks the very roots of human
freedom:
it means (in a different
sense in each case) the
surrender of autonomy (of thought,
will,
action), the tying of the
subject's reason and will to
pre-established
contents in such a way that
these contents do not form the
'material'
to be changed by the will
of the individual but are taken
over as they
stand as the obligatory norms for
his reason and will."**

This view of the acceptance of
authority as the subjugation of

one's reason and will to that of another
misapprehends the essence of
authority, argues Gadamer.

Dealing first with the authority of

particular individuals, Gadamer argues, like
Winch, that there is an
epistemological basis for authority.

Rejecting the equation of the

acceptance of authority with authoritarianism, he
says, "But this is
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,33,,,, „^

^^^^ ^^^^
^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^
that have authority;
hut the authority of
persons is hased ultimately
not on the suhjectlon
and ahdioation of
reason, hut on the
recoonltio^
and knowledge - knowledge
namely, that the other
is superior to
cneself in judgement and
Insight ano that for this
reason his
judgement takes Mieceaence,
precedence i.e.
p
if k
it
has priority over one's
own
The esscence of authority
is not the failure
to exeroise one's own
reason or carry out one's
own will. Gadamer,
like Winch, insists that
authority "rests on
recognition and hence on an
act of reason itself
Which, aware of its own
limitations, accepts that
others have a better
understanding. Authority in
this sense, properly
understood, has
nothing to do with blind
obedience to a command. Indeed,
authority
has nothing to do with
obedience, but rather with
knowledge."*8
.

i

.

Thus, the acceptance of
authority is not necessarily
a restriction

on freedom and reason but
is consistent with their
exercise. For it
is no restriction on my
reason to recognize the superior
knowledge of
another. Moreover, the carrying
out of any freely chosen action
may
require the recognition of another's
superior knowledge and insight
pertaining to that action. Authority,
then, is not something that is
imposed but a guide to action
that is accepted by the individual
who
places himself under the direction
of authority.
"Thus the

recognition of authority Is always
connected with the idea that what
authority states is not irrational and
arbitrary, but can be seen in
principle, to be true.

This is the essence of the authority
claimeo

by the teacher, the superior, the expert.

are legitimized by the person himself.

The prejudices they implant

Their validity demands that
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tHis .a.es t.e™ t.en,
in a sense, objective
p.eju.ices. .cr the. ..ing
about the sa.e bias in
favor of something that
can co.e about through
other .eans, e.g.
through the solid
grounds offered by reason."*'
There is a second
dimension to the proble.
of authority that
ste.s
fro. our historicality.
"...na.ely tradition. That
which has been
sanctioned by tradition and
custo. has an authority
that it nameless
ahd cur finite historical
being is oar.ed by the
fact that always the
authority of what has been
transmitted - ano not only
what is clearly
grounded - has power over
our attitudes and behavior. "^O
Tradition
is not .erely a constraint
on our behavior that we
could choose to
leave behind. We always
act within the boundaries
of tradition.
unfortunately, fro. Gada.er's
standpoint, both the Enlightenment
and the Romantics defined
tradition in opposition to
reason and
freedom. But whereas the
Enlightenment saw the constraint
that
tradition imposed on reason and
freedom as unnecessary ano harmful,
the Romantics insisted that
unbridled reason and freedom woula
doom
human society. But neither
side denied the inherent opposition

between reason and freedom on the
one hand and tradition on the
other.

In this sense the Enlightenment
and the Romantics were mirror

images of each other, differing only
in their respective preferences.
Both missed the essential connection,
claims Gadamer, between reason
and freedom, and tradition.

Traditidn does not survive and persist simply
out of blind

unreflective adherence to what has always been
the case.

The

continuation of tradition depends itself on the
exercise of reason.
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The fact is that
t.a.Uicn is ccnstanti.
an element of f.ee.o.
an. of
history itself. Even
the .est genuine and
sciid tradition does
not
persist b, nature because
of an inertia that
once existed. It needs
to be affirmed, embraced,
cultivated.
It is, essentially
preservation, such as is
active in all historical
change. But
preservation is an act of
reason, though an
inconspicuous one.... At
any rate, preservation
is as
a freely chosen action
as revolution
and renewal. That is
why both the enlightenment's
critique of
tradition and its romantic
rehabilitation are less than
their true
historical being...51 contrary
to there being an antithesis
between
reason and tradition, the
two are inseperable elements
of man's
historical being.

«h

This last point cannot be
understated, from Gadamer's

perspective.
tradition.

There is no possibility of
exercising reason outside of
To insist that reason can
step outside of tradition

completely is to insist there is
an abstract, independent
seat of
reason outside of society. No
such independent perspective
exists,
claims Gadamer.
possible.

In short, it is tradition
that makes reason

There is no place outside of
tradition form which we can

examine that tradition:

"...we stand always within tradition,
and

this is no objectifying process,
i.e. we do not conceive of what

tradition says as something other,
something alien.

It is always part

of us, a model or exemplar, a
recognition of ourselves which our later

historical judgement would hardly see as
a kind of knowledge, but as
the simplest preservation of tradition. "^^

The inescapability of tradition holds not
just for everyday life
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but for the reflective
understanding of that
life and tradition
as
well.
What we perceive to
de the problems of
our age, our interest
in
the past, the issues
to be investigated,
are all determined by
tradition. There is no
possibility of an objective
approach to the
study Of tradition for
such an approach would
have no starting point
would have no contact with
the world which it
seeks to know and
explore. To study tradition
one .ust let it speak and
let oneself be
addressed by it. Hence
Gada.er, like Winch, denies
the antithesis
between tradition and knowledge.
In Gadamar's words, "Our
historical
consciousness is always filled
with a variety of voices in
which the
echo Of the past is heard...53
tradition, then, is the
founoation on
which reason must build.
Attempts to construct an
objective

U

rationality like that advocated
by Martin Hollis, one that
is free of
tradition, untouched by historical
circumstances, is bound to
flbunder.

For the goal of an ahistorical,
objective reason is a mere

mirage and formulations of
objective rationality must either
be so
abstract as to be meaningless or they
must implicitly rely on some

unacknowledged tradition.
The example of academic life
illustrates Gaoamer's point in

several respects.

In order for us to pursue academic
life as we know

it we must accept a set of traditional
standards regulating the

activities that constitute academic life.

These standards and norms

are binding on those engaged in academic
life.

Norms concerning

plagiarism, a certain etiquette regulating academic
conferences, and

standards of criticism are some of the traditions
that those involved
in academic life take as authoritative.

They are not standards and
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norms that are constantlv
':iy scr[itini,=H
scrutinized or in need
of Justification
even though so.e of
those standards .a,
occasionaiiy undergo revision

Moreover .any of these
standards of hehavior
that are taken as
authoritative within academic
life are constitutive
of that life
If
they were to he
discarded or altered
significantly, academic life
as
we .now it would cease
to exist.
In short, the
traditional standards
(such as those prohibiting
plagiarism, of academic life
make that way
Of life possible,
without those traditions
we could not even choose
to engage in academic
life as we know it; it
would not even be an
option for us.

Consequently these standards
and norms are not merely
restrictions
on those engaged in
academic life. They are, in
fact, the necessary
foundations of that way of life,
the foundations that make
our freedom
to pursue academic life
possible. Hence, the elimination
of those
traditional standards would make
it impossible for us to
exercise our
freedom of choice to follow that
way of life as we know it.

What is perhaps equally important,
though underdeveloped in Truth
and Method, is the extent to
which the traditons and standards
of

academic life make possible the
establishment and recognition of
individuals as authorities within
particular academic fields and areas
of specialization.

It is only within the contexts of
the traditional

standards and practices governing
academic life, standards taken as

authoritative for the conduct of that life,
that it is possible to
determine who might legitimately be considered

an"

particular field, say on the philosophy of Kant.

authority within a
Moreover, those

particular traditions help determine the nature of those

no
authorUities.

According:,, a ..rrerent
set or .ac.g.oun.
t.a.itlons
-ght very ^ell establish
authorities of a different
nature.
It is
the authority of
academic traditions, in
other «oros. that
provides
the foundation for the
personal authority of
the academic in his
particular field or area of
specialization.
in turn, these of
us seeking tc understand
a particular subject
-tter (staying «ith our example,
say the philosophy of
Kant, »oulc
seek out those considered
to be authorities in
that particuar field
(Kanfs philosophy), and
consult the. regarding
difficult aspects,
passages or points of Kanfs
work.
Our freedom to pursue the
study of
Kant, and our understanding
of it, is made possible
by the authority
of academic traditions
and ways of life.
In su., the authority
of

academic traditions and the
individual authority that they
give rise
to are the necessary
requirements for our being free
to pursue
academic life and the study of
those fields that interest
us.
The
relationship between this authority
and traoition on the one hand
and
freedom and knowledge on the
other is not a contingent
relationship
but is internal; the former
helps constitute the latter.
It would be a mistake to interpret
Gadamer's account of authority

as an authoritarian defense of
all de facto authority.

aim is, in some respects at least,
just the opposite.

Indeed, his
It is precisely

the acceptance of the pronouncements
of scientific authority, which he
sees as partially anonymous and
therefore unaccountable, that Gadamer

believes to be one of the primary problems
facing industrial Western
societies.

He hopes to shake both the unconscious
acceptance and the

conscious but uncritical acceptance of scientific
authority in areas

Ill

'^^t axe .e.cn. the
legitimate .eal. an.
expertise or
science or where truth
claims resulting fro.
other forms of
understanding are denigrated.
This concern is
reflected in his
criticis™ of science's
self-understanding and its
reslutant position
towards doth social life
and nature,
this respect Gadamer's
wor.
can be interpreted as
a continuation of
the themes that Heidegger
lays
out, particularly in
"The Question Concerning
Technology." Hence

m

Gadamer-s position places
him sguarely at odds
with the most dominant
form of authority existent
in contemporary industrial
society, i.e.
the authority of those
who exercise technocratic
control over the
everyday lives of individual
citizens.
Second, Gadamer should not
be interpreted as attempting
to
resurrect older forms of
authority that some conservative
thinkers see
in decline in the twentieth
century (e.g. the decline of
the authority
of the aristocracy in
political life). Such an
interpretation fails
to take account of Gadamer
's expressed aim of
rehabilitating

Aristotle's notion of practical
wisdom as a resource with which
the
common citizen could fight the
encroachment of science as a standard
and way of organizing, conducting
and controlling everyday life.
Gadamer 's defense of genuine
authority and the challenge that it
constitutes to those who insist on
interpreting authority as
antithetical to freedom and something which
must therefore be limited
can be summarized as follows.
Language and history do not just bind
us to a linguistic-historical situation
but also make possible the

distanciation necessary for the critical understanding
of our past,
and the possibilities for the present
and our future.

A necessay part
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Of that linguistic-Situation
is constituted by
tradition, the
authority that tradition
holds for us, and those
authorities

that it

engenders.

Authority itself, then,
is not something that
is
eli^inahle for beings whose
iife is linguistically
and historically
constituted. Whether or
not social theorists
and actors wish to ad^it
the ineyitability of
authority, it persists.
Moreover, this is true no
less for science as it
is for other
for^s Of life and
understanding, within science
the increasing
tendency towards specialization
has .ade the pronouncements
of
specialists in any particular
field incomprehensible to
their
counterparts in other fields.
In .any respects the
growing diyision
of labor in science has
made laymen of us all. The
result is that
even the most sophisticated
researcher in one field must take
the
statements of those in other
specialized fields on authority.

Ironically, the division of labor
that has resulted from the
virtual
boundless growth of science, a
science that once set for itself
the
task of criticising and eliminating
all forms of authority, has led
to
the creation of new forms of
authority within science as well as
new
forms of authority between the
scientific community and society as a
whole.

Moreover the authority of science itself
rests on a tradition

that it takes uncritically, a posture
towards nature that science has

never openly challenged or scrutinized:
the idea of objectivity that

reduces nature to a mere pool of natural
resources, the instrumental

means to man's purposes.
Given this inescapability of authority, evidenced
even within the
growth of science itself, it can be seen in retrospect
that the

113

Enlightenment attack on authority
could only have resulted in
the
creation of new forms of
authority that mask themselves
under the
guise Of freedom and reason.
The task of the social
theorist, then is
to come to a full understanding
of genuine authority that
would make
the existence of authority
recognizable. Such an achievement
would be
the first step in laying
the foundation for the
appropriate critical
evaluation of those in authority
and thereby enable them to be
held
publicly accountable.

Several parallels emerge between
Gadamer's and winch's respective
accounts of authority. First, both
insist that authority, because it
is tied to tradition (Gadamer)
or a way of life (Winch), is an

ineliminable aspect of human social
existence.

It is not something we

could eliminate even if we wanted to.
Second, both see an epistemological
basis to authority.

Those who

are in authority are those whose
superior knowledge, skill or insight
has been established.

Hence, authority cannot be defined in

opposition to knowledge and reason.

Authority is founded on the

exercise of superior knowledge and reason and
subsequently helps to

detennine better and worse, good and bad instances,
applications,
extensions or interpretations of a particular set of
traditions.
Third, and related to the previous point, authority
cannot simply
be defined in opposition to freedom.

On the contrary,

both winch and

Gadamer insist that the existence of authority is one of the
conditions for the exercise of freedom.

For both, the authority of

established ways of life or traditions enable us to act in the world
and provide standards of criticism for the reflective evaluation of

those actions, enable
us to determine
good and bad, better
and worse
reasons for acting and
ways of proceeding.
..t.orit. enables rational
free choice.
In spite Of these
similarities one subtle
difference does exist

between the two accounts
of authority.

«nch is somewhat more
explicit in connecting
the authority of
individuals, those recognized
as authorities concerning
a way of life, to
the established standards
Of that way of life. A
triadic relationship
exists, he claims
amongst a way of life,
those in authority, and
those over whom
authority is exercised.
The last remain in a
position to hold the
second accountable by
standards provided by the
first.
In other
words, a way of life provides
those over whom authority
is exercised
with a set df standards with
which to judge the actions
and
pronouncements of those in authority,
even when those actions and
pronouncements are claimed to be
interpretations of that way of life.
Gadamer. on the other hand,
though he connects the authority
of
individuals to knowledge of tradition
and established standards of
conduct, is not quite so explicit
about how those over whom authority
is exercised are able to check
the pronouncements of those in

authority.

At times he seems to give those
in authority almost

complete hegemony in interpreting ways
of life and underplays the

extent to which the recognition of
individuals as authorities can
itself only be an act of reason if
those placing themselves under
authority have themselves some insight
into that traoition, some
notion (even if unarticulated or only
vaguely articulated), of the
good and bad, right and wrong, better
and worse applications.
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interpretations, adaptations
and extensions of
that traoition.

Philosophioal Hermeneutir. .n^
Self-ldPnti

The ontological priority
that Gada.er olai.s
for language has
several consequences for
the concept of the
autonomous inoividual.
would, for instance,
take issue with the
concept of the individual
that emerges with the
Enlightenment and the possibilities
of

self-determined actions.

It

Specifically, it would mean
that "Language

maintains a kind of independent
life over against the
individual
member of a linguistic community
and introduces him, as he
grows into
it, to a particular
attitude and relationship to
the world as
well."
What this means for human
actions might best be

demonstrated by Gadamer's examples
of conversation and play.
In a genuine conversation
it is somewhat misleaoing,
argues

Gadamer, to say that we conduct
the conversation.

A genuine

conversation is one that takes on a
life of its own.

It takes turns,

leads in directions and arrives
at conclusions that are not within
the

will of either partner:

"the people conversing are far less
the

leaders of it than the led.

conversation.

happens to us

No one knows what will come out in
a

Understanding or its failure is like
.

a

process which

"^^

Similarly, in discussing the concept of play,
both in the artistic
and non-artistic sense, Gadamer argues
that the real subjects are not
the players of the game or the actors in
the play, but the game and

play itself.

In relationship to the author of the play as well
as to
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the actors

"the play has In
relation to the. all.
an absolute
autonomy...
The possibilities
for action by the
players or actors
are determined by the
play or the game.

Moreover, the self-knowledge
that would be the basis
for
individual action is itself
available only through
language. There is
no self-knowledge
outside of the linguistic
tradition that we inherit
and grow in.
"Rather, in all cur knowledge
of ourselves, and in all
knowledge of the world, we
are always alreaoy encompassed
by the
language that is our own. We
grow up and become acquainted
with men
and in the last analysis
with ourselves when we learn
to speak.""

Before we can be an

I

we must be the Thou that
language constitutes.

This view of the relationship
between language and self-knowledge
would lead Gadamer to dismiss the
possibility of a self-identity that
is totally independent of
the historical-linguistic
situation that
individual actors find themselves
in.
The fundamental ontological

status that Gadamer claims for
language and the prejudices that it

embodies implies that any actual,
non-abstract account of personal
identity would have to recognize that
the self-identity of the social
actor is constituted by some combination
of these prejudices of the

particular historical period.

In effect Gadamer 's rejection of the

so-called strong notion of personal identity,
such as that defended by

Martin Hollis, would run parallel to his
rejection of the
possibilities for understanding that are free of
the effects of
effective-history.

Mollis' version of self-identity is more

accurately described as self-deception, from Gadamer
's standpoint, for

Hollis requires the same objectivity, the same social amnesia,
that
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advocates an. t.at
.a.a.e. ...sts .3
.poss..e.

-entU.

is in fact Just
the

oppcsUe.

a for. of social
ioentity
w^ich. even i.
achievable, wcui. .a.e
the scciai acto.
..ine.a.ie to

protect the individual
from.
Hollis- project for
autononnous self-identity,
it will be
remembered, is that the
autonomous man must be
able to distance
himself from the social
roles available to him
in order to rationally
decide Which Of those
roles is constitutive
of his true identity
and
embddies purposes, ends
and a way of life that
are consonant with his
real interests. The
autonomous man, fom Hollis'
standpoint, can
accurately evaluate the
social rcles of his
social-historical
Situation only if they no
longer have any immediate
effect on him. He
must be able to shed his
roles in the same manner
the historicist
insists we must shed our
historical prejudices and
values.

opposed to Hollis' rationalist
account of personal identity
the
Gadamerian would offer an account
of personal identity that
binds it
intimately to the language and
traditions of one's historical
situation. Our personal identity
is possible because of the
constant
dialogue that we have with and
within our language. It is our

participation within our language
and traditions that allows us
to
situate ourselves both historically
and with respect to our

contemporaries, to reflect upon the
situation and those relationships
and thereby determine and
reflect upon who and what we are.
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our participation in
this language, at
ieast in its .est
.eveiope.
ro..s, takes the for.
of a conversation
or dialogue. Each
of the
partners of the conversation
poses questions to the
other, advances a
series of claims or
pursues a line of questioning,
reguiring the
partner in the dialogue
to respond.
This genuine conversation
requires that each participant
re.ain open to what the
other has to
say without giving up
his own perspective.
Hence, in the course of
the dialogue so.e ideas,
arguments, beliefs, prejudices
will cone to
hought and subsequently be
discarded while others will
be affirmed or
allow further understanding,
it is out of this dialogue
that one's
identity emerges. The dialectic
of agree^nt, disagreement,
questions
and answer result in a for™
of identity that is anchored
in not just
one's subjectivity, but in the
mutual recognition of the other.
Hence, my self-perceptions, my
self-knowledge and self-identity are
all recognized (and thereby
affirmed) as well as challenged by
the

other in the dialogue.
The identity that each participant
experience is not unlike that

described by Hegel in the master-slave
dialectic.

In both instances

genuine recognition, recognition that
corroborates one's
self-identity, is dependent upon mutuality
between partners.

Moreover, since the dialogue involves
another, one with a different

horizon and set of prejudices, the
possibility of a genuinely critical

evaluation of one's self-identity is always
imminent.

Interestingly

enough, the more socially inclusive the dialogue,
the greater the

number of different horizons one is exposed to and
therefore the
greater the possibilities for criticism.
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on the other hand,
an identity that
is rooted outsioe
of ahy

on-going linguistic tradition
(assuming for the ti.e
being that suoh
an Identity were possible)
would not experience the
mutuality of
partners in a dialogue.
It would be an
identity that would have
difficulty sustaining itself
if and when not
corroborated by others
«hen the subject
're-e^erged' in social life,
it would face the sa.e
problems that Hegel outlines
for self-consciousness
£rior to the
.aster-Slave dialectic. The
self-ioentity of the incivioual.
whatever
he determined it to be,
would still lack the necessary
requirement to
.ake it the social identity
that Hollis pays lip service
to.
Hence,
the identity that would emerge
from Hollis' ahistorical
rationality!
lacking the confirmation of
an other self-consciousness,
would be
susceptible to a shattering upon
contact with others whose identity
was firmly rooted in the mutuality
of a dialogical relationship,

m

the company of self-conscious
individuals with a so-called weak

personal identity, weak because, according
to Hollis, it is not

distanced from the social fabric it
emerges from, the individual with
'strong' personal identity of Hollisautonomous man would live a

precarious, fleeting existence.

CHAPTER

III

PHILOSOPHICAL HERN€NEUTICS
TO CRITICAL

The growth of science,
the diffusion of
scientific .ethod, and the

concern for Ourgen Haber.as
as they are for Gada.er.
Moreover, both
cadaver and Haber.as use
the Aristotlean .odel of
practical philosophy
as a contrast
model for the relationship
between theory and
practice. However, Habermasconcern with the growth of
science and
technology appears to have had
a slightly different
emphasis than
Gadamer- s. Whereas Gadamer
's concern with the
growth of scientific
objectivism has focusea primarily,
though not exclusively, on the

interpretation of texts and the
evolution of German philosophy,

Habermas has been more explicit in
his focus on the social ana
political implications of the development
of science and technology.

Habermas agrees with Gadamer that the
growth of science and
technology has been characteristic of
modern society.

Not only has

science become a primary and consciously
applied factor of production
in industrial societies but the
modern world has witnessed the

reflexive application of scientific
methods to the study ana

organization of social-political life, resulting
in a decline in the
classical doctrine of politics as a prudential
art and skill and the
rise of a Hobbesian notion of a science of
politics.

Among the

positive outcomes of this phenomena, claims Habermas,
was the
empirical knowledge it made possible.
120

"The affirmative achievement of

^
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the .cdern sciences
consists in statements
about empirical
uniformities...^ This
empirical knowledge, in
turn, enabled greater
technical control over
nature and society.
A second positive
achievement, and one that
flows from the first

'

is that the critical
capacity that scientific
reason made possible
resulted in the rational
challenge to and subsequent
undermining of

traditional dogmatisms.

At its inception,
..Reason takes up a partisan

position in the controversy
between critique and dogmatism,
and with
each new stage of emancipation
it wins a further victory,
this

m

kind of practical reason,
insight and the explicit
interest in
liberation converge. The higher
level of reflection coincides
with a
step forward in the progress
toward the autonomy of the
individual,
and with the elimination
of suffering and the furthering
of concrete
happiness. Reason involved in
the argument against dogmatism
has

definitely taken up this interest
as its own.... Reason has not
as yet
renounced the will to be rational.'.^
Reason at this point still
aspires to the critical evaluation
of practical questions.
However, the relationship between
theory and practice changed

significantly, argues Habermas, with the
positivist appropriation of

reason and its concommitant separation
of

facts and values.

now is restricted to the realm of
empirical statements.

Reason

Statements

not reducible to empirical claims
become mere value judgements, the

adjudication of which lies outside the boundaries
of rational
argument.

Consequently, .'Every single value appears as
a meaningless

agglomerations of meaning, stamped solely with the stigma
of
irrationality, so that the priority of one value over the other thus

^

the persuasiveness
which a value
vdiue claimc;
Claims w.>h
with respect to action cannot be rationally
justified."^
In spite of the
positivist
bXLivist ri^^-im
M
claim fh.^
that reason can

no longer
address and rasclva
questions of value,
instrumental reason is
extended to .ore and more
areas of .odern life in
an atte.pt to
rationalize the
to achieve pre-deter.ined
ends.
Reason,

^

in its

narrowly defined,
purposive-rational for., is extended
to .ore areas
of sooial life. But
it addresses only those
questions that oan fit
the narrow field of
instrumental rationality or
restates practical
questions so that they can
fit that for. of reason,
leaving the .ost
fundamental, practical questions
and issues untouched.
Reason is now
installed in a different position
with respect to the
relationship
between dogmatism and practice:

constellation of dogmatism, reason
and decision
^h^^
eighteenth century anS
exacUvTtKp°H°"''^^'''^^
exactly
to the degree to which the
positive sciences have
become productive forces in
social development! For as
our civilization has become
increasingly scientific the
dimension within which theory was
once directed towards
praxis has become correspondingly
constricted. The laws
of self-reproduction demand of
an industrially advanced
'' it look after its survival on an'escaLting
scalp n'f'
scale
of a continually refined
administration of human
beings and their relations with
each other by means of
social organization.
In this system, science,
technology, industry and administration
interlock in a
circular process. In this process the
relationship of
tneory to praxis can now only assert
itself as the
purposive-rational application of techniques assured
by
empirical science. The social potential of
science is
reduced to the powers of technical control its
potential for enlightened action is no longer
considered.
The empirical, analytical sciences produce
technical recommendations, but they furnish
no answer to
practical questions.
The evolution of modern science, at
least since its appropriation by
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PositiWs., .eans that the
p.c.ise of the Ena,hten.ent
that science
once hel. regains

unfuinneo.

relegated to the real,
of

ultimately, practical
questions are

^

.alue Judgements and
hence outside the
boundaries of rational
argument.
Consequently, reason no
longer
serves as the guiding
force in the enlightenment
of citizens and the
development of their
potential to ta.e control
of and shape their own
history.
..Thus on this level
the critipue of ideology
involuntarily
furnishes the proof that
progress of rationalization
limited in terms
Of empirical science to
technical control is paid
for with the

corresponding growth of a mass
or irrationality in the
domain of
praxis itself. For action
still demands an orientation
as it did
before. But now it is
dissected into a rational
implementation of
techniques and strategies and
a irrational choice of
value-systems.
The price paid for the
economy
the selection of means is
a

m

decisionism set wholly free in
the selection of the
highest-level
goals.

However, what presents itself
at this point as the neutrality
of
scientifically grounded reason toward
ultimate questions of social

practice is, claims Habermas, a
facade.

In fact scientific

rationality and control are now assumed
as values in themselves.

Having gained a monopoly in the
evaluation of rational action, science
can now undermine competing claims
to the guioance of social action,
"Any theory that relates to praxis
in any way other than by

strengthening and perfecting the possibilities
for purposive rational
action must now appear dogmatic.

The methodology of the empirical

sciences is tacitly but effectively rooted in

a

technical cognitive
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interest that excludes
other interests:
cohsepuehtly all other
relations to life-praxis
oan .e blocked out
under the slogan of
ethical neutrality or
value-freed™. The economy
in the selection of
purpcsiva-rational .eans which
is guaranteed by
conditional
predictions in the for. of
technical reco™endations
is the sole
admissible value, and it
too is not seen explicitly
as a value,
because it simply seems tc
coincide with rationality
as such."' Any
theoretical approach to
social practice which does
not fit within the
boundaries of purposive-rational
action appears ipso facto
irrational
and dogmatic.

Not only does the apparent
value neutrality of scientific
exclude competing approaches
to social theory on the
basis of
inherent irrationality and
dogmatism (i.e. value commitment),
moreover, within that scientific
technique lurks the inherent

method
their
but,

value of

control and manipulation of the
object of scientific knowledge
and
organization. The original Enlightenment
goal of the creation of an
informed, emancipated citizenry
is replaced by the goal of
systematic,

behavioral control by social engineers.

In Habermas' words,

"Emancipation by means of enlightenment
is replaced by instructions in
control over objective or objectified
processes. Socially effective
theory is no longer directed toward
the consciousness of human beings
who live together and discuss matters
which with each other, but to
the behavior of human beings who
manipulate.

As a productive force of

industrial development, it changes the basis
of human life, but it no
longer reaches our critically beyond this
basis to raise life itself,
for the sake of life, to another level."
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one consequence of
the unrestrained
spread of scientific
fcr.s of
rationaiit. to ail areas
of social life is
the foreciosin, of
the ver,
possibility Of emancipation.
Haber.as puts this
point sharply
"...the danger of an
exclusively technical
civilization, which is
devoid Of the interconnnectipn
between theory and praxis,
can be
Clearly grasped; it is
threatened by the splitting
of its
consciousness, and uy
by tne
the splitting
sniiftinn of
of k
human beings into two
classes the social engineers
and the inmates of olosed
institutions."^ The
installation of reason as a
guide to social action,
though it once
held out the hope of the
creation of a society of
autonomous
individuals, freed from
dogmatism, ignorance and
traditional forms of
authority, threatens to
recreate the division of society
into a
minority with access to the
means of social control and
the majority
that is the object of that
control.
It is perhaps here that
we should take note of the
similarities

between Habermas- and Gadamer's
views of the growth of science
and
technology. First, both claim
to detect an inherent value in
the

scientific approach to knowledge and
social organization: the

relationship between the knowing
subject and the object of knowledge
is one of control or power.

Second, there are similarities in
their

attempts to unite theory and practice
in and attempt to replace the

relationship of control and domination
inherent in scientism and the
scientific organization of society.

As we mentioned earlier, both use

the Aristotlean model of practical
philosophy as a contrast model for
the relationship of theory to practice,
though the tendency to

rehabilitate that practical philosophy is more
pronounced in Gadamer
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than it is in Haber.as.

^netheless,

oth do see an important
role

for Philosophy in
countering the growth and
extension of scientific
for^s Of knowledge and
control, either directly
(Gada.er) or
indirectly through social
theory (Haber.as) .
it is in the context
of
this very general
agreement that *ber.as
appraises Cadaver's work and
finds several strengths
in it.

Habemias' Apprerlation of Fhi in.nph

cs

Most fundamentally Habermas
believes that Gadamer is quite
correct
in his account of the
historicity of understanding.
The

inteipretation of the present will
always and necessarily be made
with
a reference to the past
and an eye to the possibilities
for the
future.

This in turn has led Gadamer,
again quite rightly claims

Habermas, to emphasize the
objectivity of language through which
our
history is transmitted. Language
is not merely an instrument
at our
disposal to Shape as we see fit.
its objectivity requires that
the

speaking subject recognize not only
his freedom ftom language but his
dependence on it as well.-^°
Habermas further agrees with Gadamer
that this objectivity of
language does not totally close off the
possibilities of reflection:

"...reflexivity and objectivity are fundamental
traits of language, as
are creativity and the integration of
language into life-praxis."^^
In

recognizing the inherent reflective potential
of language Habermas

is acknowledging that Gadamer

's

claim that natural language posseses

the means to eludicate the language itself
or foreign languages is

correct.

Natural languages
possess the reflexive
potential that
enable the speaker to
confront and .a.e sense
of Poth opacities
within
his own language ana
external, Incomprehensible
sy.Polic systems.
In
Habermas. words, "the
.eans of natural language
are. In principle
sufficient for elucidating
the sense of any
symbolic complex, however
unfamiliar and inaccessible
It .ay Initially
appear.... Hermeneutic
axperlenca brings to consciousness
the position of a speaking
subject
vis-a-vis his language. He
can draw upon the
self-referentiality of
natural languages for
paraphrasing any changes
metacommunicatively...i2

Each natural language has,
in principle,

the self-sufficiency for
self-translation and for the
translation of
other languages.

Moreover, the creativity of
natural languages, the fact that
their
grammar allows infinite number
of combinations and
formulations,

enables the speaker to comprehend
new situations.

"This productivity

extends,..., not only to the
immediate generation of sentences
in
general, but also to the long-term
process of the formation of

interpretive schemes which are formulated
in everyday language and
which both enable and pre- judge the
making of experiences."^^
This reflexivity and creativity
enable each natural language to

transcend itself.

Philosophical hermeneutics emphasizes the
extent to

which it is language itself that enables
transcendence, that enables
each language to go beyond its immediate
self.

In doing so,

"Hermeneutics mistrusts any mediatizing of ordinary
languages and
refuses to step out of their dimension; insteao
it makes use of the

tendency to self-transcendence embedded
in linguistic practice.
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Languages themselves
possess the potential
of a reason that,
while
expressing itself
the particularity of
a speoific gra^ar.
Simultaneously refleots on
its limits and negates
them as partioular
Although always bouno
up in language, reason
always transoends
particular languages; it
lives in language only
by destroying the
particularities of language
through which alone it
is

m

incarnated...^*

By insisting on the
embeddedness of reason in

language and the resulting
tendency toward transcendence.

Philosophical hermeneutics
serves as an antidote to
those views of
language that see language
as a prison-house or a
monadically sealed
symbolic system.
In additon to its insights
into the objectivity of
language and

the connection between reason
and language, Habermas
believes that
Gadamer's work has several
positive consequences for the
sciences.
First, it demonstrates that
science is only one way of understanding;
it does not have a monopoly
on truth.

Moreover, science itself is

dependent on natural language within
which its is located.
"Hermeneutic consciousness also affects
the scientific

self-understanding of the natural sciences
but not, of course, their
methodology.

The insight that natural language
represents the 'last-

metalanguage for all theories expressed
in formal language elucidates
the epistemological locus of everyday
language within scientific

activity ."'^
Secondly, by focusing on the importance
of intersubjectivity and
its role in structuring the social life
world, it reminds the social

sciences that the social life-world cannot
be exhaustively accounted

for through operationalized
procedures; the intersubjective

pre-structuring presents unique
problems to the study of
the social
life,
specifically, "If the access
to data is no longer
.ediateo
through controlled observation
but through co^unication
in everyday
language, then theoretical
concepts can no longer be
operationalized
within the framework of the
trie Dre-«^ripnti
f in^n
^
pre-scientifically
developed language game
of physical measuring. "'^
Thirdly, and perhaps most
importantly, "Hermeneutic
consciousness
destroys the objectivist
self-understanding of the traditional

Geisteswissenschaften.

it follows from the
hermeneutic situatedness

of the interpreting scientist
that objectivity in understanding
cannot
be secured by an abstraction
from pre-conceived ioeas, but
only by

reflecting upon the context of
effective-history which connects

perceiving subjects and their objects. "^^

Philosophical

hermeneutics shows that the objectivist
understanding that is the goal
not only of positivism but also of
historicism is merely an

abstraction.

It misperceives the possibilities
of understanding,

language and history.
In its analysis of language and
the nature of understanding

Habermas insists that philosophical hermeneutics
is

a

substantial

improvement upon phenomenology and, more importantly,
the linguistic
analytic traditon that begins with the latter
Wittgenstein, of which
Winch is a part.

Wittgenstein, as Habermas reads him, characterized

understanding and the use of language as the application
of the

pre-established rules of
socialized.

a

language game into which one is

These language games are congealed in two senses.

First,

there is little or no
room fcr movement
within the language
game
itself or for its further
development. Secondly,
wittoenstein's

language games are, on
Habermas' reading, monadical
unities.
Ttere is
no possibility of genuine
translation between language
games,
"in his
(Wittgenstein's) hands the
language game congeals to
an opaque
unity
By emphasizing the historical
dimension of language, Gadamer
demonstrates its reflexivity and
the creative potential of
language
and is thereby able to show
that "language spheres are
not

monadiacally sealed off but are
inwardly as well as outwardly
porous.
The grammar of a language
cannot contain a rigid design
for its
application.

Whoever has learned to apply its
rules has not only

learned to express himself but
also to interpret expressions in
his
language. Both translation
(outwardly) and tradition (inwardly)
must
be possible in principle."^^
What is at stake here is not a
battle
between two esoteric views of language.
Habermas' sensitivity to

practical questions enables him to spell
out what the practical
implications of the competing views of
language are.

A completely

closed language game, one monadologically
sealed from alien language
games and firmly congealed internally,
would absorb individuals and

threaten the autonomous subject that Habermas
wishes to protect:
Whosoever starts from the normal case of
conversationand not ftom the model of precision langluage immediately
grasps the open structure of ordinary language.
An
'unbroken' intersubjectivity of the grammar in
force would
certainly make possible identity of meaning and thereby
constant relations of understanding; but it would at
the same
time destroy the identity of the self in communication
with
others
Languages that are no longer inwardly porous and
have hardened into rigid systems remove the breaks of
'

13.

°"^^™ther. They no longer
permit the vuln^r.hVrL
Which the idehtity of
?he'ego h2lo"di:^!cp"o" "°
With no roc. fcr
distanciatico, a ccpletely
cicsed and ccngeaied
language ga^e, while
providing ccmpiete
icentity cf meaning
and

undrcen cc^unicatich,
.culd ciose off
self-develcp.ent.

the pcssiPiiity of
autcncous

One possible political
ratification would be the

increased potential Tor
systematic control of the
way of life partly
constituted by the language
game.

But Gadamer.

account of language and
history show how this
problem is avoided, claims
Habermas. Gadamer, by
accurately
describing the historicity
of language, is able to
account for the
space that is available
to the speaking subject
resulting from .'his
specific freedom from, and
dependence on, language . "^^
short,
Gadamer -s work is an
improvement on Wittgenstein's
analysis of
language, cr at least Habermas'
reading of it, in two respects.
It
takes account of both the
translatability that exists between
language
games and the nature of
historical transmission of particular
language
games, specifically the creativity
inherent in language the enables
s

m

transcendence of that language.
The features of Gadamer 's
account of language and

intersubjectivity that are the basis of
its superiority to

Wittgenstein's notion of language games
also provide it with another
strength.

Gadamer 's work provides the foundation
for understanding

which is translatable into social
practice of those engaged in that
communication, claims Habermas.

"I

find Gadamer's real achievement in

the demonstration that
hermeneutic understanding is linked with
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transcendental necessity
to the articulation
of an
ori f
^" action
^"^o-orrentrng
self-understanding. "22 xhis
.nn
'''''''''
°' "^b--as. is
particularly
i,,
interesting since one
of the ^"ticisms
crltiVi^m. Of,
.
interpretive or hermeneutic
.
theory has been that
its account
accnunt of
„f
^
.
understanaing short-circuits
the
translation of that
understanding into social
practice
once again Haher.as
sees positive
political implications
fro. this
feature of philosophical
her.eneutics.
helps to provide the
basis
Of a for. Of
communication that makes
•

,

u

the use of force
less likely:

"intT^nl^TlllZi:^ roS^"^l"""^ -^-^^^ toward
^?"°"-°^i^"ting
self-under%tanSing

Of sSciL'qroips
makes possible a
form of consensus nn wM^k ; S"^""?^directions: verUcanv tn nn»?~"'"^"^ breakdown in two

"

elementary condition of
servival is dis^u^Jiri
possibility Of constraint

and^?e'cogni't\"n"'^:Shout'''

Hence, on Habermas' reading,
philosophical hermeneutics goes
part of
the way toward achieving
precisely the explicit goal
that Gadamer sets
out fdr it and that we
mentioned at the beginning of
the previous
chapter.

Finally, philosophical
hermeneutics with its claim to

universality, hopes to mediate
between the findings of science
and the
language of everyday life.
"Hermeneutic consciousness is, finally,

called upon in one area of
interpretation more than any other and
one
that is of great social interest:
the translation of important

scientific information into the language
of the life-world. "^^
growth and importance of science
in the modern world has created

The
a

-ed

to

.late scientinc .nowle.ge

to eve...a.

are.

nt

is

With Its claims to
universality ."25

Habermas' rriH-^ue of Ph
nncnpK.-.,i

ijenrierieutics

It xs in Its clai.
to universality that

Habe^as detects two
related flaws in Gada^er-s
account of Her^eneutic
understanding. The
f-st flaw consists of an
underestimation of the
necessity of and
possibilities for controlled,
methodical fo^s of reason
and
reflection.
The second flaw, flowing
fro. the first, is an
inability
on the part of
he^eneutic understanding to
detect and correct what
Habermas refers to as
systematically distorted
co^unioation.
Although Gadamer's critique
of objectivism and the
self-misunderstanding of science

that follows from it is
correct

argues Habermas, Gadamer
underestimates the efficiency
of methodically
controlled reflection and
overestimates the superiority
of
understanding that occurs in
unmediated natural language.
The claim
for the superiority of
unmediated understanding threatens
to undermine
the very goal that Gadamer
sets out for philosophical
heimeneutics.
The task of mediating between
the language of science and
the language
of everyday life requires
that philosophical hermeneutics
must,

translate the findings of a
monological system of communication
formulated in a language that is
removed from everyday speech to the
dialogical system of communication
that characterizes natural
language.

This requires not a reflection
within natural language but
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mediation between
different language
systems, m
y dge systems
claims Habermas.
Formulated this wav i-ho ot.^ui
'

-~...ola.l.,

'

that:

.eco.iUo.

were, step outsi.e
the .ialo.ical

..a

philosophical

To. the possi.ilit.
to, as it

st.ct.. or e.e...a.
la.oa.e an.
tc use language in
a .onological
«ay Tor the formal
constroction of
theories an. for the
organization of purposive
rational action "^^
It is precisely this
type of activity that
.ada.er shuns

denying its
necessity (an. possibility)
for intergrating the
scientific «orl. an.
every.ay life. The
i^unity Ca.a^er claims
fro^having to engage in
n-ethcological .isputes^^
allows the sciences to
ignore the
implications that philosophical
her.eneutios has for the stu.y
of

social life.

"The clai. which
her^eneutics legitimately
mates goo.
against the practically
influential absolution of a
general

.ethcology of the empirical
sciences, brings no .ispensation
from the
business of methodology in
general.

This claim will,

effective in the sciences or
not at all."28

i

fear, be

j„ 3^^^^^

ontological nature of Gadamer's
claims, the oppositon between
hermeneutic experience and knowledge
obtained methodologically, and
the claims for the superiority
of the unmediated understanding

transmitted through natural language,
succeeds only in securing the
irrelevance of philosophical hermeneutics

in a society on the verge of

total scientific and technological
control.

Accompanying this irrelevancy, and
once again flowing from the
claim of the universality and ontological
priority of language, is
form of irrationalism.

a

From Habermas' standpoint Gadamer has
aaopte.

something like Hegel's view of history
and substituted for Absolute
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Spxr.t the infinu. of
language,

role Of a .oving force
in history.

m

.cing so he .enies
reason the
Conseouent:,. the
development of

language is the development
of non-ratlonally
founded tradition:

lu^'gent'absllutf ''it'.'?''"; '^"^uage beoo.es

a

comprehend itself

as absolute spirit- 'it

subjective\p1ru'as\'bs°ott:Towlr^!h'X""^°"H

Objective in thp hiQfnTii.IT Z ^^^V^- n^is power becomes
°^ ^°^i^°ns of
possible experience
S^^^^^^
Shrinks to the awa?ene2^?ilt experience of reflection
happening in' w^ic^'t^llon'dmons^'f
^° '
irrationally accordino to timp ^hh ^
^"^^^^ "^^^^^e

transcending power of reflection
thaf is'afso operative
'^''^ ^° 1°^9^^ ^'^ch
beyond Itself
ueyono
iSSf'tr.n'oh'
to an absolute consciousness
whirh n
pretends to be. The way to
absolute idealism is barred
to a transcendental
consciousness that is hermeneu?i^^?i.
r'a

'buT''

thTp^^of

—

conti'ng1n?'c^^^^\'x'^

--^n

struck on

The inflated claims that
Gadamer makes for language and

hermeneutic understanding are the
complement to his underestimation
of
the power and independence of
reflection. The connection between
tradition and understanding does not
protect that tradition from
changes that are made possible by
the exercise of reason.
Gadamer's
view that "understanding - no
matter how controlled it may be cannot
simply leap over the interpreters
relationship to tradition"^° is

correct.

"But from the fact that understanding
is structurally a part

of the tradition that it further
develops through appropriation, it

does not follow that the medium of
tradition is not profoundly altered
by scientific reflection. "^^

In new and unanticipated situations

tradition must be prudently developed in ways
that are not simply the
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blind assertion fo
previous ideas and ways
of conduoting affairs
It
in such Situations
that reason .est olearly
shows its independence
fro. tradition.
..Cada.er fails to
appreciate the power of
reflection
that is developed in
understanding. This type of
reflection is no
longer blinded by the illusion
of an absolute,
self-grounded autonomy
that does not detach itself
fro. the soil of contingency
on which it
finds itself.
But in grasping the genesis
of the tradition fro. which
it proceeds and on which
it turns its back,
reflection shakes the
dogmatism of life practices.-^^
The capacity of reason
to shake the
nature-like appearance of existing
social practices and arrangements

-

is not altered by the fact
that

reason always confronts a particular

set of practices and tradition
and hence is always situated
within an

historical context.
In effect, Habermas interprets
Gadamer as saying that the exercise

of reason is merely the appropriation
and extension of tradition.

Consequently, Gadamer fails to appreciate
the changes that are the

potential results of the exercise of reason.

"In Gaoamer's view,

on-going traditon and hermeneutic inquiry merge
to

a

single point.

Opposed to this is the insight that the reflected
appropriation of
tradition breaks up the nature-like substance of
tradition and alters
the position of the subject in it."^^

m

fact it is only through

controlled reflection that philosophical hermeneutics could
make the
transition from an ad hoc, non-systematic apprehending of
tradition to
a genuine,

critical science.

understanding from

a

reflected procedure.

"A controlled distanciation can raise

prescientific experience to the rank of

a

In this way hermeneutic procedures enter into
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the social sciences. "^^

Habermas detects an
additional
•

nas no unmediated
accesscess,

•

(2)
all fh
(2) an
that4- constitutes
human reality is

somehow reflected in
language
^

an

.
eouallv serious
equally
flaw in the claim

i
'

p

i.-n
l^^g^^stic
in nature; and
(3)
•

flaws in understanding
are necessarily
endogenous,
if any or all
Of the adove conditions
are unmet, if
structures of meaning
or
structures that determine
meaning develop outside
and alongside the
structure of meaning
available
-Lc to natural
natural language;
lann
if there is more
to human reality
than what is reriected
reflected in
in natural
n.f
language; or if the
barriers to genuine
understanding are endogenous
or the result of the
very organization of
understanding, then the
Gadamerian claim to
^

.

universality on behalf of
philosophical hermeneutica
cannot be
sustained.

Habermas believes that the
development in linguistics and
Piagefs
work in genetic epistomology
are sufficient reason
for calling the
hermeneutic claim to universality
into question. But the most
serious

Challenge to that claim to
universality is posed by
psychoanalysis.
Habermas formulates the challenge
this way:

the question whether a
critical
the way
^^'P^^^
Skillful'lntPrn.^'^''°'"''^^'^
Skillful
interpretation is tied to the natural
competence
of everyday communication
with the help of a
theoretically based semantic analysis and thereby
refute the hermeneutic claim
to universality.
Can there
be an understanding of
meaning in relation to symbolic

Irtnni

""""^l

meta-language.33

°^ ^^^^^^ ^^tural language as the
last

In other words
is it possible
that there
tnere exist.
.
exists structures
of meanina

there are and that
psychoanalysis provides
the example.
"l
Shan... consider the
question whether a
critical science such
as
psychoanalysis can hy-pass
the .ay s.ill.ull
interpretation is tied to
the natural competence
of everyday
co^unication with the help
of a
theoretically based semantic
analysis - and thereby
refute the
hermeneutic claim to
universality."^^

one Of the primary
goals of psychoanalysis
is the interpretation
Of a variety of
phenonmena previously
thought to be meaningless

unexplalnable, or accidental.

Dreams, parapraxes,
neuroses, as'well

as a variety of other
common types of behavior
became, with the advent
Of psychoanalysis,
phenomena that could be
explained by demonstrating
the hidden sense or
meaning the such isolated
and seemingly

unimportant phenomena had for
the patient.

"It was a triumph of
the

interpretive art of psychoanalysis
when it succeeded in
demonstrating
the hioden sense or meaning
that certain common mental
acts of normal
people for which no one had
hitherto attempted to put
forward a
psychical explanation, were
to be regarded in the same
light as
the

symptoms of neurotics; that
is to say had meaning, which
was unknown
to the subject but which
could easily be discovered by
analytic

means.

139

—

p..:e.

.0. ps..oana:.3.s,

appea. .n .a..eots

..eve.

.3 t.at

.ten

t.e o.Ject

(as

t.e case c. .ea^s,
0.
ere .s nc .™e..ate
cpnnect.cn tp an.
ct.e. event c.
.e.av.o. (as is
one. t.e case wit. pPsessipns.
fantasies or pa.apra.es,.
A p.ecess
0

des..ppn.3tipn .as cccu^e.
..ic Pisconnects t.e
criminal event

experience or cpnflict
fro. public
cp™pnication.

As Haber.as puts

^t,

"...What is unccunscious
is removed fro.
puPiic co^unicaticn
insofar as It expresses
itself in sy.Pols or
actions anyway, it

-ifests

itself as a sy.ptp™,
that is as a mutilation
anP pistortion
of the text pf everyday
habitual language games. "^^
The exclusion of the
meaning of the psychoanalytic
text includes
the interruptiph of
the patients dialpgue
with himself.
"Because the
symbols that interpret
suppressed needs are excluded
frpm public
communication, the speaking
and acting subject's
communication with
himself in interrupted. The
privatized language of the
unconscious
motives is rendered inaccessible
to the ego. even thpugh
internally it
has cpnsiderable repercussions
upon that use of language
anp those
motivations of action that the
ego cpntrpls. The result
is that the
ego necessarily deceives
itself about its identity in
the symbolic
structures that is consciously
produces."^' The subject himself
does not have access to the
meanings of the symptoms and
furthermore
may not even perceive them
as symptpms pf anything.

Faced with this dilemma, the
analyst attempts to draw out the
missing parts of the phenomena
(dreams) or hidden drives, events or
wishes that the object of
explanatipn is tied to

.

Through scenic

~—
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understanding, i.e. the
reconstruction of thP

::

^^^^^"'^

" "
^
interpretation

-

-^^^"^
^

•

^^^^^

—

--"--"on

--cn.

in the case o.

or tne drea™ and
then an

cf the drea. as
a whole in ter.s
or th
° ^" "^^^s of
the residues of
the case of the
neurnti. h h
•

...
daily

life,

m

to Show the
connection to

see

frustrated wish or
orive

TWO features of
scenic understanding
place it outside the
process
c
everyday understanding
achieved through
natural language,
therehy
challenging the her.eneutic
clai. to universality.
Pirst. scenic
understanding ta.es place
within the analytic
relationship Petween
patient and analyst. It
is a methodologically
controlled artificially
created situation that
Hater.as insists fulfills
experimental
Cdhditions that Gada.er
would characterize as
a for. of ohjectivis™
Without this analytic
situation the meanings of
the dreams or symptoms
could not emerge.
Second, psychoanalytic
interpretation depenos upon
theoretical
assumptions that circumscribe
the possibilities of
meaning that can
emerge from the analytic
situation: "the analyst's
pre-understanding
is directed at a small
segment of possible meanings:
viz early,

conflictlve object relations.

The linguistic material that
emerges in

talks with the patient is
classified within a closely
circumscribed
context of possible double meaning.
This context consists of a

general Interpretation of infant
patterns of Interaction which is

correlated with a theory of
personality that exhibits specific phases
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.at

.

.ot

.3na.e

eve... spea..,
sl.ect

to

Simply because of
his natural
t
.
natural linguistic
competence. Habermas
specifies three dimensions
of the analv.n.
analyst's pre-understanding.
(1) The analyst entertains
a pj-e
pre-concentinn
conception off 'normal'
or
a^stcrte. creation.
•

^

,

Un.istone. co^unlcatlon

is characterize,
by a congruence
between levels of
co^unication; is p.bUe,
i e

follows intersubjective
roles; allows the
differentiation between
subject and object,
appearance and reality;
enable the subject to
secure his identity and
that of uuiers
others within th»
the language community;
and finally enables
the speaker to make
a distinction between
Objective states of affairs
and subjective
experiences of speaking
subjects.
This preconception of
undistorted co^unication
provides
the analyst with a
basis for determining
where and when distortion
in
a patients communication
exists, it throws into
relief irregularities
in communication
itself.
,

(2) The analysts'

second assumption is that
the organization of

symbols occurs in two distinct
stages.

"In the first stage the

process of symbolization
does not rely on the
intersubjective rules
that govern public communication.
"This layer of paleo-symbols
is... devoid Of all the
properties of normal speech.

not integrated into a system
of grammatical rules.

Paleo-symbols are
They are unordered

elements and do not arise within
a system tt^t could be
transformeo
"^2
grammatically.
Hence, they are not part of public
con^unication;
they are privatized meanings.
Moreover, the organization of

1A2

palec-symbols does not
follow any particular

-

—-on.

a

13

"

.

.losyjau.

THe second sta.e
of symbolic
organl.aton Is t.at
.le. I3 mediated
by linguistic
rules and gra^ar.
It is this .
h
^^oond
stage that enables
resv,.hn,re-sy.bol.zataon through
the translation
of pre-linguistic
Paleo-sy*ols into
recognizable linguistic
egression. This
Of se.antic contents
fro. he pre-linguistic
stage to the
l-.^ist.c state Of
aggregation widens the
sphere of co^unicative
action at the expense
of the unconsciously
motivated one. The
™ove.ent of successful,
creative use of language
is one of
emancipation."^-^

V

It is important to
emphasize that the first
stage is a

pre-linguistic stage, it
genetically preceeds the
linguistic stage of
symbolic organization.
This helps account for
the fact that
when the

original symbclization
emerges from the unconscious
it is not
immediately completely
translatable into normal
communication. "The
assumption that neurotic
behavior is guided by
paleo-symbols and only
subsequently rationalized by
linguistic int^pretation also
provides
an explanation for the
characteristics of this form of
behavior: for
its status as
pseudo-communication, stereotyped and
compulsive
behavior, emotional attachment,
expressive content and inflexible
situational tie."*'*
(3) Finally, psychoanalysis relies
on theoretical assumptions

about the structure of mind
which itself is prior to language,
i.e.
the structure of mind does
not develop within language but
rather

language develops thrdugh it.

"Depth hermeneutical understanding
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-.uage

.

P--.te..,

e.enos onto
gene.:, .eteas
he^ene.tioa. ..e.tan.ng
a.a.s

for.s and changes
itself within
linguistic co^unication...^
The
structural theory of .ino
the Preuo articulated,
consisting of the
ego. id and super-ego,
does not itself have
a linguistic basis
Hence, its existence
is not ultimately
=-iy explained in .
terms of tradition
or language.
The organization of
paleo-sy*ols and the structure
of ™ind that
serve as the theoretical
context for interpretation
also provide the
analyst with a theory of
systematically distorted
co^unication. The
paleo-symbols of an individual's
pre-linguistic background and
the
dynamics of the constitutive
parts of the mind
systematically distort
the communication of
the individual with
others and with himself.
It
is this systematic
distortion that the analyst
and patient aim to
remove when they enter into
the analytic situation.
"The omissions
and distortions that it
rectifies have a systematic
role and
function. For the symbolic
structures that psychoanalysis
seeks to
comprehend are corrupted by the
impact of internal conditions.
The

mutilations have meaning as such.

The meaning of a corrupt
text of

this sort can be adequately
comprehended only after it has become
possible to illuminate the meaning
of the corruption itself.
This

distinguishes the peculiar task of
a hermeneutics that cannot
be

confined to the procedures of philology
but rather unites linguistic
analysis with the psychological
investigation of causal
46

connection."

Any attempt to explain or understand
the types of

14A

-avior

that psychoanalysis
is concerned with
an. .hicn .oes not
recconi. the structural
prohie.s in.cive. in
that understanding
.iii
f^nd itself wcefuiiy
inadequate .cth as a fc™
cf e.pianaticn and
as a
means of remedying the
symptoms.

Finally, the idea of
systematically distorted
communication, that
emerges from the theoretical
presuppositions of the analyst,
itself
pre-supposes a theory of
communicative competence,
argues Hahermas.
"I would say,..., that
each depth-hermeneutical
interpretation of
systematically distorted
communication, irrespective
of whether it
appears in an analytic
encounteror infonnally,
implicitly relies on
those assumptions which can
only be developed and
Justified within the
framework of a theory of
communicative competence. "^^

Finally, the idea of
systematically distorted
communication, that
emerges from the theoretical
presuppositions of the analyst,
itself
pre-supposes a theory of communicative
competence, aigues Habermas.
"I would say,..., that
each depth-hermeneutical
interpretation of
systematically distorted communication,
irrespective of whether it

appears in an analytic encounter
or infoimally, implicitly relies
on
those demanding assumptions which
can only be developed and justified

within the framework of a theory of
communicative competence.

""^^

In

short, psychoanalysis implicitly
invokes a notion of undistorted

communication, an idea of what is required
for there to be normal

intersubjective relations between two speaking
subjects.
Habermas believes that this account of
psychoanalysis with its

emphasis on the structural theory of mind
and the prelinguistic stage
of symbolic organization is sufficient
to refute Gadamer's claim to
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universaut, of her.eneutic
understanding,

.ot onl, are these

language, .ut tHe .eans
of understanaing
an. explanation
that are
regulreo fox access to
these phenomena are
net available to
the
speaking subject through
the capacities
developed within natural
language.
In Haber.as. words,
..Her.eneutic consciousness
regains
inccplete as long as it
does not include a
reflection upon the li.its
Of hermeneutic
understanding. The
experience of a her.eneutical
n.itation refers to specifically
incomprehensible expressions.
This
specific incomprehensibility
cannot be overcome by
the exercise
however skillful, of one's
naturally acquired
communicative
competence; its stubborness
can be regarded as an
indication that it
cannot be explained by sole
reference to the structure
of everyday

communication that hermeneutic
philosophy has brought to light.
Ano again later, "Already
the implicit knowledge of
the condition

of

systematically distorted communication
which is pre-supposed in an
actual form in the depth-hermeneutical
use of communicative
competence, is sufficient for the
questioning of the ontological

self-understanding of the philosophical
hermeneutics which Gadamer
propounds by following Heidegger."*'
If language itself is subject
to systematic distortion, a
distortion that is beyond the boundaries

of the reflexivity of that language,
it follows that ordinary or

natural language is insufficient for
rendering a complete account of
meaning; something beyond hermeneutics
is required to give an account
of the distortions of that meaning.

Habermas' challenge to the hermeneutic claim
to universality and
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its subsequent
identificatinn
Tication nf
of fK
the complex of
language

ana authority with
rea<.nn

u

With H
with
h
Habermas'
interoretafinn

only
o^-

°' psychoanalysis,

Challenge posed by
pychoanalvsl^
,
Claim to
universalitv i^

™

h.h

.

'

tradition

i

fnr-i-h^T.

•

m

addition to the

that the hermeneutic

"rcu.scribed

by our relationship
to
nature and the
arrangements concerning
social control..An
-terpretive sociology tht
hypostasizes language to
the subject of
forms Of life and
of tradition ties
itself to the idealist
presupposition that
linguistically articulated
consciousness
determines the material
practice or
of lire.
life
kBut the objective
framework
Of social action is
not exhausted by the
dimension of
intersubjectivity intended
and symbolically
transmitted meaning. The
lihguistic infrastructure
pf a society is part
of a complex that,
however symbolically
mediated, is also constituted
by the constraint
cf reality - by the
constraint of outer nature
that enters into
procedures for a technical
mastery and by t^ constraint
of inner
nature reflected in the
repressive character pf social
power

relatipns...50

The techniques of production
and the relationships of
power and dominatipn are not
reducible to rules of
intersubjectivity.
Moreover, developments in
these two spheres have important

implications for the sphere of
intersubjectivity.

As was previeweo in
our discussion of the
similarities between Habermas and
Gadamer,

Habermas takes the developments
of institutionalized science and
technology to be particularly
important.

"I

suspect that the

institutional changes brought about
by scientific-technical progress

indirectly exert an influence
on the linguistic schema of
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world-comprehension not
unlike th^t
that fformerly
exerted by chanoes
cnanges in the
hho
mode of production
Fnr
•

"^"^

P--tive

.orces...one

.

^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^

-

--.n .

.n.,e .3 .en

at language has
been put to In
.1.1.,

-

^^^^^^^^^
the

.eo.g.a:

J

...eso.Mng. an. managing
awareness of social
domination and tne
ejects of developments
In
for t.e intersubjectlve
transmission of knowledge.

Unguage

can be and Is used
to distort, manipulate,
decieve and mislead,
this respect, language
Is also a medium
of domination and
social
power, It serves to
legitimate relations of
organized force. Insofar
as the legitimations
do not articulate the
power relations whose
institutionalization they make
possible. Insofar as these
relations
merely manifest themselves
in the legitimations,
language is also
ideological. Here it is a
questions not of deception
within a
language but of deception
with languge as such.
Hermeneutlc
experience that encounters
this dependency of the
symbolic framework
on actual conditions changes
into critique of ideology. "52

m

m

short, the systematically
distorted communication that
occures on the

psychologicai level has its analogue
on the social level.

Given this

capacity or use of language,
it is naive to assume that
the mere
appropriation of tradition can
guarantee the breakdown of those

prejudices that do not contain truth
or lead to greater understanding,
but rather which function to
mislead and divert our understanding
of

our actual social conditions
and the possibilities ano alternatives
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available to us.

Ha.er.as further develops
.is crUip.e of
t.e ...ne.tic
clai™ to
-versanty an. Us .prejudice
ror prejudice,
into a

ctUi..

Oada.er.s defense of
aut.orU..

of

Su^axi^ng aa.a^er.s
positions, .e
says. "Gadamer deduoed
the rehabiiitation
of prejudice fro.
his
her^eneutic insight into
the prejudgenentai
structure of
understanding.

He does not see any
opposition between authority
and
reason.
The authority of
tradition does not assert
itseif hiindiy hut
only through its reflective
recognition by those who.
while being a
part Of traditions
themselves, understand and
develop it through
"53
application.
Fron this Gadamer concludes
that "true authority
need not be authoritarian."^^

What Gadamer ignores,
according to Habermas, is
that in order for
authority and tradition to
merge with knowledge and
reason it would
have to be the case that
all authority and tradition
could be
validated by reason.
"That authority converges with
knowledge means
that the tradition that is
effectively behind the educator
legitimate
the prejudices inculcated in
the rising generation; they
could then
only be confirmed in this
generation's reflection,

m

assuring

himself of the structure of
prejudgement, the mature individual would
transfer the formerly unfree recognition
of the personal authority of
the guardian to the objective
authority of a traditional framework.
But then it would remain a matter
of authority, for reflection could
only move within the limits of the
facticity of tradition.

The act of

recognition that is mediated through reflection
woulo not at all have
altered the fact that tradition as such remains the only
ground of the

s
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validity of prejudices
J u^ues.

th.This

amounts to thP
n^-;,.
^'^^ Claim,
argues
Habermas, that nothing
new has Pvpr
^^^^
^
Of reflection,
that
reflection can only re-affir^n, u ^ .
'''^'^ ^^^^
Previously existed
in
,
tradition,
making such a claim
"Gph^.
Gadamer-s prejudice
for the
rights of prejudice
certified by tradition h
°^
denies the power of
u^,

m

.

_

•

reject t.e c.a..

.

t.a.U.on.

.enect.on .U30.es
su.stant.ant.

because it not only
confirms but also
break.
oreaks „„
up H
dogmatic forces.
Authority and knowledge
do not converge...^^

That reason and

renectlon have the
potential to both reject
ano af.lr. tradition
and

prejudices indicates an
Independence for reason th.f r h
'^^^^O" tfiat Gadamer
seems not
can establish Itself
outside of the contingencies
of tradition or
that
reason comes to tradition
from the abstract
heights of objectivity
"Reflection can, to be sure,
no longer reach beyond
Itself to an
absolute consciousness
which it then pretends
to be."^^

Nonetheless the power of
reson does not leave
everything as It
was.
Its retroactive
application to tradition
which is inculcated by
authority can result in
the rejection of that
tradition or change the
nature of It. ..Reflection
recalls the path of authority
along which
the grammars of language
games were dogmatically
Inculcated as rules
fdr interpreting the
world and for action,

m

this process the

element of authority that
was simply domination can
be stripped away
and dissolved into the
less coercive constraint of
Insight and
rational decision."^®
A second dimension
of the Habermasian critique of
Gadamer.

defense of authority
follows fro. his
View that
view
tnat ianquaae
lann
double role within
our political
life i
e

tha^

-f

olavc; ^

""'^

truth an. .nowle.ge
hut it can also
to manipulate and
distort
H
and hence
is a .eans of
domination as well
as enlirht
enlightenment.
To the
.
extfnf that*
-tent
institutionalized authority
is dependent on
the
systematically distorted
communication, either
for its existence
or
or Its continued
operation and policies,
it can not he
accepted as
'

.

•

"

T"

^"""^

""""

""^

-

—

Oe.
indeed, in
such forms, it must
rely on the containment
of reflection and
understanding for one if
its conditions of
continued existence.
But
Gadamer. argues Habermas,
fails to aodress
this problem seriously
enough, tending to
minimize or underestimate
the extent to which
authority has relied on
obfuscation and untruth
rather than
promulgating reason and
knowledge.

Given the inadequacies that
Habermas purports are inherent
in the
Philosophical hermeneutics as
detailed by Gadamer, Habermas
rejects
the hermeneutic insistence
that the commitment to
enlightenment must
be brought under a self-imposed
discipline by the social
theorist.
"If then, such opposition
between authority ana reason
does in fact
exist, as the Enlightenment
has always claimed, and if
it cannot be
superceded by hermeneutic means,
it follows that the attempt
to impose
fundamental restrictions upon the
interpreter's commitment to

enlightenment becomes problematic
too."^'
Instead of insisting upon an
unjustified limitation of the scope
of reflection, a hermeneutically
informed social science should be

concerned with outlining the conditions
under which critical

reflection could be
brought to bear nn
^
^""^ °"

^eao to t.e critical

w-c.

it foiiows tHe

-versa:

a„t

ascenai™ent

of

prejudices of traditi
on and

t.th oni,

...iative p.i.cipie:

to t.e extent
to

to t.. to estaPiis.

«it.in the f.a.ewor.
of an unii^ite.
co^unit, of
erpreters. Oni, this
principle can .a.e sure
t.at t.e .e^eneutic
effort Poes not cease
until we are aware
of deceptions wit.in
a
forcible consensus and
of t.e systematic
distortion Pe.inP seemingly
accidental misunderstanding,
if the understanding
of meaning is not
to remain ajortiorl
indifferent towards the
idea of truth then we
have tp anticipate,
together with the concept
of a kino of truth
which
measures itself pn an
idealizeo consensus achieved
in unlimited
communication, also the
structures of solioary
co-existence in
communication free from force...^°
Habermas implies that it
is only
the anticipation of such
a radical understanding
that can possibly
achieve the goals that Gadamer
stakes out for philosophical

hermeneutics; i.e. the protection
of everyday practical,
political
judgement from the increasing
influence of technology and
scientific
control of society. For one of
the purposes of that rdical

understanding is the laying bare
of the social relationships
and
relationships with nature that entail
domination and false prejuoice:
"The idea of truth, which
measures itself on a true consensus,
implies
the idea of the true life.
We could also say:
it includes the iaea
of being-of-age (Mundigkeit)

.

It is only the formal antlciption
of an

idealized dialogue, as the form of life to
be realized in the future,

~

~

which guarantees the
ultimatP
umimate supporting
c^nnn
and counterfactu;.! .n.

„ u „ „. „„:::

factual agreement,
should it be
ue a false
f^i.p n
one, as false

consents an. t.e...
.ones t.e .,.,at.e
p.oc.p^e c. .t.na.

^-course...

CaCa^er^s ver.
participation in
.etaHe^eneutic
debates is itself
testimony to the fact
that Oa.a.er hi.self
anticipates the consensus
reaulateri by
regulated
hv fh.
the principle of
rational
discourse, implies Habermas
mas.
HenrP p.ho
Hence,
Gadamer implicitly
recognizes the
strength of reason and
its ability to
distinguish false
prejudices
and hence the potential
it has for changing
language and tradition!
•

•

•

.

The Gadamer j an Reioinaer

For the time being we
will postpone Habermas'
oevelopment of a
theory of co^unicative
competence since that theory
is intended to
answer many of the questions
that arose in his debate
with Gadamer and
is best understood in
that context. Presently,
being we will examine
Gadamer-s response to Habermas'
critique of philosophicl
hermeneutics
and Habermas' own rejoinder.
Gadamer 's response to Habermas'
critique and project focuses on
four related issues:

1.

2.
3.

the goal of critical theory
as outlined by Habermas;
the universality of language;
the power of reflection and reason;

the Character and
necessity of authority

''^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
Ca.a.er
begins his counter-critiaup
•-j-xuxque nf
or mok
Habermas bv examining
examininr, fK
the very goal of
this latest version
of critical theorv
L"eory, i.e.
i p
fh
the
claim
,

•

i

that is is

necessary to raise
hermeneutic reflection
k- .
to a higher,
more systematic,
seir-conscious activity
activitv
"tk^
The modern social
.
scientists .... in so far
as they recognize
hermeneutic refiection
as unavoidable,
nevertheless
advance the claim (as
Habermas has formulated
it) of raising

understanding up out of a
prescientific exercise to
the ranK of a
self-reflecting activity by
controlled alie^tion that is. through
•methodical development of
intelligence.
The assumption
underlying this claim is
that only the distance
that such controlled
alienation provides can make
the reflective
appropriation of tradition
possible. Hence, it assumes
a conflict between
ongoing tradition and
the rational evaluation
of that tradition.
This assumption cuts right
to the heart of the
hermeneutic account of tradition
and reason, and

displays, claims Gadamer, the
same error and unredeemed
faith in
objectivism that plagued the
Enlightenment, historicism. and
earlier
accounts of hermeneutics:

'
^ ^^^^^^^^V consequence of
recognizing the operativeness
recomi'zfnn'thp'"'
J"'"'
of history in our
conditionedness and finitude - that

the thing that
^o see through the dogmatism
of
assemm'Sn
^""^^^f.^^ and
^^.°PP°^^tion
separation between the ongoing,
nT,rl] f

^"""^
reflective appropriation of it
^s^^^tion stands a dogmatic objectivism
that
distortr^hf'"
distorts the very concept of hermeneutic
reflection itself.

In effect this objectivism
denies the power or presence of

effective history with respect to the
observer (or in Habermas' case,

the critical theor^Q•l-^

that thro

.

transmitted.
'

-.^

cont^ne. anenatioo

—

the

theo.st .s ah:e to
ne.t.a.e

But this view,
whether it is held k

-

Z

" ™"

-thcd.

..etuan.

a naive

0. controiied reason
and

the historian,
even the one

cruicai scienoe-.

social engineers or

thecr. .erei.
demonstrates

--^"-"es

:

a

^ope Of ohjectivis.
is

.0

treats .istor. as

is so iittie
separated fro. the
ongoing

^^

tradition (for e.ampie.
those of his nation)
that he is
in contrih^ to the growth
and development of
the national

*

°"

°'

'"^"-^

^^^t«ians; he helongs to
the nation

Hence. Ha.ermas-

faith in the
possibilities of methodical,
systematic
appropriation of tradition
fails to escape the
same problems of
earlier types of dogmatic
objectivism, e.g. bistoricism,
positivism
and scientism.

w ork,

domination and the univer..,..,

k„„....„,

^

^^^^

seen, related to ^bermasclaims concerning the
necessity for

methodical, systematic examintion
of what is culturally
transmitted is
the denial of the
universality of he^eneutics.
if it were the case
that everything that could
be known was transmitted
through existing
everyday language, the need
for a methodical examination
of tradition
would be either unnecessary
or. as Gadamer claims,
represent only one

relativity within language
itself.

But if there are areas of social

life, the truth of which lies
outside the boundaries of everyday

languge and ordinary transmission
of tradition, it follows that some

155

Ha

e^as attempts

to s.ow t.at
t.e.e

extra-Unouistlo areas of

.«n

a.

sue.

p.e-nn,.,3t. an.

expenence an. that
.no«le.,e of t.ese

areas is available
to us onl, through
the .etho.lcal,
controlled
examination of social
an. psychological
life. Consequently.
hermeneutics must restrict i)-==if t ..^
itself to the understanding
of the
transmission of tradition
and culture.

Cadamer ta.es issue with
Hahermas. characterization
of the problem
and the inferences
that he draws, rirst,
Gadamer does not deny
that
there are pre-linguistic
and extra-linguistic
areas of human
experience,
agreement with Habermas
he cites Piagefs work
on
cognitive development as an
example of the former
and formal

m

mathematics as an example
of the latter.

Furthermore, a passage we

quoted earlier seems to
indicate that Gadamer is
sensitive to the
influence of technology on
language and culture:

wUWnlhe'iife' rjH'""^!'

industrial world is expanding

nJcl^^J^
'"^^
comm n cat ng ? h
wcrds°or with^f
terms^rom the
sign lamuaoe
language n?
of the modern industrial world
Tt i«
'''''''' '''' forms of the ndustrial
age
a!so\'?f'%'?''
^^ct the

irnpoverishment of the^
vocabnL^v ofi"?9^^9^'
vocabulary
language is making enormous progress. ..65
.

Hence, it seems clear that
Gadamer is aware of the effects that

technology can have on everyday
life.
What Gadamer denies is what
he sees as Habermas- total separation
of the different spheres of
social life from one another, the view

that cultural tradition is
something distinct from work and

•

0^

^o.s an. tec.n.,.es

'

""""

'

o. working, of ,
forms and techniques
of

domination, of ideals
of liberty
'"'^y' nf nh
Objectives of oroer
..
ana the
like.
Who will deny that
our snecifin h
^^"^'^ possibilities
do not
^
,
,

,

—

.

^"

12
domination could be set

"
^<^^Hc.

.

...

f

^^"9-^90.

"It woulo be totally
abstract to consider
that It «as not
through and In the
concrete
experiences o. our h.an
existence In domination
and In .or., and onl,
here, that our hu.an
understanding of ourselves,
our evaluations, our
conversations with ourselves,
find their fulfillment
and exercise
their critical functlon..-^^
This fusion of language
with wor. and
domination places the
latter squarely within
the reach of
hermeneutics. ..rem the
her.eneutical standpoint,
rightly understood,
it rs absolutely
absurd to regard the
concrete factors of work

and

politics as outside the
scope of hermeneutics."*^
This is not to deny
that work and politics
influence language and
tradition, but rather that
they are part of that
tradition as well and
hence, in order to come
to know ana recognize
their influence, their
impact must be articulatable
in language.
This is no less true for

psychoanalysis than for social
phenomena such as work and
politics.
In Gadamer's words, "I
maintain that the hermeneutlc
problem is
universal and basic for all
interhuman experience, both of

history ana

of the present moment,
precisely because meaning can be
experienced

even where it is not actually
intended."*'

work and domination

Gadamer.

ccunter-argu.ent is directed
at what he perceives
to be an

oversi.piincation of the
power of reflection and
the Haher^asian
-sxstence on an antithesis
between reason and
tradition.

Gadamer
begrns b, denying Haber.as.
characterization of his
position, stating
that he does not insist
that tradition is the
only ground for
acceptance of prejudice,
belief or social practice:
"the idea that
tradition as such, should
be and should regain
the only ground for
acceptance of presuppositions
(a view that Haber.as
ascribes to .e)
flies in the face of my
basic thesis that authority
is rooted in
insight as a her.eneutical
process.... Tradition is
no proof and
validation of something. In any
case not where validation
is demanded
by reflection.

Habermas- mistake lies not
just in misinterpreting Gadamer
's
position concerning the fallibility
of tradition, argues the
latter.
It extends to an over-estimation
of the indqDendence of reason.

Gadamer interprets Habermas as
saying that the exercise of reason

necessarily shatters the constellation
of prejudices that we inherit
from our linguistic tradition.
As Gadamer reads him, Habermas
sees an
antithesis between language and reason.

From Gadamer's point of view

this misses the intimate connection
between the two:

"our human

experience of the world, for which we rely
on our faculty of

judgement, consists
precisely in
'

^^,

P°™ity

critical stance with
renarri
regard t„
to every convention,
this to the
linguistic virtualitv of
,

therefn
therefore,
present an obstacle
to reason.
reason

Of our taking
a
in realitv

not,

Th»
The
linguisticallty of
,

^n'^-d. it is this
linguisticallty that
enables us to take up
a
critical attitude toward
our prejudices,
nhe fact

--t

that it is in the
Of a linguistic
world and through the
mediation of an experience

the possibilities of
critiaue
critique.

nn
On th=
the contrary, the
possibility of

going beyond our conventions
and beyond all those
experiences that are
schematized in advance,
opens up before us once
we find ourselves in
our conversation with
others, faced with
opposed thinkers, with new
critical problems, with new
experiences. Fundamentally
in our world
the issue is always
the same; the verbalization
of conventions and of
social norms^behind which
there are always economic
and dominating

interests."'^

Habermas' mistake, his
unexamined prejudice from

Gadamer's standpoint, is to
assume that reason is only
active when one
confronts and rejects what
alreaoy exists. But that is
a one-sided
view of reason.
"The real question is whether
one sees the
function

of reflection as bringing
something to awareness in order
to confront
what is in fact accepted with
other possibilities - so that
one can
either throw it out or reject
the other possibilities ana
accept what
the tradition is de facto
presenting - or whether bringing something
to awareness always, dissolves
what one has previously accepted "^^
.

What Habermas fails to
appreciate, according to Gadamer, is that

reason is operative
in the examination
ano
true prejudice no
less that in .k

acceet^

tradition and
^

•

Of false prejudice
final point carries
carripq nc
us to ^.u
the question of
authority.
,

-

^

This

to the question
o. tradition and
prejudice.

Cadaver, response to
critique or the Tor.r.s
position on authority
runs parallel
to his remarks concerning
tradition. Pirst,
Gada.er denies the
unpualified defense of
authority that Hader.as
attributes to hi. ..t
IS an inacissible
imputation to hold that
1 sd.ehow meant
there is no
decline of authority or
no e.anciptlng
criticism of authority

r

never stood in relation
of domination to
those over whom authority
is

direction of his own work
in trying to contain
the growth of
scientific authority testifies
to the importance of
that issue for
him.
In Gadamer's words,
"Certainly I would grant that
authority
exercises an essential dogmatic
power in innumerable forms
of
domination, from the ordering
of education and the mandatory
commands
of the army and government
all the way to the hierarchy
of power

created by political forces or
fanatics."'^
What Gadamer ddes claim is
that it is myopic to see authority
as
opposed to freedom, an enemy of
reason, or founded on and the
advocate
of illegitimate prejudices.
Such a view is itself a false
prejudice,
one left over from the Enlightenment:

"Here indeed is operating a

'"^

- renecuon .

not

Authority is not
aiwa^s „ong. Vet
Haber^as ^egaras
regards it as an
.
untenable
oeco-rf,assertion,
and treason to
the heritage of the
Enllnhf
Enlightenment, that the
act Of
nf rendering
H
transparent the
structure of
prejudgements in
uncerstanding should
possibly lead to an
ac^o.ledgement of
-t.orlty. authority is
by his definition
a dogmatic power.
1 cannot
accept this assertion
that reason and
authority are abstract
antitheses as the emanciptory
Enlightenment did. Rather,
I assert
t^at they stand in
a basically
ambivalent relation, a
relation 1 thin.
Should be explored
rather than casually
accepting the antithesis
as a
fundamental conviction
Q,,t>,„--^
«"tfority may or may not
•
stand opposed
to freedom, be
irrationality founded, or
the prpponent of
illegitimate
prejudice. But to assume
that it necessarily
•

is all these things
is
to make the same type
of mistake as the
ungualified authoritarians
who
believe that every act of
authority is defensible.

Habermas- misunderstanding
of authority, argues
Gadamer, rests on
a misconception,
inherited from the Enlightenment,
of the relationship
between reason and authority.
It is a view that sees
a necessary
antithesis between the two, a
"mistake fraught with ominous

consequences.

In it reflection is
granted a false power and the
true

dependencies involved are misjudged
on the basis of fallacious
Idealism." 77 if we wish genuinely
to understand authority,
argues
Gadamer, we must see that the
key to authority, its essence,
is not
obedience to arbitrary command but
rather the recognition of the

superior insight of those with whom
we place ourselves in

a
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reltionship of authority:

legitimate, that is
authority is
«hetS ?^
veiled disorder t^lt
'rue order or
is c?LtPH h'T^""'
arbitrary
P°»«er.
It seems evident
exercise of
to me thL
acknowledgement is the
decisivp
authority... One need
^^^ationshlps of
stCd^ Jh»
and decline of authority
(or its^ispl^"'"''"' °^ forfeiture
IS and that out of
"^^^ authority
which it grows
u
^^^^^
dogmatic power but frnm rt^nJ^°
"°t from
dogmatic acceptance
hL^eT' f ZTll^'"' '
superiority in knowledge
and insioh^ tn%h»
this reason one believes
^^''thorlty and for
the an?hSwf
"^ht. Only on
this crucial concession
thL be??fJ
^P'^n-^^ foundeo.
Authority can rule
on??'because
recognized and
accepted. The obedience
that hP^Lif f
^° "^""^ authority Is
neither blind nor sllvish.,^

"

^

Sy

th,^^F^^ "

"

"

•

u

"Jf

In sum, Gadamer Is
arguing that td construe
the relationship of
authority in terms of
obedience is to misunderstand
what is central to

authority.

Authority rests not so much
on oog.atic obedience
but on
dogmatic acceptance that
recognizes the superior
knowledge of
another. Given this
acceptance, it makes little
sense from Gada^er's
perspective to construe authority
as a form of domination.
Finally, any attempt at the
critical evaluation of authority,
at
determining its legitimacy, must
Itself refer back to the
language and
tradition that form the background
of authority.
This further ties

reason to language and tradition.

There is no possibility of

abstracting oneself from one's
linguistic background and confronting
authority in the manner that the
Enlightenment aspired to.

The

critical evaluation of authority is
always and only made possible by
the shared understanding that
a linguistic community inherits.

Even

in the case of disagreement
between those in authority and those

subject to it, there must exist commonalities that
enable the two
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parties to recognize
what they oisagree
on.
on
y
hermeneutical reflection
teaches us:
that
^^at

"Thi.
This is something
that
i

social
social community,
with all
tensions and disruptions,
ever and ever
again leads .ac. to
a
cc«n area of sociai understanding
through «hich it exists •^^
Po.
authority no less than
any other phenomena
language is the
.etainstitution hy which
.e confront, examine
and reject or accept
authority. There are,
as Haher.as points
out. illegitimate
examples
and instances of
authority. But It is
only through language
and the
co^onalities and arguments
that is supplies to
social actors that
these distortions of
genuine authority can be
recognized
Cdnsepuently. rather than
completely rejecting existing
tradition and
language in the critical
evaluation of authority we
.ust affir. the..
In sum. Gadamer
persists in his argument
that reason, truth and
freedom on the one hand are
not inherently antithetical
to authority,

tradition and language on the
other.

Claims to that effect, such
as

Habermas', misunderstand the
nature of these phenomena.

In

particular, they represent a
misunderstanding of the possibilities
:f
reason and its relationship to
language, tradition and authority.

The Habermasian Re.ioinder

Habermas' response to Gadamer's
counter-argument is not simply

a

reiteration of his original critique,
summarized earlier, concerning
the role of reason as a liberating
force, the necessity of a

methodical and self-reflective employment
of reason as

a

aefense

against the growing technologization
of contemporary society, and its

antithetical relationship
to authoritv
necessitv »nH

t»l.-

^"""on

•

I

;

^"^^^""""^

o..nat.n. .nip.ltaion
an.

"

..e, He^e^as

ada.e. is heg.ing the
,.estion.

-.a.er insists

is the

-

ro. the

s

in

co«n

e.eot

of the

- 00^00

a,.s

that

understanding that

necessa, require.,
for social
oo™..nioation

^ay rtseir he the
result of manipulation,
coercion an. domination,
and
^ence a false consensus.
In order to insure
that the underlying
consensus or oo™onalities
are not themselves
the result of
ideological domination,
we have to go beyond
that .common
understanding, to the
origins of that consensus
that goes on .hehind
the backs. Of social
actors.
In effect Habermas
is arguing that
Gadamer fails to see that
..The dogmatic
recognition of tradition,
and
thrs means the acceptance
of truth-claims, can
be equated with
knowledge itself only when
freedom from force and
unrestricted
argument about tradition have
already been secured within
this
tradition. Gadamer.s argument
pre-supposes that legitimizing
recognition ana the consensus
on which it is founded can
arise and
develop free from force. The
experience of distorted communication
contradicts that presupposition.

Habermas goes on to point out
that it us often only through
false
or manipulated consensus
that force becomes legitimized,
and not
through voluntary recognition.

..Porce can,

in any case, acquire

permanence only through the objective
semblance of an unforced
pseudo-communicative agreement,

force that is legitimized in such
a

way we call, with Max Weber, authority.

It is for this reason there

^as tc .e that principle
process of a universal
a,ree.ent free fro.
oo.ination In order to
.a.e the fundamental
distinction between
dogmatic recognition and
true consensus.
reason,
Reason in the sense
of the
principle of rational
discourse, represents
the roc. which
factual
authorities have so far
been more ll.ely to
crash against than
duild
upon."
Gadamer.s underestimation
of the extent to which
authority
has historically
rested on false consensus
represents a serious flaw
in Philosophical
hermeneutics and compromises
its ability to protect
practical life from the
encroachments of increasing
technological

control and domination of
social life.

A social theory
that would

measure up to this task must
provide a theory of
co^uhication that
would delineate the contours
of rational discourse
and uncoerced
consensus, and provide social
theorists and actors with the
means to
determine manipulated consensus
and uncover distorted
communication.
Habermas attempts to provide
such a theory of co^unlcation
with his
theory of universal pragmatics
and communicative competence.
In this

respect this project can be seen
as the latest chapter of his
response
to Gadamer.

Universal praomatics and cn m municative onmp ptpnrp

The importance of

the theory of communicative action
for Habermas' project cannot be

overestimated.

It represents his attempt to formulate
the conditions

of rationality in oroinary,

acts.

i.e.

It represents Habermas'

institutionally unbound, speech

attempt to make explicit the conditions

of consenual agreement that Gadamer would
insist must always remain in
the shadows of language or partly
obscured.

One sympathetic

co™entator has dascxihed
Its importance
this way:

Jo"nt\Xra?y1cSntL"^to'?hf

""ique

of

-aterialsi.: rests'
°'
pS sibUUv'Tf"""
of communication
that is both JheoJ^?inI/''°"^^"9
^^^"""t
goes beyond pure
™™ative, that
hermeneutics wUhm^ h
strictly empirical-analytic
reducible to a
scien2e"82^"^

nte

It represents an
attempt to outline
the criteria of
rationality

against which individual
systems of communication
can be evaluated
The foundation upon
which Habermas attempts
to builo a theory

co^unicative competence he
calls universal
pragmatics,

of

a project cf
it is the tas. to
..identify and reconstruct
universal conditions
Of possible understanding...S3
Habermas begins his
outline of

-ich

universal pragmatics by
distinguishing it from
logical analysis of
language, formal linguistics,
and sociolinguistics.
The failure of
the first two Of these
approaches to the study of
language is that in
their attempt to outline
universal criteria for the
formation of
logically or grammatically
correct sentences, they
fail to understand
the place of pragmtic
conditions of understanding..'
The logical
analysis of language that
originated with Carnap focuses
primarily on
syntactic and semantic properties
of linguistic formations.
Like
structuralist linguistics, it
delineates its object domain by
first

abstracting from the pragmatic
properties of language and
subsequently
introducing the pragmatic dimension
in such a way that the

constitutive connections between
the generative accomplishments
of
speaking and acting subjects, on
the one hand, and the general
structure of speech on the other,
cannot come into

view.'.

8"

This

isn't so much wrong as it is
an arbitrary restriction on what is

t^^;- Of language In
Ipe^cnlL^t^and structuralist ?;^.^"L"rwS»
"^"^h the logical
""^
anaiysisof i^l
Nonetheless, this
^'^"^"Qful.
™e?So'dologicalltS'i',''
reason for the view that th=
"
sufficient
fro. Which one
abstract
be™nd™'
"r"''"" °' '''^"^Se
of the successful,
""^^ analysis.
The fact
or at leas? n?nJ
linguistic rule sCstemrcamnf P"™''^"9' reconstruction of
restricting formal analysis
Justification for
?^ 11 ^ t^- ^
the elementary units
domain.... Like
"^J""*^
of lanolnp ?'
units of speech
the elementary
(itte?ances) Sn if"^^'?^"'.

L

methodological attitudl"Sri

^^^^^J!^
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The logical analysis
of language and
structural linguistics,
along
with a variety of other
formal analyses of
language developed from
logrc, linguistics and
the analytic philosophy
of language,
are

subject to a variety of
criticisms'^ claims Habermas,
not the least
Of Which is the failure
to understand the
importance of the pragmatic
dimension to understanding.

TO remedy this shortcoming
Habermas turns to the theory
of speech
acts developed by Searle
and Austin, and using
their works as a
springboard, reconstructs the
universal pragmatic conditions
for
understanding. By reconstruction
Habermas means the making
explicit
"the intuitive knowledge of
competent subjects. "'^ Habermas
uses
Ryle's distinction between
know-how and know-what in
explicating what
he means by reconstructive
science. In this respect
reconstruction
attempts to make explicit the
rules, criteria, and requirements
of

understanding that the speaking
subject employs in making himself

understood but of which he may or may
not be conscious of or be able
to articulate:®'

To the extent that his utterance
is correctly formed and thus

comprehensible, the author
produced it in accordance
certain rules or on the
with
basis of n t
understands the system
of I^Ls of ^Is'^.n'''"'^^^^'
^^^^uage and their
context-specific application
hpL ^ P^^'theoretical
knowledge of this rule
svs?p:
k
to enable him to
produce'?he utterSnn''-"' ''''' sufficient
^^^^^ion.
implicit rule consciousness
This
is a\nn
K''
The interpreter
in turn, who not
only sha?P. h. ? ^^^r^o^^^derstano this
implicit knowledge 0
the comoetenT'' V°
his know-how into a
Lcond-SM^nn^'K^f "^"'^ transform
of reconstructive
^he task
understandim th.T
explication of the sensf of r^tin
°^ "^^^^^^9
reconstruction of
generative structures mHpIi
underlying °r?^
the production of
formations. 89
symbolic
'

f

The Shortcoming of
formal linguistics lies
in the limiting focus
on comprehensibility,
i.e. the requirement
that the utterance by
grammatically correct. While
linguistics might be able to
tell us
what rules must be met to
utter a grammatically
correct sentence, it
does not tell us what is
required for successful
communication between
two agents.
The meaning of an utterance
is dependent upon more
than
just the grammatical rules
operative in language; it requires
an

understanding of the interpersonal
relationships that form the context
of an utterance and the
substantive content of that utterance.
Hence,
to understand what is required
for

successful understanding one must'

understand the double structure of
speech, argues Habermas, i.e.
"the
two communicative levels on which
speaker and hearer must

simultaneously come to an understanding
if they want to communicate
their intentions to one another.

I

would distinguish (1) the level of

intersubjectivity on which speaker and hearer,
through illocutionary
acts, establish the relations that permit
them to come to an

understanding with one another, and (2) the level
of prepositional
content which is communicated...

it is this aouble structure of

speech which enables the successful communication
between two

subjects,

"in filing out
the double
structure nf
of speech
particinani-c:
^ir.
^icipants
in
a dialogue
communicate
-Lcate on t-wn
two levels
.

i

.

simultaneouslv

communication of

a

the communicated
content is used
,

"
content or

.

tk

'

content with

^

^^^^^^^

the intersu.Ject.e

^^o^t the role in
which
Tf ^^ther
of these dimensions

^-^^
relationship het.een
two actors

indeterminate, and surrpc;cf..i ^
successful communication
is threatened-

•c«nlc3tlcn

in language can
ta.e place onl.
.hen the participants.
with one another
ahout something,
simultaneously
enter upon two levels
of co^unications the level of

- ~atlng

mtersubjectlvity on which they
ta.e up personal
relations and the
level of prepositional
contents. "'^

Fro. this double
structure of speech Haber.as
Infers that there
are two possible uses
that language
can be put to.

We can use

language to the.atize
either personal relations
or the prepositional
eontent of an utterance.
To be sure both levels
of co^unication
™ust
be present in every
instance of successful
communication.

able to emphasize one or the
other,

But we are

"in the interactive use of

lanauaae we thematlze the relations
into which speaker and
hearer
enter - as a warning, promise,
request - while we only mention
the
propositional content of the
utterances.
In the cognitive use of
language, by contrast, we
thematize the context of the
utterances as
proposition about something that
is happening in the world
(or what
could be the case) while we only
Indirectly expresss the

interpersonasl relations."
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a

Each of these two
different uses nf i=n
language, the
interactive and
th cognitive,
the
raises a different
type of vaiidit
redeemed or .et for
successful undistorted
successful,
h
communication. The
validity claim raised
by the cognitive
u icive use of language
that makes
propositional content thpm=n^
thematic requires
constative speech acts
that
.

•

,

u

Hobermas furthermore
insists that the
validity claim of truth
ii
presupposed in all types
of speech,
»
soeech I.e.
is a universal
validity

u

i

•

structure of possible
speech in general.

Truth is a universal
validity claim; its
universality is reflected
h
in ^h.
^
the double
Q.
structure
of speech."

Though truth is the
universal validity claim,
different types of
validity Claim are made
thematic with uses of
language other than the
cognitive, "in the interactive
use of language, in
which
interpersonal relations are
thematically stressed, we
refer in various
ways to the validity of
the normative context
of speech action...'^
Reference to the normative
contexts raises validity
claims other than
truth:

Truth is merely the most
conspicuous

-

not the onlv
'^'-^^ structures f'speech
The
n'n'K'" '''I'''''
^^^^^ produc'es a
''''''
legitimate or'i 11 nf?' 'I
''"'^^^ interpersonal relation between
pa?tLSnt^ is in?
participants,
borrowea from the binding force
of
recognized norms of action... In
promises
in
recommendations, prohibitions,
prescription; *;nd the like
the speaker implies a validity
claim that must, if the speech
^^^overed by existing no^ms, and tha
°
means'bv
^^^^^f?'
^^^^^^
^^''^^ recognition that the^e norms
r?nhff
rightfully
exist.
This internal relations between
validity
norms implicitly raiseo in
speech actions and the validity of
their normative context is
stressed in the interactive use of

n

1

/
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language. Just as
onlv cnn^^,^,
in t,e cognitive
use
P-™"tea
only those speech
interact!
-'eracuCr
alts
acts arTpSteri
arp n«^^7Z^ 2
e
specific reiation that
*aracterlze a
speater
Jn^
h
of action or
evaluation^ fcail
"°™s
<=ail ^hP.'f"
"f" "^P*
these regulative
acts. "96

Sgtgr'sol^^f

speech

constative speech acts;
thev rai^P
^ney
raise fho
the claim of
rightness or
appropriateness.
.

i

•

The distinction
between cognitive
and interactive
ianguge use
constative and regulative
speech acts, and
validity claims of
truih
and appropriatness
do not, however
=ver, exhaust
exha„=;t th.
the range of use,
speech
acts and validity
claims that are
required for successful

co™unication.

There is a third
validity clai., truthfulness
or
The truthfulness
with which a speaker
utters his

Sincerity:

-tentions can. however, he
stressed at the level of
co^unlcative
action in the sa.e way
as the truth of a
proposition and the rightness
(or appropriateness)
of an interpersonal
relations. Truthfulness
guarantees the transparency
of a subjectivity
representing itself in
language.
It is especially
emphasized in the expressive
use of

ianauage."'^

Truthfulness, or sincerity,
is as universal a

condition of successful
communication as truth or
appropriateness:
"truthfulness too is a universal
implication of speech, as long

as the

presupposition of communicative
action are not altogether
go

suspended...

if the validity claim of
sincerity were absent from a

speech act, communicative action
aimed at coming to an understanding
would be jeopoardized if not
impossible. For we would then have

grounds for questioning a speaker's
intentions and desire for

achieving an understanding that
is the goal of communicative
action.
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norms of (at least)
Ippc;-!-^ fo^-jvi
tactly recognized
institutions, can have
the
Uiocutionary force that
they do when they
are successfui.
..n the
case Of institutionaiiy
unbound speech acts,
however, iiiocutionary

normative context.

The iiiocutionary
force with which the
speaker, in
carrying out his speech
act, influences
the hearer, can be
understood
only if we take into
consideration sequences
of speech acts that
are
connected with one another
on the basis
ha,i= nf
of a reciprocal
recognition of
validity Claims."''
Moreover, these validity
claims are the
foundation of the rationality
pf speech acts, i.e.
it is only because
speech acts raise these
validity claims that the
iiiocutionary force
of speech can rationally
influence the hearer:

commitments are connected with
cognitlSely typicalialidltv
^^'.^ecause the reciprocal bonds haJe
a
rafional ^S^f
^"9^9^^ =P^aker normally commits the
Inlr^ft sense in ^^t
specific
which he would like to take up
an
relationship with the thematically
stressed
i^n^ff""?"^
''^'^'^
^ ^Pecif- mo^del o1"°
^otunlc'ation:iaS^
The validity claims raised in
speech acts, and particularly those
made
thematic in the use of specific
types of speech acts, provide the

basis for determining what types
of reasons, evidence, and

justifications must be provided to legitimize
the speech act that is

-ade;

the type of evidence,
reasons and
diiu Justifl^.^•
justification considered
acceptable
vary with the use
Of language
..m the . " .
0^ language, the speaker
proffers a speech
t
=P«sch-act-i™inent
obliaation to
nrovl..
Cohstative speech acts
contain the off:;:^;::,-ssary to the
^^^^^
^^^^^^^ ^^^^^

m^^.

^

-es

.

not dispel ad hoc
douht. the persistingly
problematic trugh clai.
can become the subject
of a theoretical
discourse.. .^"l similarly
in
t^e interactive and
expressive uses of language
the speaker incurs
the
Obligation tp recur to the
normative context, i.e.
to provide
justification, and the
obligation to prove
trustworthy, respectively.
Here again, if doubt
remains, further
justification at a different
level Of discourse is
available,
the case of the
interactive use
Of languge this means
engaging in practical
discourse; in the case of
the expressive use of
language the doubts concerning
the

m

trustworthiness of the speaker
"can only be checked
against the
consistency of his subsequent
behavior.
Ih sum, Habermas claims
to have constructed a
model of linguistic

communication, a model in which
the tacit presuppositions
ana
requirements for any successful
communication are outlined:

"Institutionally unbound speech
acts owe their illocutionary
force to
a cluster of validity
claims that speakers and hearers
have to raise
and recognize as justified if
grammatical (and thus comprehensible)
sentences are to be employed in
such a way as to result in
successful
communication. A participant in
communication acts with an

orientation to reaching understanding
only under the condition that,
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- emon.,
t

tate

co.p.hensi.,e sentences
in .is speec.
acts, .e .ises
clai. in an accepta.e
... He
claims

t.t.

to. a

p^oposUionai content o.
to. t.e existential
presuppositions ot

a mentioned
propositional concent.
content

m

Hp claims
He
lightness (or
•

justxf, an interpersonal
relation that is to
be perfor.ativeiy
established
Pinali,, he ciai^s
truthfulness tor the
intentions
expressed."
in an, particular
speech act one of these
validity claims ™av be
addressed explicitly or
the.atically while the
others are

temporarily

assumed.

Nonetheless, each valioity
claim is at least still
raised in

in a particular speech
act:

"Of course, individual
validity claims

can be the.atically
stressed, whereby the truth
of the propositional
Cdhtent comes to the fore
in the cognitive use
of language, the

Tightness (or appropriateness)
of the interpersonal
relation in the
interactive, and the truthfulness
of the speaker in the
expressive.
But in every instance of
communicative action the system
of all
validity claims comes into play:
they must always be raised

Simultaneously, although they cannot
all be thematic at the same
time."
While one validity claim is
thematized, the truth of the
others remains at the level of
assumption unless and until they are

subsequently brought into question.
The theory of universal pragmatics
represents the core of

Habermas' theory of communicative
competence.

There are other

features of his account of undistorted
communication that require

mention in order
to give a
complete account of htheorv
Tn
--r..
in
acdrtron to t.e
t.ree vaii.it,
ciaims

——
^

ccmprehensibility),

an. t.e one
ciaime.
s

Habermas insists th«t

communicative

oisccvereo in

iin,,tics

a

e

f

""distorted communictlon
to take n,=
piace eacb actor
.ust bave e.uai
cbances or opportunity
to
enoaoe rn communicative
actions,
one or more
actors is den ed tbe
opportunity to engage
in communicative
action or if that
prejudiced by tbe actions
of otbers
u-ners, then the
t
requirement of
distorted communication
bas been violated,
and any consensus
tbat
-rges is suspect and may not
be cbaracteri.ed
as a legitimate,
uncoerced consensus.

u

The second requirement
concerning communicative
competence is that
each Of the actors
must be committed to
discussion until universal
agreement is reached. Only
ra,o of
nf =such
k
^y in the case
universal agreement
can it be said that
the consensus that
emerges is a totally
uncoerced
consensus. If speakers
are not committed to
dialogue until consensus
IS reached, they may
begin to engage in
strategic action that would
undermine the process of
undistorted communication
resulting in a
false consensus.
•

Universal Prag matics and Authority

Habermas- theory of communicative
competence and universal

pragmatics seems to deny the
practice of authority any positive
or
constructive role in the formation
of a genuine consensus and the
pursuit of rational action that would
emerge from that consensus.

If
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the model of
undistorted communioation
icbuiting
resultino in universal
agreement is the
paradigm or guioing
ioeal of h
it would follow
that the exerorse
of authority
must represent an
a. revration,
interruption and
substitute for genuinely
democratio
act.on. authority
is that set of
relationships that are
substituted
•

•

™t,

for When a dialogue
has not deen allowed
to
ccnunue to the point of
universal agreement.
Henoe, the e.eroise
of
-thorit, is also a
substitute for rational
action. This point
is
substantiated by what
Habermas says oonoerning
the public sphere

Prcise Of bourgeois ideology
«as

The

the replacement of
rule of authority

Of the absolutist
state with the rule
of reason exercised
through
public opinion. The
growth of scientific
forms of social control
has
eroded the public sphere
within liberal capitalist
societies and

replaced the rational,
practical public decision
making with a
technologically oriented decision
making process. The
point that is
relevant here for our
purposes is that Habermas
account of the public
sphere guided by reason seems
to have no place for
authority, or at
least would limit the duties
of authority to the
carrying out of
policies consensually arrived
at through rational
discussion in the
public sphere. Those in authority
would have no independence and
limited responsibility.

Habermas has indicated that the
ideal speech sitution, the
setting
in Which undistorted
communication
is realized,

is to be regarded as a

regulative ideal by which to measure
existing patterns of

communication and consensual agreements.

This seems to imply that a

recognition that the ideal of
undistorted communication is not in

.

net a o.spen3..e
aspect o. soc.a.
H.e.

„

.

an

acc.ete

c.aractenzaUcno.Ha.e™as...aaa.^^^^^

:i

7"
----

-™
0^

7""" "

a.t.omv,

it

see. .nc..ent

---^-0

-cse .enaeauons

.0.

.pon Ha.e^as to
a...ess
t.at

a.t..U. CO..

.e
: de^ocatic or
™a.e
outliMno the relationship
between the theor, of
universal pragmatics and
the practice cf
authority
one possible impact
of Haber^as- theory
of universal
pragmatics
can be projected. His
elucidation of the
prag.agtic reguire^ents
for
successful, undistorted
co^unication could supply
social actors «ith
a framework for
analyzing the policies,
pronouncements and directives
Cf thdse in authority.
Habermas. account of the
validity claims that
speech acts raise would
enable thdse over whom
authority is exercised
tc determine what
types of arguments, evidence,

reasons an appeals

™ust be provided or made in
order to justify the
vailidity claims
raised by the pronouncements
of those in authority
or by the

justifications for policies those
in authority embark on.
For
example, if an authority 'A'
engaged in a communicative
action
(justification for policy X) that
raised validity claims that
could
cnly be redeemed by reference
to data on the performance
of the
economy, but in fact relied
for justification of that
policy on claims
to sincerity of the individual
in authority, Habermas' theory
of

universal pragmatics would enable
us to determine the inappropriate

justification for that policy as well
as clarify what types of
evidence need to be offered but are
in this instance missing.

If this

H^ciLxuns or
authoritv
u
ity, It
if should
Qhn.
be pointed out
that precisely
P-^ecisely thic
k
this phenomena
of
suh<;;tifnf.substituting sincerity
for truth in fho
.
the redemption
of constative
speech acts is
commonplace with i-h. o
^
'^^9^^ administration
ano either
,
.

r

,

-dents

P^ics,

Of

if correct about
the p.gmatic
requirements for successful

communication, would supplv
PPiy extenripri
extended =r,H
and more specific
criteria for
the determination of
the rationaiity of
particular policies
pronouncements, etc., than
would Pe possible
otherwise.
It'would
enable us to determine
when a particular
action, polio, or course
of
action by those in
authoritv
uxity was
wa^ justified
iiicfif.-,^^
^
.
and
whether or not the
justification for what policy
was appropriate.

The Habermas-n^^riampr n ^K^te
Evaluated

Having completed our
exposition of the positions of
both Habermas
and Gadamer we will now offer
our evaluation and criticisms
of their

respective positions.

As we pointed out in the
beginning of the

previous chapter, Gadamer sets
the protection of practical
and
political life from the potential
total domination by scientific
method and technological control
as the primary goal of
philosophical
hermeneutics.

In this respect he can be
interpreted as taking up the

challenge that Heidegger outlines
in The Question Concerning

Technoloqy

.

Moreover, Gadamer is aware of the
magnitude of this

problem; he understands the possibilities
of technologically

controlled forms of life
siinnin^ graoually
into our everyday
discourse,
in light
linhi- Of
nf fK^
the magnitude
and persistence
of the prohle.
one must question,
however,
t^i, wnether
whether p.h
Gadamer's philosophical
.

everyday life to resist
the encroacn.ents
of teo.nolocical
control
At ti.es Oada.er
see.s to place .is
fait, in t.e infinity
of lan^.^e
and Philosophy,
speaking of the capacity
of modern industrial
societies to technologically
substitute artificial
language for
authentic or spontaneous
language he says, "the
impoverishment of the
vocabulary of language
is making enormous
progress, thus bringing
about an approximation
of language to a
technical sign-system
Leveling tendencies of
this kind are
irresistable. Vet in spite
of
thrs the Simultaneous
building up of our own
world in language still
persists whenever we want
to say something to each
other.
The result
is the actual relationship
of men to each other.

Each one is at first

a kind of linguistic
circle, and these linguistic
circles come into

contact with each other, merging
more and more.

Language occurs once
again, in vocabulary and
grammar as always, and never
without the
inner Infinity of the dialogue
that is the progress between
every
speaker and his partner. Genuine
speaking, which has something
to say
and hence does not give
prearranged signals, but rather seeks
words
through which one reaches the
other person, is the universal
human
task - but it is the special
task of the theologian, to whom
is

commissioned the saying further of
a message that stands
written.

The implication is that in spite of
the perserverence

of technology, language will always
provide us with

a

refuge, resevoir

and resource to
enable us to elude th= =
^""^
^"'^«3*^"'ents of technological
do..nat.on of everyday
life. Given the
infi^tv of language,
^'irinity
l,n
any
attmpt at the creation
of a totally,
total] v t.nK
technologically controlled
language is futile.
.

in part what the
questions co.es .own
to,

•

I

thin., is to what

extent does the threat
of a technologically
controlled for. of life
consist pri.arily or
totally of artificially
created language, a sign

art.frcially created meaning,
coupled with the
self-.isunderstanding
on the part of science,
concerning its universality,
is the .ost
important dimension, if
not exhanstiu,.
„p the
exhaustive, of
problems concerning the
relationship between everyday
life and
the ever increasing,

•irresistable' tendencies
toward technological
control.

If these two

Phenomena are what are at
question then the independence
and infinity
Of language and the
inherent disposition toward
philosophy on the part
of science might be
sufficient to guarantee the
long run integrity of
everyday social life.
This Characterization of
Gadamer's perception of the
problem would
make two other positions of
his more intelligible. First,
it would

explain why he insists in the
preface of the second edition of
Truth
and Method that he is not, and
philosophy has no business, telling
science what it should and should
not do and why he claims not to
be

prescribing methods for the human
sciences, but that he is only giving
an account of what actually is
the- case regarding language, truth
and

science. Second, it would make his
appeal to commonalitites, i.e.

common concerns that all of us
face as human beings, as the basis of
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practical action, .ere
understandable.

Forif

^

th
Pdlitical problems
df technninntecbnologrcal societ.
consist primarily
in artificially
created
-nrno and scientist, bot.
3re resoluble b.
features
,

—

.

:irt""""^^"""'^""^^^-^--'
Political
.

t.n

questions

problems be.in to
appear as

^^sunderstandin, .icb are
resolvable because of
tbe universality
of
accord between conflicting
parties that will serve
as the basis for
further dialogue.
Moreover, the infinity
of language would
guarantee
that even in the
face of a self-conscious
attempt to create an

emerge that would
constantly elude the net
of technological
control
and many older meaning
would slip throught
the
net itself.

Even if we grant the
accuracy of this
characterization of the
problems confronting modern
society
from the growth of
science,

questions emerge that challenge
the optimism that Gadamer
exhibits.
First, the infinity of
language does not guarantee
that the meanings
that escape the net of the
technological sign system and
the new ones
that emerge in response to
the growth of science are
necessarily
rational or sufficiently strong
to resist or reverse the
infiltration
of science and scientific
control into everyday life.
Counterculture

responses to the Americn way of
life as well as those political
responses that borrowed from
primitive societies or revolutionary
movements in pre-industrial societies
proved either helpless in the
face of the technological society

they confronted, or were themselves

co-opted by the institutions of those
technological societies, or,

•
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dissappointed by the
failure of those altPrn.f
alternatives, dissolved
when
their proponents
realized the futilitv of fh
'^'^^ °^

responses, and in some
instances became
apologists for the very
vciy societies they
th. once
opposeo
^e.g., former Maoists
in France),
Franno^
t
short, the infinity
of language
and meaning .oes not
guarantee that the
responses that emerge
wiii .e
rational responses. In
this respect the
accusation of irrationalis.
that Haber^as levels
at Gada.er is, in
so.e respects, correct.
second, it is not clear
that the tendency
to philosophy that
Gadan»er believes is
inherent in science
would itself serve as a
countervailing power regaroing
the growth of tehcnological
society
certainly in Angolc-A.erican
philosophy the tendency has
been for
professional philosophy, one
without the German humanist
tradition
that Gada.er see.s tc
place so^e faith in, to
become the hand-maiden
of precisely the tendencies
that Gadamer wants to resist.
This
problem is exacerbated by the
popular view that the practical
and
philosophical issues that philosophy
must address are themselves
not
subject to rational discussion and
resolution. They appear as the

m

.

decisions of private individuals,
mere value judgements that can
clash
but never be completely adjudicated.
Hence, the faith that Gadamer
places in the inherent philosophical
tendencies of science or

scientific society seems misplaced in
a society that has co-opted
philosophy, views it as irrelevant, or
removed it to the realm of

private decision, immune to rational deliberation.
But Gadamer 's characterizaton of the nature
of the problem facing

everyday practical, political life and its relationship
to

technological forms of control is itself questionable.

It is perhaps
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here that Habermas'
criticic^mc
''''

.

''''

.

^^P-t-t.

If in addition
to
the problems of
meaning that emerge
ueLween evervn.
between
everyoay practical
life
fo™s or tecHno:og.ca.
control tHere a.
st.ct.al p.o.le. pose,
t.e spheres of wor.
y
an. pputical
power, p.o.le^s that
reao. .eyon.
the resources available
to a society,
societv the
fho .
resolution of these
problems
would seem to require
equire the
thp self-conscious,
coif ^„
methodical application of
reason that Habermas
advocates and that
duvocates
thof r
a
Gadamer
disparages. The

-

i

structural contradictions
and constraints that
face ™any liberal
capitalist societies today
are not just problems
of the conflict
between created meanings
of technological for^s
of control and the
meanings of everyday life.
They represent conflicting
imperatives for
action that either totally
undermine other imperatives
(structural
contradictons) or jeapordize the
success of other imperatives
(structural constraints). The
result, according to Habermas,
is a
series of economic crises that
are displaced to other spheres
of life
and translated into crises
of legitimacy, motivation, etc.^O'
what

Habermas does in examining these
crises is pay close attention
to the
breakdown of traditional meanings
regarding work, politics and social
life and show how changes in those
meanings have potential impact on
other spheres of social life. In
effect he has paid much closer

attention than Gadamer has to the relationship
between work and
politics and traditional meanings that Gadamer
makes so much of.

Although Gadamer insists that the problems
of work and politics must
ultimately be articulated in language, Habermas offers
us an account
of how this has happened and the ways that issues
and meanings lose

their force, change, or become problematic in the process.
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Hcreove.. even if the

sel.^.s.n.erstan.ino of
science were
...

fact society coul.
.e ad.resse.
without the interference
of private
interests.
Suppose, for the
sake of argument,
argument it h
became obvious that
the increasing
pollution of tne
the earth was
^
.
understood
as the result of
a misconceived view
of the earth
earfh as a mere
reservoir of disposable
resources and that this
view hid ether
perspectives of our possible
relationship with nature.
The question regains
as to whether those
Who stood the most
to privatel, gain
or lose, those
organizations
Whose private wealth
is dependent upon
the instrumental
approach to
harvesting resources and
disposing of pollution,
would comply with
demands for changes in the
use of resources and
disposal of
pollution. Gadamer seems to
believe that the realization
of
.

co^onalities and the change in
misunderstanding of scientific
ways of
thinking would lead to changes
in our economic and industrial
relationships with nature. This
is at best contentious.

It threatens
to mark philosophical
hermeneutics with a political
naivite that would

condemn it to political
irrelevance and manipulation.

In this context

Gadamer 's positions on several
other issues come into question
and
thereby jeapordizes his account of
authority.

We will deal

specifically with the universality of
language and his account of the
connection between reason and authority.
In some respects the most
fundamental issue between Gadamer and

Habermas is the question concerning
the universality of language.
Gadamer believes that Habermas falls
to understand and appreciate the
extent to which language influences,
affects, enables ana constrains

us even in our
most reflect iuo m

fails to
appreciate the power
of reflection
regarding language,
and ignores the
ore
P"^-^^"SU"tic dimension of
our
Dersnn=, and
h
personal
social lives
Tho
'''''
''''''''
Clarify
What Gad
what
Gadamer means when
he ^dys
says tnat
that language
i.nn
is universal.
The statement
that 'Bp
inn fhof
'"'"3
'"^^
understood is language
^
can
two .eanlngs.
Pirst. it can .e
interpreted as a clai.
of
radical, linguistic
idealis. that onl,
those things that
enter
language can .e understood
hecause language
completely constitutes
,

•

,•

"

-

•

-e
.

face Of competing
languages this position
is pushed to linguistic

this .ost radical for.
nothing exists outside
of language.
It is
possible to interpret
Gadamer this way at times,
and at times I
believe Habermas does.

But the phrase 'Being
that can be understood
is language' can have
another meaning. It can
be interpreted as claiming
that .hat

distinguishes .an from other
animals in his understanding
of the world
is that understanding
is, in principle,
articulatable, that it fines
its most perfect expression
in language.

This view need not make the

linguistic idealist claim that
the world per se is constituted
linguistically, but it might make
the somewhat more modest
claim that
only those things that find
linguistic expression can be understood
by
me and thereby enter my
world as something I can act on,
take account
of,

avoid, discuss, deny, desire, etc.

Other things may exist in the
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'° '''''

language.

-

^°

---tan.

:n this respect
the .orl. that is

available onl, through

the. „.st ente.
™,

avaUa.le

to .e is

language, and

understanding of other
cultures, other historical
periods, or previous!,
unnoticed dimensions

It is this last
clai. that

take Gada.er to be
.aking when he
says 'Being that can
be underc;tnnH
-.-o
understood is
language- and that our
worla is
linguistically constituted.
But if
DUL
ic, fho
this is
17 tnis
the case, then he must
be
I

^

raalrty that is unknown
to .e or .isunderstcod
by ™e because n,y
language is inappropriate
for their understanding.
One example

of

thrs would be cargo cults
of the South Pacific
which mistook airplanes
for God's messengers. A
second might be the
paleo-symbols that

psychoanalytic theory claims come
into existence in the
pre-linguistic
stage of personality development.
A third would be the
political
tensions and dilemmas that
citizens experience in contemporary
society
but which do not seem to find
expression in the political vocabulary

available to them.
But having admitted this, one
of Gadamer's primary claims

regarding the universality of language
remains defensible, i.e. that
these things must find expression
in the language of actors before
they can be understood.

Hence, even Habermas points out that
in the

analytic situation the analyst must be able
to translate, through
scenic understanding, the paleo-symbols that
remain at the unconscious
level into language that is familiar to the
patient.

Only then is it

possible for the patient
to act on
rh.n
Kchange his behavior.
His worln
.
,
knowledge
,

f...
°^ attempt to
h

°^ly when the
analyst's
finds expression
in the patient'.
^
^ language. This I think is
1

as psychoanalysis
does.

The issue concerning
the universality
of language .len.s
into the
questions involving the
autonomy of reason
with respect to
language
and the force of
reason vis a vis language.
Haber.as hi.self argues
that a language ga^a
that is congealed
internall, and hermetically
sealed externally «ould
per.it an identity of
meaning, .ut that this
Identity of meaning would
prevent the auton^ous
development of
ego-identity. Hader.as seems
to be implying a
connection here between
freedom and the indeterminacy
of language, i.e.
that the former is
dependent upon the alienation
and distanciation enabled
by the
latter. Vet this throws
into question the status
of the ideal speech
situation based on a theory of
undistorted communication and
the
redemption of validity claims
that Habermas identifies
as constituting
the pragmatic requirements
of communication. The
achievement of the
ideal speech situation would
seen, to result in an
identity of
meaning.
If this is the case, and
it the identity of meaning
would
close off the alienation and
distanciation required for autonomous

self-identity, the achievement of
the ideal speech situation
would
result in the type of repressive
constraint on freedom that Habermas
aims at preventing.

On the other hand, to grant the
indeterminacy of

language, to allow that meaning embodied
in language is greater than
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the capacity to
reflectively

appropriate th=t
=ada.er.s point that
the
li.it of reason
^ limits
sppmc:
seems

w-; n
willing
to admit.
•

.

'° ^^^"^

are yreatei
areatpr fhor.
u .
than Habermas

That the boundaries
nf ianr,,o

capacity of langluage
to clarifv
° ^'^^^^y ^^^g^age and redeem validity
Claims
seems to be an
implication of the
i-ne nranm^i-.v
pragmatic requirements
of
communication that he so
carefully retails.
details
Tf communication
If
involved
only the sinole use
of language,
raising only one type
of validity
c:a.. at a ti.e, one
coul. conclude that
the conditions for
rendering
the .eaning of any
particular speech act
totally transparent
could .e
met. But Habermas
insists that =11
all three pragmatic
validity claims
truth, appropriateness,
and truthfullness,
are present in any
speel
act, but that only one
of them can be made
thematic and redeemed
at
any particular time.
He says, ..individual
validity claims can be
thematically stressed whereby
the truth of the
proposition content
comes to the fore in the
cognitive use of language,
the rightness (or
appropriateness) of the interpersonal
relation in the interactive,
and

the truthfulness of the
speaker in the expressive.

But in every

instance of communicative
action the system of all
validity claims
comes into play; they must
always be raised simultaneoulsy,
although
they cannot be thematic
at the same tme.'''°^ This
implies that
the

redemption of even the validity
claim made thematic might

provisionally presume that the
other validity claims could be
redeemed
as well.

Moreover the redemption of the
speech validity claims

themselves assume that the speech
acts engaged In the redemption of
the initial communication
can also meet these validity claims, ad

infinitum.

But this IS n-r^.
preciseiy the type
of restriction
or li.it on
reason that Gadamer
insists that h.h
Habermas ignores.
it appears that
this arrnnnf
p
•

^

•

ad.Us

two

^^"^"^ ^^^i-

.

-stitutions an. nor^s that
for™ the background
of those other

other clai.s but

U

is possible only
by assuming the
redemptions of

previous validity claims
remains in tact and
is unchanged by the
redemption of or failure
to redeem subsequent
vallolty claims
second. Habermas. account
of how each

validity claim is redeemeo

further substantiates
Gadamer's argument concerning
the inescapability
Of language. Habermas
argues that each validity
claim is redeemed
differently. Truth,
appropriateness, and sincerity
ultimately appeal
to experiential sources,
normative context, and
subsequent behavior
respectively. But one of
Cadaver's points is that what
can count as
experience, what determines
the normative context, and
what in
a

person's behavior will be taken
as evidence of sincerity
are all
influencao (determined is too
strong a word) by the historical
period
and linguistic traditions
one finds oneself
short, no

m

matter how far one wishes to
press one of the validity claims
of
speech, that further scrutiny
must always take place in the
language
one has inherited.
The final issue between
Gaoamer and Habermas, ano one that flows

from the previous
issue

"

u

fh=

::. :

...

r

-

:

recalled that Gadamer'c;

being ineliminable,
it was an
abstraction h. claimed,
to imagine
ourselfes acting
ways that were
not partlv
Nut
partly influenced
inf,
by the
authority of tradition.
Moreover
oreover, the
thP h.odecision to acknowledge
•

,

m

•

Paniciar

a

in.i.i..ai as an
a.tbo.it. rests on the
recognition o. bis

an exercise of freedom.

However, latter in his
rejoinder to Habermas,
Gadamer
Characterizes the relationship
between those in authority
and those
over who. authority is
exercised as dogmatic
acceptance rather than
dogmatic Obedience.
Unfortunately, it is
unclear how dogmatic
acceptance is any more
rational that dogmatic
obedience, and does
nothing to enable us to
determine which instances
of dogmatic
acceptance are rational and
which are
""icn
ars nnt
ri- „
not.
It could even be
argued
that it is precisely
dogmatic acceptance that
characterizes the
relationship between everyday
practical life and technological
society. Hence, Gadamer'
s account of authority threatens
to undermine
the earlier case he made
for the compatibility of
authority with
reason.
The problem could be resolved
if he were willing to make
the
~ve that Winch makes when Winch
claims that the pronouncements
of
,

those in authority can always
be checked by those over whom
authority
is exercised by reference
to the way of life

that gives rise to

positions of authority and of which
the authoritative pronouncements

or actions are
meant to extend

ri=f

^

°" ^^^^i°PBut Gaaamer's
in.. .
insistence
on dogmatic
acceptance pieciuaes
precludes this
possibility.
It
changes Winch's
triadic relationship
r=i=,n
into one in which
those in
authority are the only
source of information
inf„
that those pyer
whom
authors
authority is exercised
haye concerning
concernlnn the way
pf life or
tradition in
Questlnn
T
question.
TO describe this
type pf acceptance
pf authority as
rational is to stretch
the meaning pf
reason beyond
recognisable
^-rts. Hprepver. and
cpntrary to Cadamer's
purposes, it could
easny be used to
legitimize the most
complete forms pf
tePhnplpgical
control of practical
life.
'

•

Habermas. alternative
account of authority
is not, howeyer,
a
satisfactory response.
Habermas' account of
reason leaves little
room
for authority in
rational discourse and
the formation of
rational

authority that are also
forms of domination.

Even his account pf
teacher student relationships
is interpreted in
these terms-

iiiflsfsirs
l^inkf^tl^TZ'

prospect Of'

But this is one-sided vie«
of authority in the
educatipnal

'

relationship, pne that is
characteristic of a distorted or
perverted
educatipnal prpcess. It may
be true that some forms of
education are
systems of socialization. But
surely other forms of education
are

aimed at knowledge, at
providing the student not with
traditional

values or goals but
with Skills
sun. ana the
development of critical
capacity that eventually
make the
thP »H
y
educational relationship
unnecessary. To
describe such a relatinn^h'^^^^tionship as a
system of
domination is something
of a distortion.

interestingly enough,
the example of
psychoanalysis that
Habermas

anguag

and one .hich he
thinks provides the
basis for rejecting
^adamer.s claims regarding
the identity or
reason and authority
Uself involves an authority
relationship that Habermas
seems t^
ignore.
In the analytic
situtation the analyst
occupies an

episte.ologically privileged
position regarding the
structure of mind
'
personality development,
and the dynamics of
the analytic situation
that are necessary for
the success of the
analytic experience. The
analyst is 'an authority
on these things. Although
the ultimate
success of the psychoanalytic
experience rests on the
patient

acceptance or validation of
the explanation offered
by the analyst
the analyst is still
in the position of
determining which parts of
the
raw material that comes
to the surface in the
analytic relationship
will be worked up and offered
as an explanation to the
patient. Hence
there is a dependence between
the patient and the analyst
made
possible by the analyst's privileged
knowledge and skill.
This point has serious
implications for Habermas, for he
takes the
example of psychoanalysis and
the analytic relationship between

patient and analyst as the paradigm
of emancipatory knowledge and

application of critical theory.

If the relationship between the

critical theorist and other social
actors is analagous to that between

19:

accurately described
as an error nf n™°^ °™^^^°"•

0

I" offering the
theory

co™..,.3tive action as an
ideai of .distorted
co^unication upon

whrch one would duiid
genuine consensus,
Hader^as ad.its that
the
"eai speech situation that
«oulo resuit in
consensus is unii.eiy
to
be achieved in
practice. Hence, any
poiiticai decisions that
resuit
actuai poiiticai life,,
even one guided by
critical theory are
l^^ely to be less than
the genuine consensus
that Haber.as believes
is
the .ark of true
democracy. Presumably,
in the absence of
genuine
consensus, sd.e type of
political authority would
be reguired to carry
out those decisions
that were .ade before
genuine consensus could
be
reached. This means that
the probability that
those decisions will
conflict with the political
wills of at least some of
the political
actors of that society will
remain.
Unfortunately, Habermas offers
no
positive account of what this
authority might look like, how
it may

-

be

made more democratic, or how
it may be held accountable.
One final problem that both
Habermas and Gadamer face is the

depoliticization of the problem both
attempt to redress.

There are

several aspects of Gadamer 's work
that contribute to this

depoliticization.

First, his model of the dialogue
as the primary

form of social interaction, though
it provides a number of insights

concerning hermeneutic understanding,
does not reflect many of the
problems that emerge in political
life.

This was partly reflected in

our discussion of
the promise of
philosoDh,>=,
P'lilosophical h
hermeneutics in solving
the Prcdle.
Drohi»™ concerning
the growth of
technological society.
But it is

«th co^onalities.
-at

Will

Though

deco.

thin, this is in
part correct for
Clearer in the next
chapter, the examples
he
I

hunger, and world-«ide
pollution are problematic
in a sense.
There is
nc agreement on .hat
the nature and causes
of these problems
are and
seme contemporary
political leaders,
particularly those in the
current
Reagan administration,
deny the unqualified
undesirability of those
problems. Indeed, on some
political questions, one
example being
abortion, one would be
hard put
"dro
out to
tn find
fi^n any ^
deep common accord that
would unite the interested
parties in a dialogue.

Moreover, in Gadamer's
example, the dialogue
relies on further
discussion between the
participants whenever agreement
is not reached
or misunderstanding
occurs.

In politics such furhter
discussion is

often cut off. (sometimes
necessarily), if it is present
at all.
Hence, though philosophical
hermenuetics may contribute to
our

understanding of social action in
importantt ways, it falls short of
providing us with an account of
political life. This inability or
failure to take accunt of the
political dimension of social meaning

prevents Gadamer from being able to
develop a theory of political
authority, democratic or otherwise.
If Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics
includes an apolitical

strain, Habermas' version of critical
theory is no less guilty of the

same flaw.

For Habermas, democracy seems to be ianetical
with

consensus agreement
ana the process
by which
wnicn true r
consensual
agreeement is reached.
Only When
when an
.n ,,n
uncoerced, total
consensus has
been achieved has
the ideal nf

f

.

'^^^

process o.
of co..ng to

"^^^^^^

the

•

truly democratic

a

consensus is interrupted
defore genuine

Rut if

+.k

-nsensus is achievea
had the Characteristic
that Haber^as clai.s
it has; if ail
the
validity Claims that
are necessary for
undistorted co^unication
are
^u^mied; if actors alsc
refrain fro. engaging
In strategic action
and suspended their
co^it.ent to action
altogether while the
process
Of coming to consensus
works itself out, It
is difficult to see
what
role politics would
play in the emancipatory
i.eal.
The interruption
Of the process of coming
to consensual agreement
can 5e interrupted
exther by the exercise
of authority or by the
political engagement of
some of the participants.
Either iuuLc
route lesuits
results in
in th=
the compromise of
the system of undlstorted
communication and the ideal
speech
situation.
The Implication of this
seems to be that political
authority per se is Indicative
of the pre-emption of
rational action
and consensus.
In spite of their
disagreements several important
similarities

emerge between Habermas and
Gadamer.

First, and most obviously,
both

recognize the importance of language
and the fact that it has
assumed
a central place in social
theory. Habermas, in the Postscript
to

Knowledge and Humain Interests

,

says:

The human interest in autonomy
and responsibility is not
mere fancy, for it can be apprehended
a priori.
What
raises us out of nature is the only thing
whose nature

we can know:
lanauanp
tk,^
u
and responsibIlI?fffe
^^tonomy^
posUed fn^'
sentence expresses
0*^^ ^irst
uneqSiW^^^
universal ana unconstra^nlH
intention of
autonomy and res ons
^^^ether,
ITnlfll'J; ^l''''
possess a priori in
^^^^
the sense of J^p
k^^^
^^^^^ °^ the philosophical
tradition. 1^;^
.

^

An exsew.e.e.
..Tc.a. t.e p.oble.
of ,an,.age .as
.place, t.e
tra.U.onaI p„..e. o.
ccnsc.ousness; t.e
t.anscen.enta: c.t,,.
o.
language supercedes
that of consciousness
uusness. ""2 The
Th» importance
.
of
language of H3.er.as
is further eW.ence.
the centraUt. of
speach
his theory of
co^unicative action an.
his eiahoraticn of
universal
Prag.atics. Ironicaiiy.
the reguirements
that Haher.as sets
.»n for
the successful completion
of un.istorte..
institutionally unhoun.
speech acts are all
requirements that would
have to be met hy
the
participants in Gadamer 's
dialogue.
•

-

Second, though they may
disagree about the efficiency
of
reflection and its ability
to neutralize, disperse
and penetrate

established meanings,

I

think their disagreement
is best seen as a

difference of emphasis rather
than an unresolvable conflict.
At times
Gadamer admits that meanings
that we reflect on often no
longer have
the same force that they
previously had, but that this
does not free
us from the language we inherit
or the net of traditional
meanings
that our language transmits.
Habermas, on the other hand, admits
that
we can no longer aspire to
complete independence from our language,
that even the validity claims of
universal pragmatics are dependent on

established norms and institutions, but
that the exercise of reason
can be made methodical ana can engage
traditional meanings in ways
that allows us to distance ourselves
from them and limit the claims
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-

-

Ha.e™as

1.

--.enoes

.ct

intimates at one
point that the

that separate
CaPamer an. himsei.
are ones or emphasisn present conditions
it ma. be more
urgent to indicate
the limits of
the false claim to
universal
if v m.H
u
'^''^
=""=i3m rather than that of
the hermeneutic claim
to universality
wherp the
th« h.
dispute
about the
grounds for justification
is concerned,
however it
"uwever,
It is n
necessary to
critically examine the
latter claim, too.""^
'

Thirdly, both seem to
believe that the
practice of authority is
such that it absolves
those in authority from
having to offer reasons
explanations, and justifications
for their actions.
Habermas focuses
on authority as a form
of domination, as
force that has legitimized
Itself, usually ideologically.
Gadamer's insistence that
authority is
that Which is dogmatically
recognized threatens to
preclude the
possibility of criticising
authority.
In this respect Gadamer
differs
somewhat from his counterpart
in England, Peter Winch.
Indeed, it
could be argued that the
dogmatic obedience to authority
(a
'

Characterization the Gadamer explicitly
rejects as being to
inconsistent with the exercise of
reason),

possibilities for democratic authority.
obedience

I

promises greater

In the case of dogmatic

might insist on retaining my right
of judgement while

obeying those commands or complying
with those policies that
to be wrong or misguided.

judgement.

But

I

believe

at least reserve my right of

In the case of dogmatic acceptance,

right of judgement.

I

I

surrender even my

Hence, my basis on which to hola authority

accountable, to chasten authority, is somewhat
more restricted.

Finally, as we have pointed out,
there are apolitical tendencies

in both t.in.e.s.

Por

Oad»er the .odeX of the
dialogue, his faith

^

Phiiosophy and the infinity
of language, and the
faith in
co^onaiities between
participants/antagonists in the
dialogue would
see. to leave substantial
areas of politioal life
that he
would have

difficulty acoounting for.

similarly, Hahex.as.
.odel of consensual

agreement as the .odel of
democratic decision .a.ing
would eliminate
politics fro. his View of
true democracy,
it implies that
those who

would favor democracy must
see politics and the
imposition of
authority that results as the
interruption of the formation

of

democratic will or decision,

it implies that a truly
democratic way

of life, even if only an
ideal, entertains no
politics and that a way
Of life that celebrates
politics will always fall short
of democracy.
in spite of their shortcomings,
both Gadamer and Haberaas
advance
the debate concerning authority
some distance. As Habermas
points
out, Gadamer's project of
philosophical hermeneutics provides
an

important corrective to science's
self-understanding, even if
Gadamer does underestimate the necessity
df methodically applied
reason.

In addition,

Gadamer's focus on the connections between

language and reason emphasizes the extent
to which the latter is

both constrained and enabled by established
social meanings.
Habermas, on the other hand, provides
the necessary counterbalance to

Gadamer's faith in the anonymous authority of
tradition.

Moreover,

Habermas' examination of the pragmatic reguirements
of understanding

make explicit the tacit assumptions we all hold in
our attempts at
communicative action, and he thereby helps to outline the
foundations

of

a form

of rational discourse that could address the problems of

social practice.

CHAPTER

IV

TOWARDS A THEORV OF
OEMCCRATIC AUTHORITY

in the preceding
chapters .e have seen
how the debates
in

conte^pcrary phncsophv
and pcUtical theory
thc.gh they raise
the
.estion or the nature o.
authority and Us
reiaticnship tc iang.ge
and reason, .ai: to
provide satis.actcrv
answers to that question

ParUcuiarly fail to resoive
the prodie. of
poiiticai authority
Of the interpretive

and

Both

theorists we have
examined insist that
the

relationship detween
authority on the one
hand, and reason and
freedo.
on the other, is not an
antithetical relationship
that thinkers since
the Enlightenment
have thought it to be.
clai. hinges on the
connection that reason,
freedo. and authority
have to language and a
co^on way of life. aada.er
Insists that the internal
connection
between reason and language,
i.e. that reason is
embedded in a
language that we are
historically delivered up to,
means that there
need not be a conflict between
reason and traditional authority.
But
Gadamer-s insistence on the
dogmatic acceptance of authority
would
make submission to authority
rational only in an extremely
restricted
sense of the term. Moreover,
he downplays the coercive
potential of
some types of authority, a result
of his apolitical tendencies
in his

^s

examination of meaning, language and
social life.

Winch, on the other

hand, recognized the need for
critical leverage regarding authority

and argues that the common way
of life that those over whom authority
199

is exercised and those
In authority
share,

provides not only the

defining features of
authority hut the
standards for Justification
and
critical evaluation as well.
But his identity of
those .in authority
with those Who are 'an
authorityitself attempts to
resolve the
proble. of political authority
by conceptual fiat.
Like Gada.er.
Winch in the end downplays
ui underestimatpc
or
H
unoerestimates fho
y
the coercive potential
of
authority.
Hollis- notion of autonomous
man, with its concept
of objective
real interest and strong
personal identity that is
distanced from

language and traditions, leaves
absolutely no room for the
authority
of either tradition, individuals
or institution, of the
thinkers we
have examined Mollis comes closest
to the Enlightenment account
of the

relationship amongst language, reason,
freedom, authority and
tradition.

But in spite of his attempt to
avoid the pitfalls of the

Enlightenment, and particularly the mistake
of positing a pre-social
form of personal identity

,

Mollis fails to resolve the tension

between strong personal identity and an
identity that is also social

identity.

This failure is due primarily to an
acceptance of a theory

of language that is insufficient for
supplying the link between

autonomous personal identity and social identity that
Mollis attempts
to make.

Habermas avoids the mistakes that Mollis makes by recognizing
the
importance of language and the insight of the interpretive or

hermeneutic approach.

But in the end he tends to construe the

relationship between authority and reason as purely antithetical and

hence focuses on authority as pure domination.

Mence the possibility

Of developing a theory
of authority that
is consistent with
democratic
practice is closed out for
Habermas, particularly
in light of his

seeming identity of democracy
with total, genuine
consensus.
in spite Of the failure
of the thinkers in
these debates to
resolve the problem of
authority, and the problem
of political
authority in particular,
l think that these
debates provide a
springboart^ from which we
might reach a solution
to the problem of

political authority.

^,e insights gained from
these debates, along

with those provided by some
of the work done in
analytic political
philosophy on the concept of
authority, will help to provide
us with a
solution to the question of the
relationship amongst language,

authority, reason and freedom (i.e.
human agency).

Politic al Authority;

'In

Authority" vs 'An Authnrity.

One of the most insightful
treatments of the problem of political

authority has been Richard Friedman's
distinction between being -in

authority and being

'an

authority.'

Friedman claims that most

approaches to the study of authority treat the
problem too narrowly by
focusing on the relationship of authority to
conduct.

This approach

only addresses one type of authority, claims
Friedman.

Authority is

exercised not just in the influence of behavior or
conduct, it can
also be defined as the ability to influence others' ideas,
beliefs and
opinions.

"Concommitantly, a person may be said to 'have authority'

in two distinct senses.

For one, he may be said to be 'in authority,'

meaning that he occupies some office, position or status which

entitles him to make dppicinr^c u ^
decisions about how
people should behave
But
-con.l,, a person .a.
be sal. to be
.n authoilt,. on
so.ethln,
-nln, that his .lews oi
utterances are entitled
to be believed'

-lu.1,.

.,.,,,,3,^

^^^^^^^ ^^^^^

-hers,

^^^^^
priests, parents,

and experts (of
various .In.s) as
having authority over
beliefs as
-II as legislators. Judges
and generals having
authority over

Those Who occupy
positions of

.In

authority do so because
of some

set formal rules defining
the procedure for
determining who shall be
in authority, ^ere
existence Is a purely
pragmatic feature
acccrdlr^ to Frled.an.
„eant to create and insure
organization and
crder that would otherwise
be absent without the
existence of
authority. Since the point
of -in authority is
to regulate conduct
and prevent chaos, belief
in the correctness,
justice or morality of
the commands, decisions
and policies of those in
authority is

irrelevant to obedience.

In rrledman's words,

"the basis of the claim

to obedience made by a
person -in authority is of
a very special

kind.

TTiis

claim does not derive from
any special personal

Characteristic of the person invested
with authority such as superior
powers of judgement or special
knowledge (as in the case of the
being

'an

part

authority).

His claims to be obeyed is simply
that he has been

put -in authority- according to
established procedure, rather

than his decisions.

What makes an act obligating is the
fact the it

has been declared obligatory by the
person invested with authority
over that class of actions... the merits and demerits of
the actual

decisions are irrevelant
to the ohHgation
to obey, and
therefore the
Claim to Obedience is
not comprised b,
showing that it is
inferior to
some other decisions
that might have been
ta.en.
(indeed the whole
point or setting up this
sort of authority is
to dissociate the
claim
to Obedience from the
merits of the particular
decisions one is being
asked to accept. For as
long as the claim to
obedience is left
contingent on the judgement
of merits, the
disagreement among men at
the substantive level is
bound to reintroduce the
chaos the system of

IS not contradictory to
defer to the decisions of
this sort of
authority and yet also the
case that his internal assent
is also
irrelevant." ^ Hence, on this
view those in authority
need not
legitimate their actions, policies
or commands.
Those actions,

policies or commands are made
authoritative because they originate
with someone who is established
by some set of rules as being
'in

authority,

and not because they adhere
to or are consistent with,

some set of principles, goals or
values of those over whom the

authority is exercised.

As Friedman puts it,

"This type of authority

produces a decision to be followed, not a
statement to be believed.

Belief is both unjustified (since no decision
can make something true,
but only obligatory) and unnecessary (since
it is common action not

common opinion that constitutes the purpose
behind the establishment

of this type of authority)."

'

It is

is exercised in legal, administrative,

this type of authority that
and political authority.

The second type of authority that Friedman claims
to detect he

describes as 'an authority.'

'An authority'

relies on an
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ep.ste.o:csicaUv pavUege.
posUioo

t-s

instance rests en

see

^'^^^

'

Us

Torce.

^.t.orUy in

superior .no«le.oe or
insig.t t.at those

-

^" P-tioe. .navaiXa.:e
to
Who accept it or
over who. it is
exercise..
is the t.pe of
authority that both
Gada.er and Winch
emphasize or take as the
Paradig. of authority,
in contrast to the
first type of authority
an authority, produces
statements to be believed
and not Just
decisions to be followed.

r
tHcse

„

Finally, the two types
of authority are
unrelated according to
median. The fact that someone
is placed -In authority
has nothing
to do with their being .an
authority, on anything:
..But so„.one who Is
in authority, is not necessarily
an authority on anything;
his
decisions do not have to be
presented as authoritative
expressions,
deliverances, or interpretations
of logically prior beliefs
or
principles. On the contrary,
it is precisely the key
point about the
concept of -in authority to
be dissociated from any
background of
Shared beliefs... * whereas .an
authority presupposes a background
of Shared beliefs, -In
authority, presupposes Just the
opposite, an
absence of shared beliefs that
threaten chaos.
The two types of authority do
have one thing in common, claims

Friedman.

He insists that both types of
authority involve the

surrender of private Judgement on the
part of those over whom it is
exercised:

.'to

have authority is not to have to offer
reasons in

behalf of what one has prescribed as a
condition of being paid
obedience.

In this sense,

obedience to a command 'simply because x

gave it'... entails abdication of one's own judgement to the

particular act in question
and the adoption in
Its place of the
judgement of someone else
as guiding one's
conduct..
it

is this

suspension of private
judgement on the part of
those accepting
authority and the absence
of the need of those
who hold authority
to
have to offer reasons that
distinguishes authority fro.
rational
argument.
Friedman's distinction between
-in authority and
-an authorityhelps to clarify several
issues that remained confused
in much of the
literature concerning the concept
of authority.
But in spite of

this

contribution several flaws in his
account of the two types of
authority and the notion of
authority in general remain,
i will begin
by examining specific
problems in his account of authority,
later

tracing it to

a

misunderstanding of the nature of
political life,

i

will use this criticism as a
foundation for an alternative theory
of
democratic political authority.

Political Aut hority and the Surrender of
Judgement

The characterization of authority as
involving the surrender of

private judgement is not peculiar to Friedman,

it is a fairly

common

way of defining authority, particularly
by those trying to distinguish

authority from rational persuasion.

However,

it is a

misinterpretation of what is involved in the obedience to
authority,
mistaking what occurs in specific or isolated instances of
authority
for a general characteristic of authority.

In one sense the

surrender

of private judgement occurs when, say, one accepts the pronouncements
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fo someone who is

-an authority-

as in the case when
we ask a

recognized authority on Hegel
about the meaning of
in the Phenomenology
.

a

specific passaoe

But if we look at otner
aspects or different

instances of authority it
becomes clear that the
surrender of private
Judgement cannot be said to
typify authority relations
as a whole or
to be a defining characteristic
of them.

in the first place,

as Richard Flathman
points

out/

the

acceptance of authority minimally
involves the judgement that
someone
or some institution legitimately
holds a position of authority
and
that the command, policy or action
taken is consistent with the
rules
and procedures that establish the
authority.

Hence, we would refuse

to take a traffic officer's advice
on the meaning of a particular

passage in the Fhenomenoloqy

.

But there is a second sense in which
the authority relation does
not require the suspension of judgement.

Referring back to the

traffic officer, we generally obey his commands
concerning the
regulation of traffic.

But our obedience to those commands, our

acceptance of his authority, does not require us
to surrender our
private judgement concerning how traffic should be
managed.

Indeed,

many of the less patient of us often develop quite
explicit ideas and
make harsh judgements about the correctness of the traffic
officer's
decisions.

What we surrender in such cases is not our right of

judgement but our right of action based on our judgement.'^

The same

holds true for any number of other decisions made by those 'in

authority

.
'

I

may not believe in the soundness of a particular

government policy and even insist on my right to criticize it, but

consistent with Priedman.
own characterization
of .n authorit^
as
the making of a
decision to be ODeyed,
obevPri
nnf
not the pronouncement
of a
statement to be believed.

From here it is tempting
to conclude that
the surrender of
judgement is characteristic
of ^an authority
relations. But even
this must be qualified
in important ways.
Let us

examine the
relationship between those
who are taken to be
.an authority on
something ahd those over
whom that authority
is exercised,
rriedman
points out that in order
for someone to be
accepted as .an authority,
there must be what he calls
an epistemological
framework that is
Shared by those involved in
the authority relation,
mis

epistemological framework supplies
the subject area over
which those
Who are 'an authority,
claim expertise, it defines
the procedures
(formal or informal) by which
one achieves recognition
as an
authority, and finally the
types of statements that will
be accepted
as authoritative. *nce,
Judgement is involved here in what
Friedman
describes as second-order claims
that provide the background for

authority .S

Judgement is involved on the part of
those over whom

authority is exercised then at least
at this second-order level.'
But if we examine one of the paradigm
cases of

'an

authority

I

think we will see that the exercise
of judgement pervades the

authority relationship.

Let us take the example of the academician

who is said to be .an authority on
Hegel.

on

a

One becomes an authority

particular subject matter, in our case Hegel's
philosophy, by

being able to offer convincing interpretations
of his work and

Philosophy.

These interpretations
are, quite obviously,
not
arbitrary, ^ey are backed
up by reason, argument
and evidence
including references to
texts, Hegel .3 relationship
to other thinkers
his historical situation,
etc.
One does net, in short,
become

recognized as an authority
on Hegel by si.ply
dogmatically announcing
so.e interpretation. One
is required to offer
reasons why one should
be considered 'an authority
on Hegel in order to
gain that position
Having established oneself
as an authority
on Hegel one's opinions
or

interpretations of Hegel or
particular passages fro. his
works would
generally be accepted with little
or no rational argument
needed for
their support.

But imagine that having established
oneself as an authority on
Hegel, that one newly recognized
Hegel expert consistently and

repeatedly refused to offer justification
for interpretations of

particular works or passages of Hegel's.

Perhaps in the classroom our

new Hegel expert insisted that students
dogmatically accept his

interpretation without his having to justify
it.

When pressed by his

colleagues whose interests also included Hegel,
he denied the
necessity of having to offer a reasoned argument
as to why his

interpretation of Hegel was better than competing
interpretations.

If

this behavior continued, at some point the recognition
of our new

Hegel expert would be withdrawn, and it would be withdrawn
precisely
for his refusal or inability to offer reasoned argument
for his

pronouncements.

Put another way, the continued recognition of being

'an authority,'

at least in some paradigm instances, rests upon one's

ability to demonstrate superior knowledge or insight.

The refusal or

.

lna.aity

to .e.onstxate that
insight .oui. iea.
people to chalienge

that authority.

The point here is
not that reoognition
of 'an

authority, constantly
involves justification
of one's stat us
or
expertise. That would
surely indicate a loss
of authority
What it
does indicate is that
those who are 'an
authority .ust. in principle,
be able to provide
reasoned arguments for
the correctness of
their
interpretations or pronouncements.
In the case of the
Hegel expert it
requires that he be able to
offer convincing grounds
or arguments for
the correctness of his
interpretations, indeed in
the example we are
considering, the ability to
offer more convincing
arguments for one's
interpretation might enhance one's
standing as 'an authority. '1°
That the surrender of
judgement is not an inherent
characteristic
of authority is further
demonstrated by the fact that in
any

particular subject matter people
who are recognized as authorities
can
offer conflicting interpretations
of the
same thinker, work of art.

play, political philosophy,
etc.. and both still be recognized
as an
authority
Those insisting that recognition
.
of authority involves the

surrender of private judgement have
yet to explain how one could
surrender private judgement simultaneously
to two conflicting

authorities

Returning to the example of our traffic
officer,

I

would like to

make a further point concerning judgement
and authority.

Friedman,

like many other writers on the subject, insists
on the suspension of
judgement on the part of those over whom authority is
exercised in an

attempt to eliminate the dependence of obedience to authority
on the
merits or demerits of the particular decisions made by those in
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Of authority is that
obedience to it is not
dependent on the
correctness, validity,
.craiity or any other
criteria hy which it
™.ght be judged. Pried.an
is in .any respects
typicai of this

position When he says that
the whoie point
behind setting up authority
xs "to disassociate the
clai™ to obedience fro.
the .erits of the
particuiar decision one is
being asked
to

accept.""

if those 'in
authority, were required
to give reasons to
Justify their actions
authority would be
indistinguishable fro. rational
persuasion,
indeed, in instances in which
those 'in authority are
questioned, we
often say that their authority
is being challenged.

If this point regarding
the disengagement of the
requirement of

Obedience fro. the merits or
Justification for an action were
correct,
and if this disengagement
were total, three things would
follow.
First, authority would
unquestionably be the antithesis of

rational choice and autonomy.

For now the obedience to authority

would preclude my acting according
to my own rational purposes.

It

may sometimes be the case that
the decisions of authority coincide
with the decisions

I

would make if given the chance to
deliberate and

exercise my choice according to that
deliberation.

But such

coincidence would be purely that, i.e.
accidental.

Second, the

exercise of authority would be purely arbitrary.

Obedience would be

required simply because some one or group in
authority made a decision
that required one to do this or that.

If the requirement of obedience

is totally disengaged from the merits of the
decision,

absolutely no basis on which to Justifiably disobey.

I

have

The requirement
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Of Obedience cannot
be suspended because
of any criticisms
of the decisions of
those in authority.

I

.ay ma.e

Third, this requirement
would make all obedience
to authority

authoritarian,

obedience is required not
because those in authority
^now What they are doing,
have a better perspective,
or are trying to
achieve some common good.
Obedience is required simply
because
authorities have made decisions
that require obedience,
it is
precisely this view of authority,
that is common to Oa.eshott
as well
that I wish to Challenge,
i should like to
do so by going back to
our
example of the traffic officer,
an example that is sometimes
given as
the paradigm case of the
requirement of obedience to
authority being
divorced from the merits of the
decisions.
NO one,

I

think, would disagree that
obedience to the commands of

the traffic officer are obeyed
in spite of the fact that some
drivers

believe particular decisions to be
wrong, idiotic or inefficient.
This is true even when we are
inconvenienced by such decisions, when
we are late for an appointment or
when the ice cream in the grocery

bag is melting on

a hot

summer day.

The fact that in such instances

our personal ideas about how traffic
should be directed is at odds

with the decisions of the traffic officer,
yet we still obey his
commands, is given as evidence that obedience is
disengaged from the

merits of the decisions made by those in authority.
But imagine a situation in which the traffic officer,
directing

traffic near an elementary school, has the habit of waving
on
automobiles traveling simultaneously at perpendicular directions
toward an intersection; tends to ignore children crossing in school

.

atrols; and at other
ti.es see.s to ignore
traffic altogether
it
ould not ta.e long for
motorists and pedestrians
to notice that his
cessions concerning the
directing of traffic were
questionable
-cisions, so.eti.es hazardous
to the health of those
traveling near
'.r through the
intersection. Consequently,
they would obey the
cfficer-s commands selectively
(if at all), feeling
safe to proceed
rnly when it was obvious
the officer was holding
other traffic, but
-ry and even disobedient if the
commands did not seem to
take account
'^f other traffic
and pedestrians,
effect the disobedience and
:.elective obedience that emerges
does so because those over
whom
:

.

m

^•^uthority is being
^.hey

exercised deem those decisions
to be bad decisions;

undermine the very point behind
having someone direct traffic,

-.e. the common puipose of the
safe regulation of traffic amongst

Motorists and pedestrians (which may
or may not coincide with some
other set of purely private,
particular interests, e.g. getting the
-ce cream home before it melts)

.

The point here is that obedience
to

authority is not divorced from the
merits or demerits of the decisions
•lade.

Rather,

the decisions that are made must be
consistent with

iome common purpose or way of life
that provides the point behind the

existence of that authority, delimits its
sphere of control, the types
:f

decisions it can and cannot make, and the standards
by which those

Jecisions will be evaluated as good or bad, better or
worse
Jecisions.

We may say that there is a prima faciae assumption
that

:he exercise of authority is in fact directed at
achieving that common

:urpose.

But that common purpose always stands as the background

igainst which we can evaluate and criticize the decisions of authority

commands and policies.
At ti,„es

'

.ae.™an al.ost se.s

to

.cooni.

this,

in «s account
authority, he
.istin,uishes between
n.st or.er .eiie.s
that X

so^e set

0. procedures that

estahUshv

as .in autho^t...

.

.^.es

a

parallel distinction in
his discussion of
.an
dii authoritv
auTinority,' arguing
that
in addition tc the
nrst order helief that
there are pronouncements
to
be believed, there are
second order beliefs,
consisting of an
episte.ological background,
that those in the
authority relation
Share. But he does not
draw these connections
thoroughly enough and
failing to do so fails
to show the extent
to which these so-called
second order beliefs establish
the point behind authority,
as well
•

-

as

help determine how it
will operate, what types
of decisions and
pronouncements and policies it
can legitimately make or
carry out, and
how these provide the
standards of critici^ and
justification for
particular decisions, commands,
pronouncements, and policies.
If our argument to this
point has been correct, if the
obedience

to those in authority is not
completely disengaged from the
merits of
their decisions, but rather if
there exists a prima faciae
belief that
the policies, decisions, etc.
are consistent with the common
purposes
or way of life that provides the
Justification and standards of

criticism for authority, then the
concepts of .in authority and .an
authority, are not completely unrelated,
but rather the two notions

are variably present in all instances
of political authority in a
democratic polity.

TTiat

is,

even where those .in authority, are not
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for^all, established
as ^an autHcrity
on seething, there
is the
assumption and expectation
that their decisions,
etc. wili achieve
see co™on purpose or be
consistent with a way of
iife.

This is not

to .ake the extreme
claim that winch makes
that ali who are .in
authority, are eo ipso
.an authority..
But it does

impiy that the

notxon Of being .an authority
provides the background for
evaluation,
criticism, and justification
of those .in authority.'
That this common way of
life, or common good,
is partly
constitutive of authority I want
to demonstrate in another
way, by
examining not isolated instances
of authority but the
practice of
authority extended over time.
Imagine our questioning a
group of
individuals about a particular
person or group that stands
in

authority In their culture or
society,

pcUcy that those

we ask them about a
particular

in authority pursue but which
the group is critical

of and ask them why they comply
with that policy.

It is imaginable

that they would respond that they
are complying in spite of their

criticisms because the policy was made
by those in authority and the
former are obligated to obey it.

Imagine further that we ask the same

question each time a new policy is announced,
and each time the group
in question disagrees with the policy
but complies anyhow.

Imagine

finally that we survey everyone affected
by those policies, i.e.

everyone over whom those in authority exercise
authority, and everyone
to the last man and woman insists that the
policies of those in

authority are always wrong but they obey them anyhow.
The first example is easily understandable.

any number of ways.

We could explain it

Perhaps the Individual group supports other

poUcies

Of t.cse in power,
per.aps t.e o.Jectiona.:e

-tters Of relatively little
importance,

poUcy concerns

or perhaps the group
in

question feels obligated
to give the
questionable policy a chance
The second example is
somewhat less easily
explained. The dissenting
group might respond by
saying that in spite of
its disagreement with
the policies of those in
authority, it derived
other benefits that
outweigh its objections to
the policies in guestion.
Or
perhaps the

group in question saw no
alternative to compliance,
there being no
practical way to escape this
authority relationship or
to change those
in authority.

THe former case might be
still explained as a

relationship of authority, we
would be tempted to describe
the latter
as a relationship involving
power or coercion, rather than
authority.
Finally, in the last example,
to say that everyone in a
society
objected to all the policies that
those who claimed to be 'in

authority pursued, and then

to explain that this is an
example of

authority and not power, total
domination, or coercion, would be
unintelligible.

For the question that would emerge
would be why those

who objected to the policies did
not replace those in authority.

To

say that those in authority retained
the instruments of violence, or

brainwashed the entire population, and to
insist that what existed is
still a case of authority, is to eliminate
the difference between

authority, manipulation

and coercion.

Yet for accounts of authority

that insist that obedience to authority is totally
disengaged fJom the

merits of particular decisions, none of these examples
would appear
unintelligible or anomolous.

The last example is as consistent with

their account of authority as the first.
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in son,e respects
the characterization
of the authority

relationship as involving
the suspension of
Judgment on the part of
those over who. it is
exercise, is the result
of focusing on onl,
one
type of activity that
those who occupy
positions of authority
engage
in. I.e. the giving
of commands.
But in adcition to
the giving of
co..ands. those in political
authority also decide on
i.ple.ent and
follow public policies,
^ese activities cannot be
reduced to the
giving of co^ands without
doing violence to the.,
.any instances
the carrying out of policy
does not involve

m

the giving of co»ands.

even though those policies do
have effects on others.
When the Federal Reserve

For example,

decides to follow a policy of
high interest

rates, that decision is not
strictly a command for me
to obey.
Rather, it partly establishes
the conditions or context
for my

economic activity.

In effect, the implementation
of policies is more

question of what happens to those
affected by the decisions than a
question of obedience to a command
to do this or refrain from doing
a

that
.

In such instances those affected
by the decisions of those in

authority often make judgements about the
wisdom or correctness of the
policies implemented.

Moreover, the appeals of those in authority
for

support of those policies is often baded on
the correctness of those

policies.

One recent example of this latter point
is the appeal on

the part of the Reagan administration to the
business sector to

increase investment in light of the Reagan administration's
pursuit of

policies that were ostensibly designed to encourage investment.
In sum,

the claim that the authority relationship involves a

surrender of judgement on the part of those over whom authority is

exercised misrepresents the
relationship of Judgement
to authority and
specifically fails to ta.e
account of the role of
Judgement in the
establishment and continued
performance and acceptance
of authority
The decisions made by
those -in authority- do
depend on their merit
for their continued
obedience; the decisions
must be consistent with
the common way of life that
is the basis for that
authority. Those
over whom authority is
exercised obey that authority
because they
assume that the decisions could
be legitimized if pressed
for

justification,

m

political life this common way
of life includes a

notion of the common good.

Hence, the position of being
-in

authority is circumscribed by the
idea of being
What

I

-an authority.'

would now like to demonstrate is
that this concept of

authority is consistent with a notion
of freedom that relies on a

strong theory of human agency,

it is not to say that there is
an

identity between freedom and authority,
but that the common way of
life that is the foundation of authority
is also the foundation of

strong theory of human agency.

I

a

shall proceed by first summarizing

that notion of human agency and then the general
features of the

common good.

The Strong Theory of Human Agency

The theory of human agency that
Charles Taylor.

I

will rely on is one developed by

Taylor connects a theory of human agency to the

possibilities of evaluation that are available to human beings.
Whereas both human beings and animals have desires, it is

a

distinctively human trait to
be able to evaluate
those desires
"capacity to evaluate desires
is bound

The

up with our power of

self-evaluation, which in turn
is an essential feature
of the mode of
agency we recognize as human. "-^^
Taylor goes on to distinguish
two types of evaluation.
The first
Taylor describes as weak
evaluation, and is typified
by mere
preferences for things, such as
certain flavors of ice cream,
the

Choice between two types of
pastry, or where
summer.

I

will vacation for the

Two things characterize
evaluation in tar~s

preferences.

-f

-ere

First, in weak evaluation the
fact that something is

desired is sufficient for calling
it good.

For example if asked why

prefer to vacation on Cape Cod
rather than in the Berkshires, the

simple answer that

I

prefer the ocean is sufficient
explanation and

justification for my preference.

The second characteristic of weak

evaluation is that the incompatibility
between alternatives is
contingent.

require that

My preference for vacationing on Cape
Cod does not
I

dislike vacationing in the Berkshires.

I

may in fact,

pretending to be a Californian, spend time in both
areas during my
vacation.
The second type of evaluation Taylor calls strong
evaluation.
This type of evaluation does not remain at the level of mere

preferences; it describes alternative in

a

much stronger, richer

language, referring to the qualitative worth of the alternatives, e.g.

the nobility or ignobility, courage or cowardice, justice or

injustice, admirability or inadmirability of the desires entertained
or alternative offered.

In

contrast to weak evaluation, the mere

i

preferences or desires for
something are not sufficient
warrant for
doing or fulfilling it.
-.m weak evaluation,
or something to he
Judged good it is sufficient
that it be desired,
whereas in strong
evaluation there is also
a use of -good, or
some other evaluative
term
for which being desired
is not sufficient,
indeed some desires or
desired consummation can
be judged
bad, base,

ignoble, trivial,

superficial, unworthy, and
so on."^^

connected with this first
distinction between weak and
strong
evaluation is a second distinction,
^ereas with weak evaluation the
incompatibility between alternatives
is contingent, in the
case of

strong evaluation the
incompatibility between alternatives
is of a
contrastive nature. The fulfilling
of one desire precludes the

fulfilling of the contrasting
alternatives.

"That there should be

incompatibility of non-contingent kind
is not adventitous.

For strong

evaluation displays a language of
evaluative distinction, in which
different desires are described as noble
or base, integrating or
fragmentary, courageous or cowardly,
clairvoyant or blind, and so
on."

14

Although it is possible to re-describe weak
evaluation in

ways that make it contrastive and strong
evaluation in ways that make
it non-contrastive, Taylor insists that in
the end with weak

evaluation the preferences and dislikes are independent
of each other

and hence conflicts are contingent, accidental and
circumstantial,
whereas with the contrastive language we employ in strong
evaluation

our decision in favor of some alternatives over others is not

circumstantial or contingent.
This contrast between different types of evaluation has
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implications for the notion
of the
cne seir
self .

implies

a

different type
ype of supject.
subiert

(r.nh
Each

f

type of evaluation

n no.
A
person whose

evaluation of his
desires .ere only evaluation
in the weak sense
would be unable to
articulate his preferences
beyond saying that he
merely preferred A to
B.
Without recourse to the
contrastive language of strong
evaluation,
the weak evaluator can
say no more than that
he prefers one desire
(say a nuclear arms freeze)
to another (chocolate
ice cream).
His
ability to articulate preferences
stops at the point of this
assertion
of the preference of one
alternative over the other.
With. strong evaluation, on
the other hand, there is
a vocabulary

available to the subject that
allows him or her to describe,
explain,
justify and criticize the choice
of alternatives,
in contrast to the
simple weigher of alternatives
the strong evaluator "is not
similarly

inarticulate,

"mere is the beginning of a language
in which to

express the superiority of one alternative,
the language of higher and
lower, noble and base, courageous
and cowardly, integrated and

fragmented, and so on.

The strong evaluator can articulate

superiority just because he has

characterization."^^

a

language of contrastive

The simple evaluator lacks the depth and

richness that is available to the strong evaluator.

Along with the articulacy that is available to the strong

evaluator comes a deeper form of reflection.

The strong evaluator,

because he is not limited just to evaluation in terms of preferences,
is able to describe his desires, motivations and intentions in

qualitative terms that also describe the possibilities of his being in
the world.

"A strong evaluator by which we mean a subject who
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rrt

'^""^^

-t.vat.n

at

^eate. .ept..

.

c.a.cte..

--—3

one .es..e or

-cHnat..on as .on.,e.
o. no... o. .0.
.nte,.ate.. eto. t.an

—

which

-

0^

-tains.

I

eschew the oowor.l,
act,... .eca.se

^

want to .e a courageous
and honorable hu.an
.elng. whereas for
the
Simple weigher what
is at stake IS
i.. the
fho ^
u
desirability of different
consummation, those defined
by nis
his de fnrtn
facto h
desires,
•

y

•

for the strong

evaluator also examines
the different
possible .odes of helng
of the
agent. Motivations or
desires don't only
count in virtue of the
attraction of the consu™ation
but also in virtue of
the .ind of life
and kind of subject
that these desires
properly belong to,-'S ^^.^
type Of reflection goes
to
the heart of the type
of life or agent «e

wish to be. it "brings
us to the center of
our existence as
agents.
The most basic questions
of our existence are
raised,
examined, answered and
criticized, questions that are
beyond the'
vocabulary of the simple
weigher.
It is in this sense that
the strong
evaluator is more deeply
reflective, has more depth,
and is a stronger
subject, than the weak evaluator.

This connection between strong
evaluation and human agency has
implications for the question of
personal identity as well,
our

identity is determined in laige
part by the evaluations that we
make
in this strong sense of the
term.

The strong evaluator, because
he

sometimes is concerned with those
questions that go to the heart of
what type of human agent he is
to be, is addressing questions of

personal identity.

"Our identity is therefore defined by
certain

evaluations which are inspnarahio
inseparable f^^,.
from ourselves as
agents,
these we would oease to be
ourselves, by whioh we
do

shorn of

not mean
trivially that we would be
different in the sense of
having some
properties other than those
we now have - this would
indeed be the
case after any change however
minor - but that shorn of
these we would
lose the very possibility of
being an agent who evaluates,

that our

existence as persons, and hence
our ability to adhere as
persons to
certain evaluations, would be
impossible outside the horizon
of these
essential evaluations, that we
would break down as persons,
be
incapable of being persons in the
full sense.

The elimination of

these evaluations without their
being replaced with others would
not
simply mean that I would have a
different personal identity, it would

mean that

I

would have none at all.

For

I

would have lost precisely

those characteristics of a human
agent that enable me to determine the

meaning of things for me as a human agent,
my relationship to them,
the role they play in the type of life

I

wish to pursue, etc.

Taylor's argument concerning strong
evaluation, human agency, and

identity are part of a more comprehensive view
of the nature of

language per se.

Taylor's position is derivative of an expressivist

view of language, a view that contrasts with the
designative theory of

language

typical of empiricism, that holds that language cannot
be

understood simply as a medium for objective description of the
world.
Rather, language is the medium in which we achieve reflective

awareness.

of language;

Reflective awareness is tied to the expressive potential

subsequently

a rich

vocabulary enables reflection with

greater depth while the simpler vocabulary of mere preference limits

t.e speaker to
shallower

To^s or reflection.

:n

contrast to

deslonatlve theories of
lan,.a,e characteristic
of Hoh.es. toc.e
an.
conte^pcrarv Ao,lo-^erlcan
phUosophv. the ..presslve
theory opens
new .tension,
xf language serves
to express-reall.e
a new .in. of
awareness, then it may
not only
"-Ly maKe
make possible
nns.ihip a. new

.

awareness of
things, an ability to
describe themtnem, out
but al.n
also n.
new ways of feeling
or
responding to things, if
expressing our thoughts
ahout things we
can co.e to have new
thoughts, then In
expressing our feelings,
we can
co.e to have transformed
feelings...^' This
Intl.ate connection
between reflection and
expression
language underscores several
of
tre points Taylor .a.es
elsewhere. In particular.
It emphasizes the
clal. that there Is a
connection between the language
available to a
speaker and the speaker's
Identity, i can Identify,
reflect and
decide on feelings, desires
and ways of being only to
the extent that
I can articulate those
feelings, etc. They can become
the object of

m

m

reflection and choice only If they
find a place In my language.

My

possibilities for reflective self-identity
are thus circumscribed by
the language available to me.
In this respect Taylor's
position
resembles that of winch and Gadamer.

Taylor would also Insist, as do Gadamer
and winch, that language
is not a private possession,

linguistic community.
others,

which

I

but exists only In and through a

Because my language grows only in dialogue
with

i.e. within a speech community,

"The language

speak,

the web

can never fully dominate and oversee, can
never be Just my

language. It is always largely our language."^"
I

I

It follows that If

can express and realize my Identity only
through language which Is

a

socia: product, i.e.
the language of a
speech co^unitv, it
further

cc^nity

I

grow up in.

relations with others

«iu ,e .eter.ine.
by that language;
language will both .ake
possible and oircu.scribe
relationships that I have
with other .embers of
.y speech
co^unity as well as those
outside .y i™ediate
speech co^unity.
raylor.s words. ..Speech
also serves to
express/constitute different
relations in which we .ay
stand to each other:
inti.ate, for.al
Official., casual, joking,
serious and so on. Pro.
this point of view
we can see that it is not
just the speech co^unity
that shapes and
creates language, but language
which constitutes and
sustains the
speech community ."^"^

m

in sum,

the strong notion of human
agnecy that Taylor ties to

strong evaluation and the
strong notion of personal
identity requires
an expressivist view of
language. Moreover, due to the
social

character of language that enables
strong evaluation, the strong
notion of personal identity that
results from strong evaluation
is in
no small part a social identity,
if Taylor's argument is
correct, the
flaws in Mollis- account of autonomous
man and his notion of personal

identity and rationality become somewhat
clearer.

The strong

evaluator that Taylor argues is dependent
on the expressivist view of
language is precisely the strong personal
identity that Mollis is
seeking.

But it is also a type of social identity
that Mollis

believes compromises the independence of autonomous
man.

in

refusing

to acknowledge the connection between the
expressivist view of

language and strong evaluation, Mollis fails to
provide this

autonomous .an with the depth
ha requires for

a

strong personal

identity.

Against the background of Taylor's
argument that

a strong

notion
of human agency requires
strong evaluation which in
turn is provided
by the expressivist nature of
language and hence a common way
of life,
I

would like to aigue that the
notion of a common way of life
implies

a politics of the common
good that we have shown to be
the foundation

of political authority.
in politics,

no less than in other areas of
social life, language

provides us with the capacity for reflection
about our political
life.

It provides us not only with
intersubjective meanings with

which to talk about that way of life, i.e.
criteria of judgement,

identification, evaluation, praise, blame and so
on.

in

addition to

these there is a set of common meanings which
those in a community
share.

These common meanings are "notions of what is
significant

which are not just shared in the sense that everybody has
them, but
are also common in the sense of being in the common reference
world.
Thus, almost everyone in our society may share a susceptibility to
a

certain kind of feminine beauty, but this may not be
meaning.

It may be known to no one,

play on it in their advertisements.

a

common

except to market researchers, who
But the survival of a national

identity as francophones is a common meaning of Quebecois; for it is
not just shared, and not just known to be shared, but its being

a

"
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co™on aspiration

is cne of the

co™on refaranoe points of

ail debate,

communication, and all public
life in a society. "22

Taylor goes on to say that
"Common meanings are the
basis of
community. Intersubjective
meaning gives a people a
co^on language

to talk about social reality
and

a

co^on uhderstandlng of certain

norms, but only «ith common
meanings does this common
rafaranca world

contain significant common actions,
celebrations, and feelings.
are objects in the world that
everybody
shares.

community

91

These

This is what makes a

.

The common meanings that enter
into political life, that form
the
basis of shared aspirations, values,
beliefs and actions, constitute
the common good.

The common good is the "set of
shared purposes and

standards which are fundamental to the
way of life prized together by

the participants.

It consists of the common reference
points

that provide the criteria for determining
the collective political

goals of the community and the legitimate
pursuit of those goals.
The notion of the common good in modern
society could not include
a notion of specific, unchanging political
good, such as Plato's

forms, which once arrived at could be used for all
time to evaluate

the policies of those in authority.

The connection between language

and the capacity of actors to reappraise and re-evaluate even
the
c entral features of their society means that the common
good will be

in large part conventional, i.e. that it is the result of human social
a ction and language and the possibilities of social organization.

This is not to deny that there may be what some thinkers have

described as quasi-transcendental dimensions to the common good: i.e.

.

social arrangements
that we insist
.ust be present in
in any society
in
strong evaluators an.
compie. .or.s .r
..an agency are .oun..
Neither .pes this
cpnventionai .imensicn
™ean that the
cpnstituent

that the

co^on meanings around
which

-form pur institutions and
practices

we organize sociai
life

such as family

Ufe

that

.or. '

politics, and personal
relationships, could be
otherwise. For
political life this means ^h=^ i-k„
that the common meanings
that constitute the
goals and limits of
ppiitical action in pur
mpdern spciety cannot
be
completely identical with
the co^on meanings
that help constitute
the
goals and limits of other
cultures ar^ historical
peripds (e.g. feudal
Japan, the Azande, or the
Lele)

one implication of this
conventionality is that the
co..on good is
subject to change, revision
and modification.
This is not to
say it

is constantly in flux, but
only that parts of it can
come under
scrutiny in appropriate historical
circumstances.

Second, the common good is not
uni-dimensional; no single value

such as justice, equality,
liberty, is likely to totallv
make up the
common good or occupy an overriding
position,
in contemporary

American society

I

would say there are a variety of
constituent

elements to the common good, among them
are individual liberty,
equality of opportunity, due process
of law,

political equality,

a

a

certain degree of

degree of personal freedom concerning

life-style, a stable, private family life
and what William Connolly

has called the "civilization of
productivity which brings affluence,
freedom and leisure to future generations."^^

The

-Ui.i.ensionantv of

tHe

constituent elements of
others.

U

oo«n
wn:

g.o. .ces not guarantee
t.at t.e

always co.ple^ent
or reinforce the

«s interpretations
of the constituent
e:e.ents of the common
aoc. Change, or as
historical circumstances
change, it ™ig,t .a
the

case that the constituent
elements begin tc
conflict. I think
seething like this has
occurred concerning the
dispute surrounding
abortion, the plethora
of problems that
exist between work and
family
life, the conflict
between the imperatives
of the civilization
of
productivity, and the value
of a multiplicity of
life styles.
«.en
the conflicts between
the constituent elements
become so great that
every course of action
available to those in authority
underlines some
part of the common good,
those in authority run the
risk of being
accused by some constituencies
of undermining that common
good.
Hence, Judge Arthur Garrity's
insistence that the Boston city
School
committee employ busing as a
means to desegregate the Boston
School
System can be interpreted as a
conflict between equality of

opportunity and the local sense of
community that some citizens of
Boston claimed was being undermined.
When the conflict between

important elements of the common
good becomes so fierce and constant
that those in authority are unable
to act without alienating

substantially large constituencies within
the polity, a crisis of

authority may result.
fl

third characteristic of the common good flows
from the two

preceding characteristics.

Due in part to its conventionality and
its

multidimensionality, the conrnon good can never be
perfectly
articulatable or made completely transparent.

Conventionality

guarantees that it is
subject to ™o.iricaticn
an. cHanoe. an. the
process ,y «hich these
changes cce about.
incZu.ing the
the,

nn.

particular account of the
co..on good is uniikely
to capture it
antireiy. Si.iiariy,
the ™ulti.i.ehsionality
of the

-an

co^on good wili

that in so^e instances
we will emphasize

s»e of the elements in
one Situation and other
elements of it in other
situations.
An example .ight be
useful here. Equality of
opportunity has been
one of the. longstandiing
constituents of the co^on
good in ^erican
political life. With the
Supreme Court's decision in
Brown vs. Board
of Education interpretations
of what constituted
equality of
opportunity began to change.
fire from two directions,

By the late 1960's it had
co.e under

a. the one side were those
members of the

black community who saw equality
of opportunity as

a

facade, the

primary purpose of which was to
justify systematically imposed

inequality between whites and blacks.

At the same time some court

decisions insisting rules concerning
seniority in the hiring and
firing of personnel be qualified
because such rules systematically

excluded blacks from obtaining the type
of seniority that would give
them the same Job protection as whites
were attacked by some unions
and many white workers as a violation
not only of the golden calf of

seniority but actually an attack on equality of
opportunity itself.
Equality of opportunity is still one of the constituent
elements of
the common good in the united States.

But it is not the same equality

of opportunity that existed in 1953, and the changes
that have taken

place have had implications for other dimensions of American life
and

other e:e.ents of the
co^cn good that underlies
^.erican poUtical
life.
Fourth, the very nature
of language contribute,
to the laok of

rules governing a «ay
of life oan never be
completely speoifle., or
as

prejudices and .ovlng between
horizons, language Itself
is never
completely transparent to
us.
This
i« nn i=„ *
mis is

no less true of the
language of

politics and the co^on good.

Though we may be able
to specify the

.ore important features of
the common good, we could
never completely
set down its details and
interpretations once and for all.
Before the
notion of the common good
could be made transparent,
we would need to
secure the external boundaries
of the language of politics
and congeal
the internal rules of
political language and political
life. But as

Habermas has pointed out, such
a situation would eliminate
the
possibilities for freedom.

A policy in which the common
good becomes

completely transparent would be a
society without politics; the only
problems that would remain would be
technical questions of

administration and dissenters from the
common good would be the object
cf political repression and terror.
Finally, the common good, because it
prescribes the right and
wrong, better and worse, good and bad
ways of organizing political

life, is the likely object of political
re-inteipretation and intense

disagreement.

Constituencies often organize for the very purpose of

influencing and changing what a political community
considers to be in
the common good.

This does not necessarily mean that authority

beco.es un.er.ined in
such circumstances,

m.eed, it is precisely
in
such instances that
political authority is
called upon to adjudicate
between competing notions
of the common good.
But the sometimes
tacit, Often explicit
arguments of political
authority are based upon
the Claim that in
resolving such disputes
ics decisions and
policies
are those that reflect
the common good,
i thin.,
for example, that
the debate about supply-side
economics versus Keynesian
fiscal policy
is at heart a debate about
the common good,
it is a debate that
is in
many respects fundamental
to American political life
and the future of
the American political economy.
And the political arguments
offered
on both sides have been in
terms of the long range benefits
that the
respective policies provide for the
American polity }^
Even when there is agreement
concerning the general notion of
the
common good or where there is
agreement that some collective action
falls within the loose notion of
the common good, it still remains
that there are instances in which
the common good conflicts with the

particular interests of individuals or
groups.

Whenever members of a

political community contest what constitutes
the common good, or when
the interests of private groups or
individuals conflict with what is

claimed to be the common good, the state has
three sources of

compliance at its disposal.

First, it can construct market-incentive

systems that channel behavior in ways consistent with
the policies

designed to achieve or realize the public good.
public authority can rely on force.

In

Second, those in

extreme cases, when groups or

individuals contest the legitimacy of the actions of those in
authority (or the state), public authorities can employ some type of

force or coercion to
obtain ^umpiiance.
compliance

RmIBut

fo
few or no states
have

relied totaU, on force;
to clai™ that force
is the only resource
for
gaining compliance «th
policies is to clai. that
those in authority
ultimately rely on te
In fact the

ccmplete reliance on force
would be indicative of
the loss of
authority.

wculd argue that any
political co^unity if it is
to avoid the
manipulation of its citizens
through market incentives
or the
I

intimidation of its citizens
through political terror,
must rely on a
third source of compliance
with its policies, laws and
pronouncements
and that is civic virtue.
Civic virtue is the tacit belief
that at
times individuals or particular
groups must forego the fulfillment
of
particular interest in favor of some
broader notion of the common good
when the two are in conflict.
It is civic virtue that explains
why

citizens obey or comply with the
dictates of authority when the
policies followed conflict with citizens'
private interests.

Obedience and compliance resulting from
the exercise of civic virtue
rests on the assumption that the policies
in question somehow advance

the common good.
The military draft in the post World War
II period can serve as an

example.

It was expected that some young men were
obligated to

military service (and in the sixties to thereby
risking their lives in
Viet Nam) while other members of the same group
avoided military

service either by college deferment or by medical
disqualification.
It was assumed and recognized that even though some
individuals were

able to avoid any military obligation, that

a

majority of others would

233

fulfill that statuatory
obligation without being
compelled to do so by
force.
Though not explicitly formulated,
the policy of partial
selective service relied on a
tacit notion of civic virtue.
This is
not to say that the background
possibility of force was not also
compelling. But the availability
of force was insufficient to

guarantee the scope of the compliance
with the selective service
system that was required during the
I960's.

Moreover, those from

working class families often never
even considered refusing to fulfill
what they considered their military
obligation even when aware that

those from more privileged families
would escape the disruption of
their lives that military service
presented.

The widescale compliance

among those from the lower strata cannot
be explained simply in terms
of the threat of force or the failure to
understand the options that

provided escape; it was the result of the exercise
of civic virtue
based on the presumption that those in authority
were following a

policy that was somehow in the public good.^'^

Political Authority and the Celebration of Politics

The view that the exercise of democratic political authority is
tied to a notion of the common good has one other implication that

distinguishes it from the positions of Winch, Gadamer, Mollis and
Habermas.

The critical basis that the common good makes available,

coupled with (a) the recognition that authority is unlikely to achieve
a purely epistemic basis in political life and (b) the recognition of

the connection between the theory of the common good and the theory of

strong evaluation .ade
possible

the expresslvlst
view of language

-Plies the pe^anenoe of
politics

In social life.

unll.e Wlncn an^
cadaver, whose accounts
of understanding focus
away fro™ political
life, or Hollls and
Haber.as whose views of
rationality and respective
views Of real Interests
and consensus leave
little roo. for either
politics or authority, the
view of the connection
a.ongst the
expressivist view of language,
strong evaluation, the
co»on good, and
authority advanced In this
chapter implies the permanence
of political
dialogue concerning authority
and lays the foundation
for it in a

democratic society.
y.

Moreover
ivioreover,

t
I

fhinu
think fK«
the stronger claim can
also be
4.

sustained that this view of
political authority results in

celebration of politics.

a

The connection between the
theory of strong

evaluation and the common language
and way of life that give rise
to
the common good and authority
implies that one is most perfectly
a
human agent when one is engaged
in the fundamental questions
of what
type of life is most desirable to
lead.
The expressivist character of
language that makes strong evaluation
possible is that which provides
the possibilities for argument and
discourse over the common good and
the Justification of the policies
followed by those in political

authority.

The justification of political authority
is tied to the

possibility of political dialogue and critical scrutiny
of authority.
To foreclose the possibility of political
dialogue concerning the

common good would be, on this reading, to pre-empt the
possibility of

evaluating those in authority or the legitimacy of their
policies.
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Wa Shall no« consider
two objections to our
account of political

authority, language, human
agency and the common
good. The first
could be Characterized as
the individualist response
and is best
Characterized by Richard Friedman:
"But someone who is 'in
authority
is not necessarily an
authority on anything: his
decisions do not have
to be presented as authoritative
expressions, deliverances, or

interpretations of logically prior
beliefs or principles,

the
contrary, it is precisely the key
point about the concept of 'in

authority to be disassociated from
any background of shared
beliefs.
It is,

then, in those circumstances
in which a society has lost
the

sense of a common framework of
substantive moral beliefs and has grown

sceptical of the idea of a homogeneous
moral community that the notion
of being -in authority may present
Itself as the appropriate fom of

authority for defining the general rules
all men must conform
to."

28

Political life, according to Frieaman, is the
area of social

life where commonalities or common shared
meanings and beliefs are

absent, where irreconcilable interests dominate,
and authority is

required to reinforce decisions that are inimical to the
interests of
one or more parties.
It is precisely this view of political life and its
relation to

authority that

I

want to take issue with,

i

shall argue that in order

to retain this view of political life as being without common

meanings, beliefs, and ideals, one would have to explain obedience to

authority in terms that either transform authority into some form of

.
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coercion or manipulation,
or in .ays t.at
cannot .e reocnciie.
„it.
developments in contemporary
society
Thinners «.o interpret
political life as simply
the aggregate of
individuals With
incommens.rahle interests,
i.e. no shared set
of
values, meanings and
ideals that each citizen
entertains simply py the
fact of his or her
membership in polity,
must interpret the
actions of
the state as either
arbitrary or. because of
its role is to adjudicate
between the conflicting
interests of its citizens,
as satisfying the
interests that one of the
contestants in a conflict
advances as a
private interest. Hfence. the
best that can be hoped for
according to
this view is that the
policies, laws. etc. of those
in authority will
be in the net interest of
most citizens resulting
in the achievement
of What has been called
the public interest.
There is, of course, on
this reading no guarantee
that the policies pursued will
be in the net
interest of the majority of
citizens. It may very well happen
that
those in political authority
succomb to the pressure to adopt
policies
that are in the interests of only
a small minority.
In practice this means there
are three possible motivations for

acting in accordance with the dictates
and policies of authority:

they are consistent with my private
interests (which

I

(1)

may have

pressed political authorities to pursue,
subsidize or support); (2)
the dictates of authority are against my
interests but the sanctions
and penalties for refusing to obey outweigh
benefits

ignoring them; or (c)

I

I

would gain by

obey because those in authority are able to

construct a system of market incentives that 'encourage'
me to behave
in ways that are consistent with the policies
pursued.

Willia. Connolly has shown
that
(3)

a

society that relies on
(1) and

to obtain obedience for
its policies could not
long endure.

The

problem of the free rider would
mean that those whose private
interests were at odds with the
policies that those in political
authority attempted to enforce
through market incentives and

bureaucratic control would seek avenues
of avoidance and escape that
would only require more regulations
and market incentives resulting
in
still more avoidance. Those whose
behavior is to be regulated, by
seeking loopholes, contesting laws
and regulations in the courts,

conforming only to the letter of the law,
engaging in various
illegalities and subterranean activities,
launch

dissolution".

In short,

"Men,

a

"dialectic of

women, ethnic minorities, consumers,

workers, parents, children, and owners are
all encouraged to contest

creatively the boundaries of explicit rules regulating
their conduct
once the tendency to do so acquires initial momentum.

For to be left

out of the process is to be deprived of the benefits
of general

compliance and to face the burdens of personal compliance.

Employees

can work according to rule; owners can shift investments abroad
to
evade domestic regulation; parents locked into an internal struggle

over the sexual division of labor, can rear their children in
conformity with the law while losing touch with the psychic economy of

child development.

Controversies will proliferate over the precise

'stipulations' governing tax payments, welfare allocations, equal

opportunity, the rights of and duties of parents and children, the

discretionary use of public funds, job performance evaluation, and

conflicts of interest in public life."

29
In

short the "polity

possesses limited resources
to will policies in
the public interest
to sustain allegiance to
the letter of the law
and to interpret the'
letter of the law in
particular cases; the members
possess powerful
incentives to oppose public
interest laws to their private
advantage,
to evade compliance and
to contest the applicability
of the law to

their particular case.

Each of these sources feeds
the development of

the others, and the dialectic
which unfolds progressively
thins out
the supply of public will,
integrity and knowledge.-^^
without some

notion of civic virtue at work in
society, argues Connolly, the
order
threatens to duplicate the Hobbesian
system in which compliance is

motivated only through fear of penalty
and sanction.
There is a fall back position for
those who deny a connection

between political authority and the common
good.

Those whose

interests conflict with the policies of
those in authority obey out of
fear and terror.

The first objection to this claim is that
it

translates political authority into political
terror, hence, those who

occupy positions of authority are obeyed out of
fear of punishment.
But this fall back position thus transforms
political authority into

political coercion or power.

Indeed, it is often when those in

authority must rely on threats and the use of force that we say
that

they have lost their authority.
A second objection,

Michael Foucault.

one that cuts somewhat deeper, is posed by

Foucault argues that in any given episteme^-*- sets

of discursive practices are established with two primary results.
First, these practices establish certain positions as positions of

authority and power.

Individuals holding these positions are

empowered to .ake
pronouncements concerning a
range of topics
determined by the discursive
practice that resuit in
networks of
control over large segments
of the population,
one example is the
judge, whose pronouncements
concerning the guilt or
innocence or
length of sentence of a
defendent has quite a different
effect than
the same pronouncements
made by someone not recognized
as a judge in
the discursive practice,

m

modern medicine, psychiatry,
and

criminology, the doctor, analyst
and criminologist respectively
are
the positions from which
pronouncements concerning physical
health,

mental health and criminal
rehabilitation emanate.

Second, and as

part of the process establishing
some people as authorities to make

the types of pronouncements cited
above, the discourses that establish
these discursive practices privilege
some forms of knowledge while

hiding others.

These latter form subjugated knowledges,
"a whole set

of knowledges that have been disqualified
as inadequate to their task

or insufficiently elaborated; naive
knowledges, located low down on
the hierarchy, beneath that required level
of cognition of

scientificity."^^

The impact of these privileged forms of discourse

and knowledge is the set of discursive practices
that identify,

individualize and control populations caught in their discursive
web.
The paradigm of the individualized object of knowledge for
Foucault

would,

I

think, be the alcoholic.

Diagnosed by modern reformers as

the victim of illness, treated by welfare workers as incapable of.

self-control, and held criminally responsible by the police and courts
of his or her 'illness' or psychological

'shortcomings,' the alcoholic

or the individual identified as such, is the perfect example of an

individual on who. these
several discourses converge,
albeit somewhat
independently
to identify a class of
persons for treatment,
paternalism and punishment.
,

several characteristics of
this network of control
need
emphasizing. First, it is not
a network that is at
the command of any
single person or group; the
techniques and micro-cosms of
power and
control have a life of their
own.

Second, the problem is not
simply a

question of freedom and autonomy
on the one hand versus power
and
authority on the other. According
to Foucault those who are
the

advocates of freedom and autonomy,
with their notions of the self,

self-conscious reflection, and responsibility,
are as implicated in
the extension of techniques of control
as those who explicitly
advocate the extension of and tighter forms
of authority.

Foucault

's

response to any project that would attempt
to make

authority consistent with strong human agency,
and

I

think the project

presented here in particular, would be that the
limits it sets on
authority and the case it makes for strong human agency
are

a trap.

What we have done, Foucault might argue, is enable the
further

extension of the discourse of control and power.

Indeed, he might go

so far as to say that the connection we have drawn amongst
the common
good, political authority, and strong evaluation indicates the extent

to which the extension of authority is dependent upon notions of the
self and theories of strong human agency.
As an alternative to the privileged forms of knowledge with their

modem notions

of the self which are part of the establishment of

techniques of power, Foucault offers what he calls, following
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Nietzsche, genealcgy.

Genealogy is Poucaulfs
attempt to provide

a

link between those
erudite forms of knowledge
that were disgualified
by more systematic
and specialized forms
of knowledge with
those
subjugated knowledges that
he calls popular knowledge,
i.e. the
knowledge of the patient,
the delinguent,

t^

mad, and the criminal.
"Let us give the term
genealogy to the union of
erudite knowledge and

local memories which allows
us to establish a historical
knowledge of
struggles and to make use of
this knowledge tactically
today. This
then will be a provisional
definition of the genealogies
which I have
attempted to compile with you
over the last few years.

Central to this project is the
demonstration of the

conventionality of our notions of
self-identity and the language along
with which we construct our notions
of self-identity.
Foucaulfs
works on reason and madness,
criminality, health and sexuality are

aimed at showing how the self-identity
that these discourses provide
us with are themselves the foundation
of techniques of control,

htence

he seeks to dismantle those notions
of self-identity, to demonstrate

their conventional nature.

In one of his more radical formulations
of

his project he characterizes his project
this way:

'"Effective

•

history differs from traditional history in being
without constants.

Nothing in man - not even his body

- is

sufficiently stable to serve

as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding
other men.

traditional devices for constructing

a

The

comprehensive view of history

and for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development

must be systematically dismantled.

Necessarily, we must dismiss those

tendencies that encourage the consoling play of recognitions.

Knowledge, even under the
banner of history, does
not depend on
•redisoovery,. and it
emphatically excludes the
-rediscovery of
ourselves..
History becomes -effective,
to the degree that it
introduces discontinuity into
our very being - as it
divides our
emotions, dramatizes our
instincts, multiplies our
body and sets it
against itself. Effective
history deprives the self of
the reassuring
stability of life and nature,
and it will not permit
itself to be

transported by

a

voiceless obstinacy toward a
millenial ending."^^

Neither our physical bodies nor

a

teleological view of history or

society can serve as the basis
for identity according to
Foucault.
must come to see ourselves, and
even this is perhaps incorrectly

We

phrased from Foucault. perspective,
s
as a group of emotions, feelings,

thoughts and ideas that are disconnected;
inte
continuity, is the goal of genealogy
(effective history)

attempts to dismantle the self.

..The

purpose of history, guided by

genealogy, is not to discover the roots of
our identity but to commit

itself to its dissipation,

it does not seek to define our unique

threshhold of emergence, the homeland to which
metaphysicians promise
a return;

it seeks to make visible all of those discontinuities
that

cross us...^^

Foucault uses the imagery of the carnival and

masquerade to convey the type of effect genealogy.

No single

identity, either for social actors or for the subject of knowledge,

should be the goal of genealogy.

alternate identities,

a

Rather, the genealogist offers

multiplicity of choice of identity.

".The

new

historian, the genealogist, will know what to make of this

masquerade.

He will not be too serious to enjoy it; on the contrary

he will push the
.aspuerade to its li.it and
prepare the great
carnival of ti.e where
.as.s are constantly
reappearing. .0 longer
the identification
of our faint individuality
with the solid

identities of the past,
hut our -unrealization.
through the excessive
Choice of identities
- rrederick of Hohenstaufen.
Caesar, Oesus,
Dionysus, and possibly
Zarathustra.

Taking up these .asks,

revitalizing the buffoonexy
of history, we adopt an
identity whose
unreality surpasses that of
God who started the charade....
Genealogy
is history, in the form
of concerted carnival. "^^

This dissipation of modern
forms of identity is to be
achieved
through the examination of the
growth of modern forms of
knowledge,

the growth of the will to
knowledge that takes the form of
criminology, psychoanalysis,
medicine and psychology:

Of the injustices of the past by

a

"the critique

truth held by men in the present

becomes the destruction of the man
who maintains knowledge by the

injustice proper to the will to knowledge. "^"^

Foucaulfs work presents the most serious
challenge
directed at showing that authority is
consistent with

human agency.

a

to any project

strong form of

The latter project itself inherently
involves the

extension of modern notions of identity, forms of
authority,

discourses of control, in short, an extension of the
will to know that
underlies modern techniques of power, argues Foucault.

Response and Conclusion: Jn Defense of Political Authority

Foucaulfs works present

a

compeling case; the boldness of the
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theses,

the imaginative deployment
of language; the
relentless pursuit

Of his the.es; and
which to survey

a

a style that draws the
reader to new locations

fr»

range of phenomena in new
ways, complement each

other to produce new perspectives
and ways of thinking,

it is

impossible to return exactly
to old ways of thinking
having taken
Foucault's work seriously.

Nonetheless there is
to Foucault's work.

a

certain amount of resistance
that emerges

Those who seek a critical
perspective from which

to evaluate authority and protect
autonomy find Foucault's account
a
compelling description of those
phenomena they are critical of and
those who would defend patterns of
authority in contemporary society.
At the same time the critics of
established authority patterns are

repulsed by the claim that they are as
complicitous in modern forms of
control as the defenders of the system
of discipline.

This resistance

makes it easy to forget that the pictures
of modern forms of

discipline that Foucault uncovers are not simply
pictures, they are

mirrors as well.

Having recognized this tendency toward resistance

there are nonetheless several counter arguments to
Foucault's works

and specifically to his critique of those who attempt
to rehabilitate
or strengthen strong notions of human agency.

Foucault's criticism of contemporary techniques of control and
discipline, coupled with his rejection of liberal and radical reforms

and alternatives, leaves open the question of what would be an
acceptable alternative for Foucault.

He explicitly refuses to engage

in normative discourse, arguing that it results in complicity in

extending extablished forms of control: "I think to imagine another

syste. is to extend our
participation in the present
syste.
Reject theory and all for.s
of general discourse.
The need for theory
IS still part Of the
syste. we reject.-^B
^^^.^ ^^^^^^
wish to replace an offioial
institution by another
institution that
fulfills the sa.e function
- better and differently then you are
already being reabsorbed
by the dominant structure. "^^
And finally,

-The whole

of society- is precisely
that which should not be

considered except as something
to be destroyed.
hope that it will never
exist again."^0

And then we can only

^.^^^^ ^^^^

hope of the future in the type
of order that inspired
nineteenth
century anarchism,
indeed, his harshest contempt,
when not directed
at Marxists, is reserved for
anarchists .^"^

Foucaulfs faith seems to be lodged in
the emergence of

a new

episteme, the emergence of which will
be facilitated by the

proliferation of resistances through the
rehabilitation of subjugated
forms of knowledge.

Given Foucaulfs rejection of what he
would

consider naive anarchism and his account of
the way that epistemes
include limits to the way that language and
knowledge develop, several

objections can be raised against Foucaulfs rejection
of the strong
notion of human agency defended here.
First, Foucault seems to recognize that in the new
episteme some
forms of order will exist.

This flows from his rejection of naive

anarchism and his account of the way epistemes circumscribe the
use of
language, the development of knowledge and ways of viewing the world.

This seems to be

a

recognition that, as Hampshire, Gadamer, Taylor and

Connolly have emphasized, any order implies a set of limits.

By

-Plication we must be willing

to believe that
the li.its of the new

Older will be more
desirable than the li.its
imposed in the
contemporazv episteme.
without specifying how
those li.its could b e
Changed and in what ways
they will be an improvement,
I think
Foucaulfs faith in the future
episteme may be unjustified.
consider the following.
Bruno Bettleheim has
chronicled how in
German concentration camps
those most susceptible to
breakdown in the
face of attempts at total
forms of control were those
with the weakest
forms of personal identity.
Members of the middle class,
whose
identity was tied to their status
and personal possessions,
succumbed
most quickly and completely
under the weight of total
control. The

question that emerges is what if
Foucault is successful in weakening
or even shattering some forms
of identity and yet some forms
of social

control remain in place.

Foucault assumes that the fracturing
of

those modern fonns of identity will
itself not lead to strengthening

of social control.

This follows from his claim that
that control

itself is dependent upon the notions of
self, identity and

self-consiousness that pervade our discourse and
discursive
practices.

But if existing forms of discipline and control
are only

partially tied to modern forms of identity for their
efficacy, it
might be possible to destroy the foundations of personal
identity and

leave (at least some) networks of control intact or in

a

somewhat

revised form.
A second point can be made regarding the possibilities of

criticism and the notion of human agency.
the proliferation of criticism.

Foucault clearly supports

At times he has,

for example, called

for the politicization
of the self.

Moreover the languaae he
deploys

or that deploys hi., clearly
reflects the belief that
there are better
and worse for.s of social
life and of co.ing to
know that social
life.
Even though his vocabulary
is not exactly the
vocabulary of
Taylor's strong evaluator,
it is the language of
criticise. But it is
precisely criticism (beyond the
mere preferences of the
utilitarian
individual) that is consistent
with human agency, that
partly

constitutes human agency, Taylor
argues.

As the possibilities for

criticism and evaluation proliferate,
so do our possibilities for
choice and action,
it is precisely to that
possibility of criticism
that Foucault has contributed; hence
it is not clear that he has

escaped the problems that revolve around
the notion of human agency
and the subject .^^
A third point can be made regarding
the project of genealogy

itself.

Foucault describes it as the rehabilitation
and fusion of two

forms of subjugated knowledges, local knowledges
and erudite

knowledges that are generally available only to the
intellectual.

Foucault
system,
off.

's

own work, particularly on the development of the penal
is a glowing example of how this project is to be carried

However, the relationship between the two types of knowledge

seems to establish a privileged space for the intellectual; it is the

intellectual who because of his erudition, is in the position to forge
the links between the various subjugated local knowledges.

Yet this

privileged position of the intellectual would seem to place him in

a

position of potential authority; it establishes the space from which
to speak,

even if one rejects permanent occupancy of it.

In light of

2A8
this,

one is tempted to turn
his own

fo™

of interrogation on
roucauit: who is ailcwed
to speak as the
genealogist, what positions
does genealogy privilege;
what for.s of knowledge
does it subjugatewhy do the local,
subjugated knowledges need
the erudite knowledge
of
the genealogists?

Finally, for those who seek
a sustained political
life, who would
celebrate politics, Foucaulfs
work plays and ambivalent
role,
in

^any respects it represents
the type of political
criticism that cuts
deepest and extends political
discourse in imaginative ways.
Yet it
seems to preclude

a

sustained political action;
politics is eposidic

(at least until the new
episteme is ushered in);

sustained political

action threatens to enable techniques
of discipline to locate,
identify and individualize the
opponents of contemporary forms of
control.

But those who are not as confident
as Foucault about the

possibilities of social life in the new
episteme; those who believe
that crisis in the contemporary political
economy may precede the

emergence of the new episteme that Foucault
anticipates, and that

resulting changes may be for the worse, cannot
afford the luxury of
episodic politics.

They must feel compelled to engage in political

discourse in attempts to ward off new extensions of
already existing
forms of control.
In light of these reservations,

those who seek to strengthen human

agency, to lay the foundation of criticism of authority, and
insure

the integrity of democratic authority, are unlikely to adopt

Foucault

's

rejection of their project.

continuing the project.

Indeed, they are justified in

In spite of the fascination with and
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temptation to surrender to the
Fcucauitlan challenge, Fouoault
can at
best play the role of the lens
through which those wishing
to defend
human agency critically examine
their own work.*^
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themselves.... Intellectuals are themselves agents of
this system of
power - the idea of their responsibility for 'consciousness'
and
discourse forms part of the system. Vr\e intellectual's
role is no
longer to place himself 'somewhat ahead and to the side' in
order to
express the stifled truth of the collectivity; rather it is
to
struggle against forms of power that transform him into its object
and
instrument in the sphere of 'knowledge', 'truth', and 'discourse'."
(Language, Counter-Memory and Practice pp. 207-208.)
In spite of
this denial, works such as Discipline and Rjnish are not only very
systmatic, claiming to detect similar patterns of discipline in the
prison, school, workplace, etc., but also make available an
understanding that many who are the object of that control do not have
and would not have otherwise.
,

In order to maintain a political dialogue it must be assumed
44.
that some questions are settled; there must be some shared meanings
and understandings. This is precisely what Foucault wants to contest
with his notion of effective history, i.e. genealogy.
It is not clear
to me what type of political life would exist in this state of flux
that Foucault is pursuing, but one possibility does present itself.
In times of disorder, those who are the first to attempt to impose
order on others are often the most successful, examples being the
Bolshevik and Nazi successes.

This is the position taken by William Connolly, "The Politics of
45.
Disciplinary Control," forthcoming.
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